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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the causes of failure of the neoliberal model of capitalism and rise of state capitalism. The arguments that efficient market economy can thrive under autocracy are refuted.

Both western neoliberal capitalism and state capitalism in China and Russia are juxtaposed and critically analyzed.

Neoliberalism is a conceptual model of enthusiastic true believers who never succeed in developing a workable economic system but rather a travesty of its own ideal. The USA instead of an efficient, competitive market economy became a playground for lobbyists and a corporate autocracy fraught with deep imbalances. Yet due to the rule of law and inherent freedoms the post‐neoliberal USA will be capable of “self repair” which is not possible in state capitalism.

The connections between politics and economics are inherently complex and difficult to be presented as predicable dependences. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary and revealing but it has obvious analytical limitations because of inadequate tools.

The proclamation of the end of the democratic capitalism is unfounded. The neoliberal ideologues are hardly to blame for the failures of the western market economy because they have merely created a pretext for corporate America to reduce the regulatory power of the government. The solution is in returning to the model of interventionist government mindful of the nation's long‐term wellbeing.

The author creates unique functional characteristics of western market capitalism and state capitalism and points out clear advantages of democratic western market capitalism often forgotten in the heat of the post‐crises debates.

The purpose of this research paper is a theoretical understanding of the most general trends of Russian economic development during the country's pre‐Soviet, Soviet and post‐Soviet time frames.

The objectives are designed in such a way as to include a historical aspect in the research. An attempt is made to grasp (rather cursorily) a logical internal progression in all stages of the Russian development for the last 150 years. In this, the paper shows no need for so‐called great historical personalities to explain the great historical events.

In the course of the work, it was found that Russia had experienced alternatively five different socioeconomic systems of: late mixed feudalism which was on its way to democratic mixed capitalism (the 1850s‐October 1917); state feudalism which was pregnant with authoritarian mixed capitalism (1918‐1921); authoritarian mixed capitalism in whose womb there was ripening totalitarian state capitalism (1921‐1928); totalitarian state capitalism which was carrying within itself the seeds of authoritarian state capitalism (1928‐1990); finally, authoritarian state capitalism which was moving toward authoritarian mixed capitalism (1991‐present).

The original value of the paper is in its fresh approach to the great events that have been taking place in Russia since the 1850s. The events have been analyzed not as they should be according or despite some theory but as they were and are. The paper, therefore, will be valuable to those who are interested in the socioeconomic development of Russia and who would like, one way or another, to attempt to predict the country's nearest future.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the direct effects of state capitalism on the internationalization behavior of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Specifically, the authors focus on four distinct aspects of internationalization behavior; namely, pace of internationalization, rhythm of internationalization, location choice (developing countries vs developed countries), and diversity of product lines.

The authors empirically test the hypotheses using data from Chinese construction companies during the period 2009-2015. The authors build a unique dataset by combining the data from ENR Top 225 International Contractors reports and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of China information. Moreover, concerning the panel data structure and the potential for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, The authors use the feasible generalized least square panel model to test the hypotheses.

The authors find that the level of state capitalism has a positive effect on SOEs’ rhythm of internationalization, while there is no significant relationship between the level of state capitalism and the pace of internationalization. Furthermore, the authors find that the SOEs affiliated with higher levels of government organizations are more likely to locate business operations in developing countries and engage in more diversity of product lines.

The findings show that the different varieties of state capitalism are the source of the different internationalization patterns of SOEs. Instead of supposing SOEs to be uniform players in emerging economies, the authors show that the nature of SOEs varies depending on the level of government with which they are affiliated, and this fact results from the divergent manifestations of state capitalism itself.

This study improves the understanding of how state capitalism affects the capabilities and motivations of SOEs in regard to overseas expansion. The authors extend institutional theory by supposing that the level of state capitalism has a positive effect on the rhythm of internationalization. Moreover, the authors find that SOEs embedded with high levels of government affiliation tend to enter into developing countries and diversify their product lines.

The purpose of this second part of this special issue is to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of Soviet society. It is not possible to analyse such a society in all its complexities within the space of one study. There are, however, some economic relations which determine society's major features. We believe that commodity‐production relations in the Soviet Union are of this type.

Despite profound differences, both the German Historical School and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School have in common a theoretical and cultural heritage in Central European traditions of social thought and philosophy. Although both schools often are perceived as quintessentially German traditions of economic and social research, their methodological presuppositions and critical intent diverge strongly. Since the objective of the Frankfurt School was to carry the theoretical critique initiated by Marx into the twentieth century, and since its members did so on a highly abstract level of theoretical criticism, the suggestion may be surprising that in terms of their respective research agendas, there was a common denominator between the German Historical School and the Frankfurt School critical theory. To be sure, as will become apparent, the common ground was rather tenuous and indirect. We must ask, then: in what respects did their theoretical and analytical foundations and orientations overlap? How did the German Historical School, as a nineteenth-century tradition of economic thinking, influence the development of the Frankfurt School?

There is little doubt that in terms of speed and scale, China's economic transformation is without parallel in the past. Never has the world seen a major economic power emerge in such a short time span and attain such a weight in the total world economy. Intriguingly, few social scientific analyses have explicitly interpreted the massive socio-economic changes taking place within China as associated with the emergence of a capitalist political economy.

This introduction to the essays that follow argues that the chief problem with the dominant understanding of world affairs in the disciplines of International Relations and International Political Economy, including their Marxist versions, is an a historical, non-contradictory and economically cosmopolitan conception of capitalism. In their place, geopolitical economy is a new approach which returns to the conception of capitalism embodied in the culmination of classical political economy, Marxism. It was historical in two senses, distinguishing capitalism as a historically specific mode of social production involving by value production and understanding that its contradictions drive forward capitalism’s own history in a central way. This approach must further develop and specify uneven and combined development as the dominant pattern in the unfolding of capitalist international relations, one that is constitutive of its component states themselves. Secondly, it must understand the logic of the actions undertaken by capitalist states as emerging from the struggles involved in the formation of capitalist states and from the contradictions that are set in train once capitalism is established. Finally, it must see in the ways that class and national struggles and resulting state actions have modified the functioning of capitalism the possibilities of replacing the disorder, contestation and war that are the spontaneous result of capitalism for international relations the basis for a cooperative order in relations between states, an order which can also be the means for realising the permanent revolution and solidifying its gains on the international or world plane.

This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.

According to the traditional Soviet view, the Soviet economic society, based essentially on governmental and collective farm property and overall national planning, is “socialist”, and has been so since Stalin's proclamation to that effect in the 1930s. Most Western observers, Marxist and non‐Marxist, recognise these two socio‐institutional features of the Soviet politico‐economic system and ascribe substantial importance to them. Beyond this point, interpretations differ considerably. Five alternative views may be distinguished. These contending perspectives argue that Soviet economic society is:

Attempts to discover an internal logic in the high‐speed events taking place in the former Soviet Union. In addressing the problems of the country′s disintegration, examines the issue in its socioeconomic, political and territorial‐administrative aspects. Analyses, for this purpose, the nature of Soviet society prior to Gorbachev′s reforms, its present transitional stage and its probable direction in the near future.