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This study aims to analyse the effect of related party transactions (RPTs) on earnings quality in a sample of Spanish listed firms, as well as the moderating role played by female directors in the relationship between RPTs and earnings quality.

The sample includes non-financial Spanish listed firms from 2005 to 2019. The authors use panel data analysis based on the firm fixed-effect estimator. Additionally, the authors use the two-step system generalized method of moments estimator to test the robustness of the results.

The results show a negative effect of RPTs on earnings quality. Further analysis reveals that the negative effect is mainly driven by transactions between the firm and its directors and major shareholders, as well as by RPTs that are more likely to reflect insiders’ self-interest. Moreover, the authors show that the presence of female directors reduces the negative impact of RPTs on earnings quality.

The study provides practical implications for investors, auditors and policymakers, who should be aware that RPTs might harm earnings quality and adversely affect the flow of financial capital to promising investment opportunities. Additionally, the study evidences the key governance role played by female directors regarding financial reporting policies as RPTs increase.

The findings promote the need for a higher representation of women in leadership positions since the authors reveal the key governance role played by female directors regarding financial reporting policies as RPTs increase.

The results to emerge from the study complement available evidence concerning the effect of RPTs on earnings quality in a continental European country. The authors also provide novel evidence vis-à-vis the role of female directors in the relationship between RPTs and earnings quality.

This paper aims to examine the influence of the gender diversity in the corporate board on the decision of announcing a firm acquisition on Friday. Prior evidence found the phenomenon of investor inattention.

A sample of 252 cash-financed acquisitions conducted by listed Spanish firms from 2004 to 2018 is analysed. Probit regressions are used.

Firms with greater gender diversity on the board are less likely to make acquisition announcements of listed targets on Friday, thus avoiding investor inattention. Women directors seem to provide higher quality information and are more concerned about investors.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that analyses the role of women directors in the publication of information on Friday, so it complements studies on the disclosure of quality information by listed companies. The Spanish market is an adequate scenario to analyse the impact of women's participation in business decision-making because Spain was one of the first countries to legislate on gender diversity.

Este trabajo analiza si la participación de mujeres en el consejo de administración puede influir en el anuncio de adquisición empresarial en un memento de poca atención (viernes) o en otro día de la semana.

Se analiza una muestra de 252 anuncios de adquisiciones en efectivo realizados por empresas españolas cotizadas en el periodo de 2004 a 2018. Se utiliza el análisis probit.

Las empresas con mayor porcentaje de mujeres consejeras tienen menos probabilidad de anunciar la adquisición de una empresa cotizada en viernes, evitando así la inatención del inversor. Los resultados sugieren que las mujeres consejeras comunican información de mayor calidad y tienen una mayor preocupación por los inversores.

Hasta donde sabemos este trabajo es el primero que analiza la influencia de las mujeres consejeras en la publicación de información en viernes y refuerza los estudios sobre la calidad de la información publicada por las empresas cotizadas. El mercado español es el contexto ideal para el estudio de la participación femenina en la toma de decisiones empresariales pues España fue uno de los primeros países en establecer cuotas de género en los consejos de administración.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) reputation on top management team (TMT) compensation, proposing corporate governance characteristics as a moderator of the relationships between the power of top managers to extract rents and the importance of external signals. The study aims to expand the domain of executive compensation literature by including the role of CEO reputation in the context of non-Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems.

The paper opted for a panel methodology for the period 2004-2009, including 534 observations from Spanish listed companies. Data were obtained from several sources. Compensation and governance information was obtained from the Spanish Stock Exchange National Commission; data regarding CEO reputation were obtained from Spanish Corporate Reputation Monitor, and, finally, financial statement was obtained from the OSIRIS database.

The paper provides empirical insights on the CEO reputation diffusion on TMT compensation, showing different scenarios depending on effectiveness of corporate governance. CEO reputation diffusion on TMT pay is strengthened or weakened by the organizational governance effectiveness. General evidence supports the notion that in countries characterized by an incomplete corporate governance system, boards – and also indirectly the structure of ownership – act as a catalyst for external signs of legitimacy, rather than for the organization's and stakeholders’ interests.

Because of the difficulty in pooling information for a long period from three different sources of data, the number of observations is not very large. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to test the proposed propositions further using other context of corporate governance.

The paper includes implications for the development of effective governance mechanisms which promote an adequate link between the CEO reputation and the TMT compensation, avoiding rent extractions.

The paper contributes to new international evidences regarding relations between top managers’ reputations and compensation. Specifically, it allows reinforcement of the importance of institutional arguments in the understanding of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in large listed companies.

Corporate governance empirical studies have primarily focused on the effects of corporate characteristics on market value, discretionary accruals, voluntary disclosure and firm performance. Nevertheless, corporate governance characteristics and the legal system of investor protection may also influence the role of statutory auditors and the demand for audit quality. The aim of this study is to investigate the corporate governance role of external audits in the Spanish capital market context.

This article measures this question by considering the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders analysed in the agency theory. This article uses a logistic regression using a matched pair design, developed with the dependent variable indicating whether the firm receives a qualified opinion, and the independent variables representing ownership concentration, board ownership, board size and family members on the board. Empirical support for this study is gathered from a sample of Spanish listed firms during the period 1999‐2002.

The results support that higher insider ownership provides better corporate governance structure leading to higher quality of financial reporting and, therefore, less likelihood of receiving qualified audit reports. On the other hand, the presence of family members on the board increases the possibility of obtaining a qualified report.

This study focuses explicitly on the end result of the audit decision process: the presence or absence of a qualification, which is the central concern of the financial statement user.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between women on the board of directors and firm performance in a comparative analysis between Italy and Spain.

The generalized method of moment is employed to examine this relationship in a sample of 1,393 firm-year observations.

The results show that the presence of women on the board has a positive impact on the performance of Italian and Spanish firms. However, when the whole sample is divided into Italy and Spain, some results are remarkable. For Spain, the presence of women on the board has a positive influence on firm performance, whereas for Italy the authors find a negative and significant effect on firm performance. This study also finds that the “masculinity” dimension has a negative impact on firm performance.

The results of this study have several practical implications. First, masculinity differences within the countries can have a large impact on firm performance and can explain some differences between similar countries. Second, the legal system of countries might not explain adequately some differences in the decision-making process. Third, cultural values and thinking styles, in terms of masculinity, might better explain why the results on the relationship between female directors and firm performance are mixed. Fourth, the findings suggest that it is very important to promote gender equality, not only by passing laws but also taking action about the educational system.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the relationship between female directors and firm performance between Italy and Spain considering the cultural differences in term of “masculinity.”

el objetivo de este trabajo es examinar la relación entre la presencia de mujeres en el Consejo de Administración y el rendimiento de la empresa, realizando un análisis comparativo entre Italia y España.

Se emplea el método generalizado de los Momentos (GMM), utilizando una muestra de 1.393 observaciones.

los resultados muestran que la presencia de mujeres en el consejo tiene un impacto positivo en el rendimiento de las empresas italianas y españolas. Sin embargo, cuando se analizan por separado ambas submuestras se obtienen algunos resultados destacables. Para España, la presencia de mujeres en el consejo tiene un efecto positivo, mientras que para Italia la influencia resulta negativa. Este estudio también muestra que la dimensión “masculinidad” tiene un efecto negativo en la rentabilidad de la empresa.

Los resultados de este estudio tienen varias implicaciones prácticas. En primer lugar, la diferencia en la masculinidad entre países puede tener un gran impacto en el rendimiento de las empresas y explicar algunas diferencias entre países de características similares. En segundo lugar, el sistema legal de los países podría no explicar adecuadamente algunas diferencias en el proceso de toma de decisiones. En tercer lugar, los valores culturales y el modo de pensar, en términos de “masculinidad” podría explicar mejor el hecho de que los resultados de la relación entre consejeras y rendimiento de la empresa no sea concluyente. En cuarto lugar, nuestros hallazgos sugieren que es muy importante promover la igualdad de género no sólo a través de la aprobación de leyes, sino también actuando sobre el sistema educativo.

Que tengamos conocimiento, este es el primer estudio que investiga la relación entre la presencia de consejeras y rendimiento de la empresa para Italia y España considerando las diferencias culturales en términos de “masculinidad.”

The relationship between accounting and fiscal rules has long been controversial. Financial statements conform to accounting principles and methods regardless of tax rules. This independence generates important permanent and temporary differences between accounting and taxable income. The paper analyses the behaviour of listed Spanish firms in this accounting‐taxation relationship 1996‐1998, the extent of introduction of the inter‐period income tax allocation method, and the number and types of permanent and temporary differences reported. Most firms adopt the income tax allocation method, and report the differences, although they do not always specify which transactions provoked them. Among the long list of operations that generate differences, the most frequent are income tax expense, welfare schemes, provision for pensions, monetary correction, accelerated depreciation, or exemption for reinvestment. Although the number and kind of differences vary through time, the variation is not statistically significant. This is the first study analysing such differences for a European Union state.

This study aims to examine the effects on Tobin's Q of various dimensions of the Spanish ownership structure likely to represent conflicting interests: ownership concentration, insider ownership and bank ownership.

The sample of firms is drawn from the population of Spanish non‐financial firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during 1999‐2002. This paper uses data that have both cross‐sectional and time variation, which allows us to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity and obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients.

Contrary to most previous evidence, the results show that the main ownership structure mechanism that affects firm value is ownership concentration. The findings suggest that ownership concentration appears to influence firm value favourably, but at high levels a detrimental effect causes market valuation to be negatively affected by high levels of large shareholder ownership. These findings, which are different from the linear or non‐significant relationships found in other countries, can be explained by the differences in corporate governance systems.

The evidence indicates that controlling owners tend to misuse their dominant position at high levels of concentration and to make decisions that destroy market value. The findings also highlight the necessity of alternative corporate governance mechanisms that lead Spanish firms to lower their agency costs and to maximise their market value when blockholders' and minority shareholders' interests do not converge.

The study builds on prior research in several ways. First, the paper offers new insights into the relationship between corporate governance and economic performance by using data from Spanish listed firms. Second, the study focuses on three dimensions: ownership concentration, insider ownership, and bank ownership, which allow one to get a more accurate picture of the ownership structure‐firm value relation. Finally, the study controls for unobservable firm effects by applying the econometrics of panel data.

This article analyses the recent inverse transition from goodwill impairment to goodwill amortisation implemented in Spain in 2016. The authors contribute to the existing literature by describing their differing impact over goodwill and impairment figures and testing the impact of goodwill on balances over stock prices.

First, using a database with all Spanish non-financial firms with positive goodwill on their balance sheets, the authors describe the impact of the regulatory change over goodwill and impairment figures. Second, focussing on listed firms only, the authors study the impact of financial reporting of goodwill and impairment on stock prices.

Average goodwill per company and the share of goodwill over total assets significantly reduced after 2016, but the results cannot be easily extrapolated to listed firms due to lack of data. When testing the impact of potentially inflated goodwill balances on prices, the authors find that investors kept overvaluing firms with inflated goodwill balances also with the amortisation method.

The lack of data for listed firms with goodwill in Spain makes it difficult to obtain statistically sound evidence, the results could be biased by the cultural traits of the country and related to the intensity of enforcement and monitoring.

This might suggest that the effects of the impairment method linger, so the authors conform to the interpretation that the systematic amortisation paired with a periodic impairment test may lead to accounting that better reflects the underlying economics of goodwill.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, there are no recent articles that analyse this new “turn-around” requiring again the systematic amortisation of goodwill.

This study aims to investigate how gender diversity and remuneration of boards of directors’ influence earnings quality for Spanish-listed firms.

The sample includes 105 nonfinancial Spanish firms from 2013 to 2018, corresponding to an unbalanced panel of 491 firm-year observations. The primary empirical method uses a Tobit semiparametric estimator with firm- and industry-level fixed effects and an innovative set of measures for earnings quality developed by StarMine.

Results exhibit a positive correlation between increased gender diversity and a firm’s earnings quality, suggesting that a gender-balanced board of directors is associated with more transparent financial reporting and informative earnings. We also find a nonmonotonic, concave relationship between board remuneration and earnings quality. This indicates that beyond a certain point, excessive board compensation leads to more opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting with subsequent degradation of earnings quality.

This study only covers nonfinancial Spanish listed firms and is silent about how alternative board features’ influence earnings quality and their informativeness.

This study introduces measures of earnings quality developed by StarMine that have not been used in the empirical literature before as well as measures of board gender diversity applied to a suitable Tobit semiparametric estimator for fixed effects that improves the precision of results. In addition, while most of the literature focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries, this study discusses board gender diversity and board remuneration in the underexplored context of Spain. Moreover, the hand-collected data set comprising financial reports provides previously untested board features as well as a nonlinear relationship between remuneration and earnings quality that has not been thoroughly discussed before.

This work provides an empirical analysis to determine whether directors’ compensation is lower (“transparency control effect” and “transparency deterrent effect”) or higher (“effects of transparency on increasing competition in pay”) among firms with greater transparency in terms of directors’ compensation.

A disclosure index about board compensation and different models based on linear panel-data regression have been developed, on a sample of 73 Spanish firms for the period 2007–2012.

Our results suggest that disclosure on pay strategy to directors leads to an increase in directors’ compensation, therefore, in this case, the effect of transparency on increasing competition in pay seems to prevail. Conversely, the disclosure on individual directors’ compensation and payment leads to a decrement in directors’ compensation, prevailing the transparency control effect and transparency deterrent effect.

The results of this study might be of interest to investors (to take into account these effects before they implement additional corporate governance reforms) and regulators (to be aware of the importance of this issue).

First, we study the effect that transparency and voluntary disclosure regarding board compensation has on the level of directors’ compensation. Second, in this study we go one step further in the transparency of board compensation disclosures by constructing a disclosure index. Finally, the results contribute to the necessary debate that is currently taking place in the Spanish, European and international context regarding this issue.