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An aspect of spectrum reform receiving increasing attention is the introduction of secondary markets for spectrum in order to enable more flexibility to reassign unused and underused spectrum to users that will use it more efficiently. This paper proposes to focus on the policy issues relating to the development of well‐functioning secondary markets for spectrum.

The paper reviews developments in the debate over secondary markets for spectrum. It draws together key elements from the academic literature, various government and government‐commissioned reports, and the practical experience of the few countries that have already introduced spectrum trading. There is considerable focus on concerns and potential costs relating to the introduction of spectrum trading and liberalisation. This has a constructive aim – to draw attention to the need to address such concerns in order to facilitate the development of spectrum trading.

While there is a persuasive case for spectrum trading, countries have been slow to introduce it because of a number of concerns. This paper identifies these concerns and the regulatory framework/policies needed to address them.

The paper distils the policy issues in the debate over spectrum trading and identifies the role that regulators will need to play in the introduction, facilitation and regulation of secondary markets for spectrum.

This paper aims to provide an analysis of the UK's experience with spectrum trading using data from Ofcom's transfer notice registry and the UK statutory instrument on spectrum trading.

The legal framework for spectrum trading is outlined and the data from Ofcom's transfer notice registry is subjected to three analytical techniques: descriptive statistical analysis, a binary logistic regression and volitional pragmatism.

A descriptive account of the empirical observations associated with spectrum trading shows that most trades (however defined) occur in business radio. A binary logistic regression of the transfer notice registry data demonstrates that trading is more likely to occur where the buyer and seller of a radio license are in the same service/industry. This analysis is inconclusive however due to lack of data. A third analytical technique, volitional pragmatism, suggests that the interdependency inherent in radio communications makes the scope of spectrum trading less workable as a mechanism of co‐ordinating spectrum use and users than previously assumed.

An approach to evaluating the real‐world efficacy of spectrum trading given the operational goals of a national regulatory authority is provided.

This paper seeks to define a coherent management preference function for determining the conditions when the market can be effectively used in the management of spectrum based on abduction and volitional pragmatism.

Volitional pragmatism based on the logic of abduction is used to provide an explanation for real world empirical observation of few spectrum trades in the UK. This is generalized for application with wider context of European frequency management.

There has been a considerable regulatory effort directed toward spectrum trading in the EU. The UK experience with trading is clearly not what was expected. It was suggested that this is a result of an analytical approach based on deductive validationism subject to ceteris paribus assumptions. This approach does have merit but its application is over extended. This is due in large part institutional under specification of what constitutes the market and the nature of the transaction taking place.

The emphasis is in this paper is on the explanation of real world facts rather than normative prescription based on deductive validationism. Such an approach though fallible (all facts cannot be taken into account) is no less valuable in the process of regulatory decision making than deductive validationism.

This paper provides a more coherent explanation of spectrum development and the spectrum management reform process.

A set of conditions are provided for determining when the market can be used in the management of spectrum. This makes explicit the intended operation of the market as well as its limitations.

This case brings out the role of institutions and corporate governance issues in regulatory/policy organisations in the telecom sector. Spectrum is a critical input for mobile services, the economic growth driver. The Indian government, like other governments, attempted to move to a more flexible spectrum governance regime and introduced trading to ensure that more spectrum became available for commercial services. Despite its efforts, the government's framework was restrictive. The spectrum trading deal between the two private telecom operators-RCom and Reliance Jio-failed. RCom was fighting to remain solvent by selling spectrum, and Reliance Jio needed it for its growth.

Posits when someone gets a spectrum licence, they are almost guaranteed that the market structure of the service provided will be frozen for a certain period. Suggest a new system based on property rights and spectrum trading would challenge all this. Concludes that a new regime based on property rights and spectrum trade is within reach. Contends that in some frequency bands, spectrum is the only bottleneck that impedes the entry of new operators.

Recognizes significant constraints that the UK’s international obligations as a member of the International Telecommunications Union and the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications Administrations impose. States there is also a trade‐off between internationally mandated allocations, which give certainty to equipment manufacturers and states spectrum is an important input into the production of a wide range of services – from mobile telephony to national defence.

This paper aims to give a short overview of European Union policy trends towards more flexible forms of spectrum management.

The paper presents a business modelling analysis, scenario construction, policy analysis and roadmapping. It argues that both flexible spectrum management and the concept of reconfigurability do not eliminate the need for a number of centralised controlling entities, and even introduce a number of new ones, performing regulatory, commercial and technical functions of a diverse nature. One of the most prominent control entities, the Cognitive Pilot Channel (CPC), is presented, and three different configurations of the CPC are outlined. Subsequently, the potential impact of different CPC configurations on business models for wireless services making use of such a channel is explored.

The paper concludes that a hybrid model combining a meta‐level CPC with operator‐deployed channels might provide the best mix of technical and strategic control for operators, and value for users.

The study undertaken here is exploratory in nature since, for example, no exact estimations of cost and revenue, or harmonisation feasibility and roadmaps can be made at this time.

The CPC is a recent and potentially crucial concept which is not yet standardised or implemented and for which no business modelling analysis has been performed yet.

This paper seeks to examine current trends in spectrum management and implications for developing countries.

The paper summarizes the findings of an extensive review of recent literature on spectrum management. It addresses three questions: What is the case for spectrum management reform? What is the current debate on spectrum management all about? Why does this matter to developing countries?

Traditional spectrum management practice has led to technical and economic inefficiencies as well as obstacles to technological innovation. Two alternative approaches are being tried, one driven by the market (spectrum property rights) and another driven by technology innovation (commons). Practical solutions are evolving that combine some features of both. Although these changes are mainly taking place in high‐income countries, they are deeply relevant to developing countries as well.

Improving traditional administration of the spectrum in many developing countries would yield significant benefits, but governments may wish to consider moving straight into property rights or commons approaches. Countries at an early stage of building up spectrum management capacity may benefit from adopting new solutions from the start. These may be especially well suited for low‐ and middle‐income countries.

The paper offers a concise overview of major current trends in spectrum management, against which the responses of developing countries can be examined. The paper is extensively annotated and includes a selection of references, many of which are accessible online.

The wireless revolution of the last decade has fuelled unprecedented demand for access to radio frequency spectrum in South Africa. For the first time, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa faces the daunting task of pricing radio frequency spectrum in a transparent and quantitative manner, while allocating the asset within the framework of black economic empowerment.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how real options analysis may be applied to achieve the goal of right pricing of radio frequency spectrum. This paper aims to combine theoretical insights with an empirical case study.

Results suggest that the primary price of a licence will vary according to the profit an entity expects to realize, rather than the licence having one fair value price.

Although such a conclusion may be counter‐intuitive to normal business practice, it is particularly relevant in the South African milieu of empowerment and economic participation by all.

The paper aims to explore accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism (Bovens, 2010) of global telecommunication operators in the process of governing spectrum and of broadband development. The two concepts of accountability are juxtaposed with operators’ corporate reporting practices and spectrum licensing procedures of European national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and are analysed accordingly. The paper argues that spectrum licensing within the European Union regulatory context offers possible venues for policy intervention, rendering telecom providers to take an account on their global operations. Corruption is the case study to draw connections to public accountability, with a focus on the information and communication technology global market activity.

Spectrum bidding processes of European NRAs were analysed according to published documentation of auctions and to answers of NRAs on specific aspects of their licensing practices. Auctioning cases on 800 MHz band frequencies (790-862 MHz, or the “digital dividend”) were selected in countries where telecoms involved in corruption cases were based or where corrupt practices were revealed. Furthermore, a survey was carried out between 08 March and 03 June 2017 – coordinated by the Radio Spectrum Policy Group among its 28 members – on inquiring about licensing practices of NRAs during spectrum trading with respect to identifying beneficial ownership of bidders to spectrum.

Findings show that European NRAs are in possession of regulatory tools that could enforce telecoms’ public accountability; there are strong arguments on the need for European and national-level policy interventions. Spectrum licensing procedures are offering possible and potential venues of accountability. Further legislative action is necessary to adopt a minimum set of criteria applicable in the licensing process. Harmonised implementation by NRAs should further develop new standards fostering transparency.

Information about the ethical behaviour and corruption of European telecom operators is surprisingly scarce and unsystematic, particularly considering the centrality of those actors in advancing a number of the aims of the historical Millennium Development Goals and the new Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations. Research into the governance of spectrum as a possible venue of accountability, and the findings shed new light on regulatory aspects of telecommunication in a global perspective.