Search results

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

Based on the theory of “optimal contracting approach” and “the managerial power approach”, this paper aims to investigate whether senior executives of listed companies in China make use of their power to gain their own private benefits. The paper also compares compensation contracts between state- and private-owned enterprises to test whether there is a significant difference between senior executives from different ownership types of enterprises in terms of compensation contracts.

The paper raises four hypotheses based on the theories of “company agency”, “optimal contracting approach” and “managerial power approach”. After that, 5,680 A-share-listed companies of stock market in Shanghai and in Shenzhen Stock Market from 2008 to 2012 were taken as research samples to conduct a series of research analysis, including t-test, reliability analysis and regression analysis, with the help of SPSS 18.0.

The senior executives of listed companies in China could make use of their power to increase their own salary to gain power pay and, at the same time, company performance, company size and other factors that are important to influence the executive compensation. This paper further argues that senior executives of private-owned listed companies are more likely to use their power to obtain power pay and increase their own compensation. Additionally, the agency costs of Chinese listed companies are negatively related to the performance pay of senior executives, whereas there is no obvious negative correlation with the power pay of senior executives.

This paper takes multiple, in-depth approaches to study the relationship among managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation and to find out the differences in compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. It also provides necessary suggestions to ensure the interests of stockholders, such as: optimizing the management structure of listed companies; improving the transparence of information disclosure of listed companies; establishing effective mechanism of incentive and constraint; and improving and standardizing the market of professional managers.

The compensation contract of senior executives in China is critical to enhance enterprises’ performance, and it will become an important factor that will facilitate the interests of stockholders and management. However, this paper argues that some phenomena of over-payment of senior executives in listed companies cannot be explained by the theory of “optimal contracting approach”, but it is necessary and important to compare the differences of compensation contract of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. A series of findings are proposed in this paper.

This paper made use of a principal analysis to extract the main factors that could represent the managerial power from different angles. In addition, this paper also compared the differences between compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. Additionally, in this paper, the compensation of senior executives was divided into “power compensation” and “performance compensation”, which were used to test the relationship with the management cost of companies.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the problems of compensation for compulsory acquisition of oil exploration fields in Delta State with particular reference to the oil field acquired by Agip Oil Company for gas pipeline way leave in Irri and Okpai towns of Delta State.

A survey was conducted in which questionnaires were administered on some residents whose lands were acquired compulsorily on one hand and some estate surveying and valuation firms who are professionals in the fields of compensation on the other hand. The data collected were analyzed and presented using simple statistical methods.

The findings in this paper show that the compensation paid to residents whose lands were acquired is grossly inadequate, since professionals are not always involved in the process.

The paper shows that the issue of compensation for compulsory acquisition for oil exploration is very central in the oil‐rich Niger‐Delta, and if this is not handled carefully, it can lead to uncontrollable crisis.

This paper empirically examined the process involved in compulsory acquisition and compensation of land in the Niger‐Delta for oil exploration with a view to determining the adequacy or otherwise of the compensation paid.

In the last 10 years, India has amended its laws dealing with sexual offences against women with the changes ranging from increasing terms of imprisonment for the offence of rape to state-funded compensation schemes for women and child victims. In this regard, challenges persist for the agencies of the criminal justice system in India especially the courts to realise the vision of restorative justice as these forums have to navigate the relevant statutory provisions and binding precedents. This chapter seeks to analyse the challenges faced by courts in proper reintegration of victims and offenders of sexual offences, the institutional responses of the courts and suggests reforms to the criminal justice system in India in consonance with the principles of restorative justice acknowledged in the restorative justice movement in the international discourse.

The purpose of this paper is to articulate the inherent unfairness in compensation outcomes between landowners whose land is physically taken versus those whose land is regulated. Using Rawlsian theory as the normative standard of “fairness as justice”, the paper argues that both physical and regulatory takings should be compensated.

Most jurisdictions invariably provide market price compensation when land is physically acquired. When land is not physically taken but merely subject to regulation, however, there is no corresponding need to compensate, even where the economic loss suffered by the landowner is the same. Adopting Rawlsian theory, this paper explains why justice and fairness in land use planning require both physical takings and regulatory takings to be equally compensable.

Applying Rawlsian theory to compare compensable compulsory purchase with non-compensable regulatory takings of land show that the latter is not compatible with an ethical planning praxis.

While Rawlsian theory has been applied in urban planning research before, this would be its first application in highlighting the apparent justice paradox which now distinguishes a physical and regulatory taking of land.

This paper aims to establish a theoretical framework that can comprehensively explain the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the context of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The author develops a theoretical framework for executive compensation in SOEs from the perspective of Marxist economics and points out that the executives in SOEs are engaged in management labor, and their compensation should adhere to the principle of distribution according to labor contribution.

Based on this theory, the author posits that the continuous upward trend of executive compensation in SOEs, is consistent with the trend of SOEs' ongoing expansion, which reflects a continuous improvement of SOE executives' management labor in both quality and quantity.

It is necessary to start with Marxist economic theory and scientifically study the issue of SOE executive compensation, adhere to the principle of distribution according to work in the context of a socialist market economy and implement the specific guideline of the Party Central Committee; only in this way can the long-term healthy development of SOEs be promoted continuously.

This paper presents estimates of total personal income for every U.S state in 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910. The series includes new figures for 1890 and 1910, and revisions of Richard Easterlin's (1960) figures for 1880 and 1900 based on recent economic history research. The new estimates allow better examination of U.S. interregional income differences and cyclical behavior of U.S. states’ total personal income.

The purpose of this paper is to examine issues of compulsory acquisition, evaluating the quantum of compensation paid to natives of communities whose farmlands are acquired and issues that must be dealt with to provide adequate compensation to claimants.

Using an oil well acquisition base in Boboroku, Jesse in Ethiope-West local government area of Delta State as a case study, various compensation claims were examined vis-à-vis market value claims in compulsory acquisition.

It was found that many claimants received N1,000.00 (naira) or less as full compensation claims for their crops while families lucky to own lands received more reasonable payments. It was also found that 40 of the 142 claimants in Boboroku community received only N4,146,120.00 as opposed to N8,802,750.00 they should have received under market values. Similarly, 39 claimants in Okuno should have received a market value of N3,195,920.00 as against N1,370,609.00 that was actually paid by the acquiring authority confirming that the rates applied were grossly inadequate.

It was established that there was no statutory provision for disturbance losses from revocation of land interests. Also, the productivity of economic crops and trees was not considered nor was the computation of claims based on market values. The paper further established that claims should be compensated on the basis of productivity value and life span of interests being acquired and not on arbitrary rates supplied by the acquiring authorities.

The case study methodology used in this paper enabled contribution to the body of studies which hitherto highlighted the issues of compulsory acquisition and quantum of compensation. It, therefore, adds to the problem-solving framework on compulsory purchase matters in Nigeria.

This paper aims to study the impact of external fairness of executive compensation on M&A premium, and examine the moderate role of institutional investors. The high M&A premium is the main factors that induce the huge impairment of listed companies’ goodwill and the plummeting performance. Executives are the decision-makers of M&As, and their decision-making process is inevitably affected by the psychological factors. In recent years, institutional investors have become an important external force that can affect the governance of listed companies.

The authors use M&A data of listed companies from 2008 to 2018 and use OLS regression to test the relationship between executive compensation fairness and M&A premium.

The results show that the lower the external fairness of executive compensation, the greater the M&A premium. Institutional investors can effectively reduce the impact of external compensation unfairness on M&A premiums. The mechanism tests show that executives' psychological perception of fairness induced by external unfairness reduces their motivation to work and prompts them to use high premium to seek alternative compensation incentives. Further examinations of executive characteristics and corporate characteristics show that the role of external unfairness in executive compensation in driving M&A premiums is more pronounced in companies with longer executive tenure, weaker executive reputation incentives and private property.

This paper enriches the research on the pre-factors of M&A premiums from the perspective of executives’ psychological perception of fairness, provides evidence that institutional investors play a positive governance role and provides decision-making references for companies to take corresponding measures to reduce M&A premium risks.

This article focuses on a set of issues concerning unemployment insurance costs. The effect on unemployment insurance costs of variables under the control of the state legislature, such as the maximum benefit amount paid per week to unemployed workers, is analysed, as are the problems of abusing the system through “lay‐off” management and the topic of underemployment. The main policy thrust of the article is to argue that there are likely to be important trade‐offs between liberal benefit policies which typically increase business costs, and long‐term employment opportunities. Therefore, liberal policies towards the unemployed need to be offset by other business cost reductions in order to allow individual states to remain desirable locations for new business capacity. The legislature′s role in this process is argued to be of crucial importance.