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It is generally believed that the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act (SHTA) of 1930 was an electoral response on the part of the Republican Party to Midwestern farmers’ concerns in the 1928 general election which via the legislative process (pork-barreling and log-rolling) was transformed into a generalized upwards tariff revision. There are, however, problems with this view, not the least of which is the fact that the farmers themselves were well aware of the fact that higher tariffs would not improve their lot, and hence favored the price support/equalization measures found in the Haugen–McNary Farm Relief Bill. This paper presents an alternative explanation. Specifically, it is argued that the SHTA had its origins in manufacturing states where the demand for a comprehensive upward revision of tariffs was transformed via the electoral process – and not the legislative process – into an omnibus upward tariff revision that included agriculture. The omnibus nature of the bill, it is argued, was intended as both (i) an electoral strategy and (ii) a hedge against near-certain revolt in rural America over anticipated higher prices for manufactures. We show that while successful electorally (i.e., in the 1928 presidential election), the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Bill fell apart in the legislature in the summer of 1929 when 13 Insurgent Republicans broke with the party to vote with the Democrats to lower tariffs on manufactures.

Trade war among the nations dates back mainly to the nineteenth century. Some of the trade wars may be cited as (i) The First and Second Opium War Empire between 1839 and 1842; (ii) The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, 1930 signed by US President Herbert Hoover; (iii) Chicken wars in the early 1960s; (iv) The US–Japan automobile trade war in the 1980s; (v) 1985 Pasta War between America under the Regan Administration of United States and Europe; (vi) The Banana wars. However, trade becomes more intense in the present century with the increase of the economic trade instruments. Under the Obama Administration, currency war and tariff war both became strong between the United States and China with intense effect over the globe. After the Obama regime, came Donald John Trump with a number of controversial (aggressive) trade protectionism plans saying thereby “China’s accession to the World Trade Organization has enabled the greatest jobs theft in history” and “Trillions of our dollars and millions of our jobs flowed overseas as a result.” Even during the COVID-19 period in the 2020s, threats and counter-threats have been on the ascend. It is in this backdrop the present chapter mainly traces the history of trade wars in the twenty-first century, touching upon the nineteenth and twentieth century trade battles.

This paper investigates the extent to which U.S. trade policies during 1922–1962 impacted the Pacific Rim economies differently from the rest of the world. Empirical analysis demonstrates that U.S. trade with the Pacific Rim had consistently higher tariff barriers than U.S. trade with the rest of the world among import-competitive manufactures. This paper then analyzes the reasons behind this phenomenon from both a political economy and a historical perspective. On both fronts, the Pacific Rim was at a disadvantage, and its higher barrier to trade with the United States was by no means historically accidental.

The promotion of low tariffs and free trade has been the underlying driver of global economic growth. The recent political developments in the United States and Great Britain calls into question, whether free trade will be supported by the governments of the industrialized world in the future. Shortly after being inaugurated in 2017, the President of the United States has repeatedly announced his plans to impose punitive tariffs on the import of foreign products in order to protect the country’s domestic economy. Besides a controversial border adjustment tax, he has frequently brought up the possibility of imposing a 35% tariff on automobile imports. The chapter aims to analyze the effects of such a tariff on trade in the automotive sector between the United States and Germany as well as on German automobile manufacturers. It takes a quantitative approach to draw a conclusion about the relationship between import tariffs on automobiles and passenger vehicle imports from Germany to the United States utilizing a fixed effects regression model based on panel data. The model finds a significant negative correlation between the examined variables, but even in a worst case scenario, German manufacturers are resilient to the predicted revenue losses caused by a tariff increase.

This study analyzes the policy initiatives that have been adopted by the US government since the 1930s. We document the institutional bodies responsible for the implementation of trade policy, as well as the objectives and decision making practices that are associated with policy formation. We also examine the new institutional movement of the Trump Administration’s neo-protectionist “America First” trade policy and its potential impact on the Asian region. Finally, our study examines the recent renegotiation of Korea-US FTA from a perspective of each country’s internal decision making process and discusses a number of issues that have relevant applications for Korea. The results from our analysis show that U.S trade policy show that despite a long period of an open and liberalized trade policy focus, recent neo-protectionist measures by President Trump could lead to potential trade wars and a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s. Such an anti-globalization agenda could have dire consequences for export dependent countries in the Asian region.