Search results

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of relational mechanisms and market contracts on cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain and to examine the role of market contracts. Relational mechanism is categorized into indirect and direct relational mechanism in this paper. Cross‐enterprise knowledge trading is categorized into explicit and tacit knowledge trading. The indirect relational mechanism is mainly expressed by knowledge brokers, while the direct relational mechanism consists of shared goals and trust.

Multiple regression analysis was performed on questionnaire data from 256 Chinese manufacturing enterprises in supply chain in order to assess the relationships between relational mechanisms, market contracts and cross‐enterprise knowledge trading.

The results show that knowledge brokers and market contracts have significant and positive effects on explicit knowledge trading, but the effects on tacit knowledge trading are not significant. Shared goals and trust have significant and positive effects not only on explicit knowledge trading but also on tacit knowledge trading, while trust has a stronger positive effect on tacit knowledge trading than explicit knowledge trading. Finally, the moderating effects of market contracts are proven in the relationships between relational mechanisms and knowledge trading, excluding the relationship between knowledge brokers and tacit knowledge trading.

Previous studies about the cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain focused on theoretical research which did not match with reality, especially in China, where the relational mechanism in trading activities is strong. Based on relational exchange theory and transaction cost theory, a conceptual model for the effects of relational mechanisms and market contracts on cross‐enterprise knowledge trading in supply chain is proposed in this paper, and then empirically tested using the data collected from 256 Chinese manufacturing enterprises in supply chain with multiple regression models. The findings provide a theoretical basis for knowledge trading participants selecting an appropriate governance mechanism to promote knowledge trading, and these also guide the knowledge trading among members of supply chain in practice.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of closing mechanism changes on market quality, investor trading behavior and market manipulation in the Shanghai stock market.

A dummy variable is constructed indicating whether the closing mechanism is call auction or continuous auction. Market quality is measured from aspects of liquidity, volatility and price continuity; investor trading behavior is scaled by order timing and order aggressiveness, and a price deviation indicator is the proxy of manipulation. Using panel regression, this study examines the impact of closing mechanism changes based on intraday transaction data from the Shanghai stock market.

The conclusions are as follows: First, market quality improves after the closing mechanism is reformed in terms of liquidity, volatility and price continuity. Second, order strategy changes significantly in the closing call market, and investors trade more aggressively in the continuous trading period before closing. Third, the closing call mechanism restrains the closing price manipulation and thus prompts an efficient closing price.

This paper examines the policy effects of closing mechanism changes from aspects of market quality, trading behavior and price manipulation, providing pieces of evidence for trading mechanism design and market supervision in emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of four different incentives in improving hedging effectiveness and propose an alternative regulatory mechanism for China’s futures market.

The research method that this study uses is a laboratory experiment, and this study follows the basic norms of experimental research. In addition, this paper designs and conducts a game experiment between hedgers and futures brokerage firms (FBFs) under different incentive mechanisms.

By analyzing the experimental data, it is found that compared with other incentive mechanisms, hedgers’ willingness to hedge and FBFs’ regulatory intention are both significantly higher for the dynamic linkage updating mechanism, indicating that hedgers have a stronger willingness to follow their hedging plan, and FBFs are more responsible for their regulatory behaviors. Additionally, the dynamic linkage updating mechanism has a long-term impact on effective hedging in the futures market.

The findings suggest that the dynamic linkage updating mechanism is beneficial for effectively restricting both hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ regulatory slack and improving the hedging efficiency of the futures market.

To solve the problem of inefficient hedging in China’s futures market, i.e., hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ passive collusion with hedgers, the regulators of China’s futures market should reform the existing incentives and adopt a dynamic linkage updating mechanism to encourage all the participants to actively improve hedging effectiveness.

This paper analyzes and verifies, for the first time, the role of the dynamic linkage updating mechanism in the investing behaviors of hedgers and the regulatory behaviors of future brokerage firms. The futures market experiment that was designed and used in this study is a pioneering and exploratory experiment that applies game theory and mechanism design theory to the field of behavioral finance.

In this chapter, we reexamine the notion that socially responsible behavior by firms will lead to increased financial performance. By identifying the underlying processes, institutional settings, and actors involved, we present a framework that is more attentive to the multiplicity and conditionality of the mechanisms operating in the often tenuous connection between firms’ social behavior and financial performance. Building and expanding upon existing analyses of the CSP–CFP linkage, our model helps to explain the mixed results from a wide range of empirical studies which examine this link. It also provides a novel theoretical account to help guide future researches that are more attentive to conditionalities and contextual contingencies.

In the strategic management literature, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain how managers generate economic rents: resource selection, and capability building. Resource selection is a Ricardian perspective where the productivity of resources are heterogeneously distributed among firms (Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984), and managers outsmart the factor markets by selecting resources based on their future values (Barney, 1986). The alternative Schumpeterian perspective is capability building, a mechanism that depends on deployment of resources to affect a desired end (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993; Mahoney, 1995). While capability building requires that managers develop a capacity to manage firm specific tangible and intangible processes, the resource selection mechanism demands managers to accurately assess expectations about the future value of resources.

This study aims to explore the relationship between non-market strategies and organizational resilience, using a Chinese private enterprise as an example.

This study collected data through semi-structured interviews and analyzed them through grounded theory, using a three-step approach of open coding, axial coding and selective coding to analyze and construct a model of the mechanism of the impact of non-market strategies on organizational resilience.

The following conclusions were drawn from this study. (1) Stakeholders, internal and external environment and entrepreneurship are important motivations that influence private firms to implement non-market strategies to enhance organizational resilience, with entrepreneurship being the key driver. (2) Non-market strategies contain three dimensions, and different non-market behaviors have different mechanisms of action on the organizational resilience of firms. (3) Non-market strategies and organizational resilience form an interactive spiral relationship. This mutually reinforcing effect promotes firm growth and sustainable corporate development. The research results enrich the theoretical connotation of non-market strategies, construct a model of the mechanism of influence of non-market strategies on organizational resilience, and describe three explanatory paths for the relationship between the two–incentive mechanism, functional mechanism and transformation mechanism.

This study's single case is unique and based on the Chinese context. In addition, this study adopts a rooted qualitative research approach and although the coding and model construction strictly follow the steps of grounded theory research, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. On this basis, future research can adopt quantitative analysis methods to test and improve the model.

This paper explores the important role of non-market strategies in the Chinese context under the impact of traditional market mechanisms, based on the perspective of Chinese private enterprises, and provides new insights and revelations for private enterprises to achieve sustainable development.

This study innovatively explores the formation mechanism of organizational resilience from the perspective of non-market strategies, adding a new perspective to the literature. Additionally, it examines the mechanisms between long-term non-market strategy and organizational resilience, particularly their relationship in times of crisis, utilizing a rooted approach that goes beyond static analysis.

Platform certification constitutes an effective mechanism for managing the lemon problem concerning food e-commerce. This work aims to evaluate the market effect of platform certification and analyzes its correction mechanism for lemon problem combined with reputation mechanism.

Utilizing the Gold Seller certification of Taobao.com to serve as an illustration, the authors conducted an empirical study based on the sales data of hairy crabs among 2,239 sample sites over six points in time from October to December 2019, systematically examining the market effect of food e-commerce platform certification along with the interaction between food e-commerce platform certification and reputation mechanisms, followed by a heterogeneity test by product price.

This study finds that sellers with platform certification can significantly increase their sales. The market effect of platform certification is more easily observed in the low-price product market. In addition, platform certification and reputation mechanisms have complementary effects. In a low-price product market, the complementary effect of platform certification and product reputation diminishes, while the complementary effect of platform certification and seller reputation disappears.

This study explores the market effect of food e-commerce platform certification, reveals the market effect of certification mechanism when multiple signaling mechanisms exist simultaneously and conducts an empirical test based on real market data. It provides a better comprehension of how platform certifications work in food e-commerce.

This study aims to examine the influence of market logics on tendering capabilities and small and medium enterprise (SME) involvement in public procurement, the influence of SME governance mechanisms on tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement and the influence of tendering capabilities on SME involvement in public procurement.

Data was collected from owners/managers of SMEs registered by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority. The SPSS software and CB-SEM software were used to obtain results on the influence of market logics on tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement, the influence of SME governance mechanisms on tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement and the influence of tendering capabilities on SME involvement in public procurement.

Findings indicated that SME involvement in public procurement is mainly influenced by their governance mechanisms whilst both market logics and governance mechanisms had a positive influence on tendering capabilities of SME firms. Market logics and tendering capabilities had no effect on SME involvement.

The study mainly focussed on SMEs’ involvement in public procurement. The research has implications for decision makers in government and SME firms concerned with enhancing levels of SME involvement in public procurement activities.

Many governments are now focussing on procurement lot sizing so as to increase SME involvement in public procurement. Despite the use of lot sizing, SME involvement in public procurement is still low in many developing countries and also declining in others. Aspects such as market logics and governance mechanisms that may help understand the variations in involvement have not been given significant attention.

The purpose of this study is to examine how the volatility interruption (VI) mechanisms affect idiosyncratic volatilities in Korean stock markets.

Collecting the South Korea Stock Market (KOSPI) data from June 15, 2015 to March 31, 2019, we collect each residual,  εi,t, from three different estimated models: capital asset pricing model (CAPM), FF3 and FF5. To estimate the conditional idiosyncratic volatility, the authors employ two conditional time-varying measurements: GARCH and TGARCH.

The results show that the conditional idiosyncratic volatility increases when stock prices reach the upper and lower static limits, indicating the implementation of adopting static VI mechanism neither stabilize market conditions nor reduce excess volatility along with the existence of price limits.

Although market regulators and policymakers improve market conditions with the advanced VI mechanism, the empirical results show the adverse effect of the mechanism. Not allowing investors to earn above average returns without accepting above average risks makes Korean stock markets inefficient along with advanced VI mechanisms.

The development of China's foreign exchange market and the reform of Chinese yuan (hereinafter “CNY”) exchange rate are closely linked with each other. Their respective journey through the past 70 years can both be divided into three historical periods; as follows: China's foreign exchange market underwent a difficult exploration period, a formation and development period and an innovative development period; in the meanwhile, the formation mechanism of CNY exchange rate also witnessed three periods marked successively by a single exchange rate system with administrative pricing, an explorative formation mechanism of CNY exchange rate and a reformed, marketized CNY exchange rate mechanism.

In the present world, the development of almost every country is closely linked to the international community, which is the result of the heterogeneity in system, market, humanity and history, in addition to the differences in natural resource endowments and the diversity in technology, administration, information, experience and diplomacy. International economic exchanges require foreign exchange, which gives rise to the existence and development of the foreign exchange market.

The 70-year history of China's foreign exchange market has proven the need to continue safeguarding national sovereignty and interests of the people, stick to the general direction of serving economic development, adhere to the strategy of steadily and orderly promoting the construction of the foreign exchange market, keep on making innovation in monetary policy operation and unbendingly stay away from any systemic financial risks.

During the 70-year history of the new China, as an indispensable economic resource in China's economic development, the foreign exchange mechanism bolstered each stage of economic development and was always an important manifestation of China's economic sovereignty. It is argued that during the 30-year planned economy that preceded reform and opening-up, China pursued a closed-door policy with few international economic exchanges. The subtext of such argument is that China did not have (or hardly had much of) a foreign exchange mechanism during this period, which is clearly in conflict with historical evidence. In fact, although China did not have an open foreign exchange market before the reform and opening-up, it had a clear foreign exchange management system and exchange rate system.