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In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

Motivated by the real-world practice that the boom of the online selling induces a higher product return as well, selecting which online channel mode indicates who takes ownership over the product and thus bears the loss of the product return. This paper aims to seek the optimal online channel modes for the two members in a platform supply chain in the presence of product returns.

This study aims to develop a platform supply chain that consists of one platform company and one supplier. Along with an offline distribution channel, the supplier can choose two alternative online selling modes (i.e. the reselling and agency modes) to sell its product through the online marketplace. This paper applies Stackelberg game to derive the equilibrium with different business scenarios and selects the optimal online channel modes for two parties, respectively. Moreover, this paper extends to a different supply chain with a reverse channel leadership and a different product return policy for testing the robustness.

Several interesting and important results are derived in this paper. Firstly, it is found that the relative pricing are largely relied on the costs of two channels. Secondly, the platform supply chain may benefit from a pure channel rather than the dual-channel when this channel enjoys a relatively low cost and/or a sufficiently high consumer preference. Then, the platform and the supplier act contradictorily when selecting their optimal online channel modes. To be specific, the platform motivates to choose the online reselling mode when both the commission rate and the slotting fee are relatively low, whereas the supplier is likely to select the online agency mode under this circumstance. Finally, a win-win situation in regards to the optimal online channel mode for two parties is achievable with numerical experiments.

Based on the analytical studies, the results derived in the authors’ work can provide managerial insights to assist the supplier and the platform company in determining the operational decision and selecting the optimal online channel mode to deal with consumer returns. In addition, appropriate commission rate along with slotting fee will make both parties achieve a win-win situation in determining their optimal online channel mode.

To the authors’ best knowledge, this paper makes the first move to determine the optimal online channel mode in the content of consumer returns and study how it is affected by different product return policies.

This paper explores how the manufacturer’s strategic choice (acquisition or investment) impacts product quality in a supply chain comprising two complementary suppliers and a common manufacturer.

The manufacturer faces six strategic choices to improve product quality: acquiring or investing in the high-capable supplier, the low-capable supplier, or both. As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer determines which strategy is adopted, while suppliers are separately responsible for components’ quality and wholesale prices. The authors use game theory and calculate the model with Mathematica.

The authors develop analytical models to analyze how acquisition costs, investment proportions, component importance and quality improvement coefficients influence decision-makers. The results show that the highest quality may not benefit the manufacturer. Investing in or acquiring a low-capable supplier is better than a high-capable supplier under certain conditions. If the gaps between two suppliers’ quality improvement coefficients and the importance of two components are dramatic, the manufacturer should choose an investment strategy.

This study contributes to the complementary supply chain management by comparing two kinds of strategies-acquisition and investment, with a high-capable supplier and a low-capable supplier.

Under the carbon tax policy, the authors examine the operational decisions of the low-carbon supply chain with the triple bottom line.

This paper uses the Stackelberg game theory to obtain the optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, sales quantities and carbon emissions in different cases, and investigates the effect of the carbon tax policy.

This study’s main results are as follows: (1) the optimal retail price of the centralized supply chain is the lowest, while that of the decentralized supply chain where the manufacturer undertakes the carbon emission reduction (CER) responsibility and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the highest under certain conditions. (2) The sales quantity when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR is the largest. (3) The supply chain obtains the highest profits when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR. (4) The environmental performance impact decreases with the carbon tax.

The results of this study can provide decision-making suggestions for low-carbon supply chains. Besides, this paper provides implications for the government to promote the low-carbon market.

Most of the existing studies only consider economic responsibility and social responsibility or only consider economic responsibility and environmental responsibility. This paper is the first study that examines the operational decisions of low-carbon supply chains with the triple bottom line under the carbon tax policy.

The aim of this study was to analyze the effects of carbon reduction efforts and preservation efforts on system benefits in the cold chain industry of fresh products.

This study develops an optimal decision game model for the fresh products in the cold chain, incorporating the retailer's preservation effort and the supplier's carbon emission reduction effort. It quantifies the relationship between carbon emission reduction effort, preservation effort and system profit. The model considers parameters like carbon trading price, consumer low-carbon preference and consumer freshness preference, reflecting real-world conditions and market trends. Numerical simulations are conducted by varying these parameters to observe their impact on system profit.

Under the carbon cap-and-trade policy, the profit of the fresh cold chain system is higher than that of the fresh cold chain system without carbon constraints, and the profit of the supplier under decentralized decision-making is increased by nine times in the simulation results. The increase in carbon trading prices can effectively improve the freshness level of fresh products cold chain, carbon emission reduction level and system profit.

This study comprehensively considers the factors of freshness and carbon emission reduction, provides the optimal low-carbon production decision-making reference for the fresh food cold chain and promotes the sustainable development of the fresh food cold chain.

This study aims to investigate the most effective approach for governments and enterprises to combat desertification by considering the governance cycle. The focus is on understanding how the government can incentivize enterprises to actively engage in desertification combat efforts.

Both the government and the enterprise are treated as rational entities, making strategic choices for joint participation in combating desertification. Recognizing the dynamic nature of the desertification combat area, differential game models are employed to identify the optimal mode for combating desertification.

The findings underscore the significant influence of the governance cycle duration on the selection of desertification combat modes for government and enterprise. A cooperative mode is best suited to a short governance cycle, while an ecological subsidy mode is optimal for a longer cycle. Enhancing governance technology and shortening the governance cycle are conducive to combating desertification. Reducing taxes alone may not be an effective control strategy; rather, the government can better motivate enterprises by adopting tax rate policies aligned with the chosen governance mode.

This research contributes by elucidating the impact mechanism of the government cycle’s length on the desertification combat process. The results may offer valuable insights for governments in formulating strategies to encourage corporate participation in combating desertification and provide theoretical support for selecting optimal desertification combat modes.

We investigate the extended service strategy choices of competing manufacturers and examine their impact on the retail platform.

We construct a supply chain model with a retail platform as the leader and manufacturers as the followers. Manufacturers face differential consumer preferences on the same agency retail platform, and they can sell a bundled extended service product and sell a separate product without any extended service.

The sale of extended warranty services on the retail platform leads to lower pricing of the manufacturers' products and changes in the product market structure in response to differences in consumer preferences. The retailing platform tends to provide an extended warranty conditionally. The sale of extended warranty services on a retail platform would be detrimental to the interests of the manufacturer who sells products with extended warranty services and in favor of the manufacturer who sells products without them.

The equilibrium results of the retail platform’s non-sales and sales of extended warranty services for the no-extended warranty product under the same commission rate and differential commission rate models are discussed, and the product structure of the market is investigated, respectively.

Against the background of the I50 paradigm, this paper queries in what ways blockchain and blockchain-based applications deployed in the smart city context facilitate the integration of the I50 paradigm in smart urban contexts.

A mixed methods approach is applied. First, by means of desk research and thematic literature review, a conceptual model integrating the I50 paradigm, smart city and blockchain-based solutions is built. Second, science mapping bibliometric analysis (SciMat) based on keywords’ co-occurrence is applied to a sample of 491 research articles to identify key domains of blockchain-based applications’ use in smart city. Third, a semi-systematic literature review complements insights gained through SciMat. Fourth, the findings are interpreted through the precepts of the conceptual model devised earlier.

The key blockchain-based applications in smart cities pertain to two domains, i.e. the foundational, service facilitation-oriented domain, including security (and safety), networks, computing, resource management and the service delivery-oriented domain, including mobility, energy and healthcare. Blockchain serves as the key building block for applications developed to deliver functions specific to each of the thus identified domains. A substantial layering of blockchain-based tools and applications is necessary to advance from the less to the more complex functional domains of the smart city.

At the conceptual level, the intricacies of the (making of the) I50 paradigm are discussed and a case for I50 – smart city – blockchain nexus is made. Easton’s input–output model as well as constructivism is referenced. At the empirical level, the key major domains of blockchain-based applications are discussed; those that bear the prospect of integrating the I50 paradigm in the smart city are highlighted. At the methodological level, a strategic move is made aimed at restoring the literature review’s role as subservient to the key line of exploration, to justify and ultimately support it, rather than to showcase the literature review as the ultimate purpose for itself.

This paper forms an e-commerce supply chain that include a manufacturer providing products and an online platform providing service. The reselling platform mode and the agent platform mode are considered through an exploration of the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), vertical Nash (VN), platform Stackelberg (PS) power structures. The purpose of this paper is to explore the pricing and platform service decisions under different platform selling modes and channel power structures.

Based on the game theory models, this paper investigates the interaction between the manufacturer and the online platform under four different scenarios. The optimal solutions of four models are provided. Through comparison analyses, this paper evaluates the impacts of platform selling mode and channel power structure on the pricing and platform service decisions and the members’ profits.

The manufacturer prefers the MS power structure in any platform mode. The online platform prefers the PS (MS) power structure under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the reselling platform mode, while prefers the PS and VN power structures in the agent platform mode. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the agent (reselling) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in any power structure. The online platform prefers the reselling platform mode in the MS and PS power structures, while prefers the reselling (agent) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the VN power structures.

The analysis result provides important managerial implications that help the supply chain members develop a better understanding of the selection of the platform selling mode and the effect of the channel power structure in the presence of platform service.

This paper aims to identify the conditions under which encroachment is a viable strategy for a manufacturer to gain competitive advantage and achieve higher profitability in the presence of the store-brand.

This paper proposes game-theoretic models in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (him) and a retailer (her), in which he distributes his national brand through the retailer, and endogenously determines whether to establish a new direct sales channel to sell the national brand when the retailer introduces her store-brand.

Analytical results show that the bar for the manufacturer to encroach the end market in the presence of the store-brand is always higher than that for him to encroach in the absence of the store-brand. Although incurring channel competition, encroaching with the national brand in the presence of the retailer's store-brand can lead to either a win-lose or win-win result for the manufacturer and the retailer. Numerical studies claim that, higher brand substitution can push down the retailer's enthusiasm to introduce her new brand. Counterintuitively, when the retailer introduces her store-brand, higher brand substitution does not necessarily push up the manufacturer's enthusiasm to respond with national-brand encroachment. When consumer preferences for the two brands are heterogeneous, a higher consumer preference for the retailer's store-brand results in the retailer's higher enthusiasm to introduce her store-brand and the manufacturer's lower enthusiasm to encroach with his national brand.

This study can help researchers to better understand the retailer's store-brand introduction, manufacturer encroachment and their interaction theoretically, and further provide decision support for enterprises to choose brand and channel strategies in practice.