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The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

This paper aims to examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability. Financial sector reform, especially in developing countries, takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision. The main objective of the paper is to examine whether this fast and sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision has an undesirable impact on financial stability. Furthermore, the paper examines the role of real economic development in determining the impact of financial reform on financial stability.

Empirically, on a sample of 57 developing countries over the period 2000-2013, the author explored the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability for different sub-groups of countries. The division is based on the real level of economic development and, most importantly, on the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision. The study uses the cross-sectional–ordinary least square model. Each country has three observations (average 2000-2004, average 2005-2008 and average 2009-2013), which are convenient, with the date of the three surveys on regulation and supervision (2002-2006-2011). The period of the averages is selected to cover periods before and after the survey as regulation and supervision may be adopted before the survey and as its impact may persist for the period after.

The major finding of this study is that it supports the important role of the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and its impact on financial stability. Soft adjustment in regulation and supervision has more positive impact on financial stability than fast adjustment. Activity restrictions have positive and significant impact on financial stability in soft adjustment countries’ group. On the other hand, in countries with fast adjustment, results show negative and statistically significant impact on financial stability, especially for supervisory independence. More time is needed for supervisors to adapt to new regulation and supervision and gain expertise to monitor financial condition of banks in a consistent manner. Results also show that the level of economic development is an important factor when testing the impact of regulation and supervision on financial stability. In lower income countries, more room is available for corruption in lending, which has a negative impact on financial stability.

This study advocates the necessity of taking the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision by policymakers in developing countries, while initiating reform in the financial sector. Financial sector reform that takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision may have undesirable results in terms of financial stability. On the other hand, soft adjustment in regulation and supervision, which gives more room for supervisors to adapt and gain expertise, may have more positive impact on financial stability.

This paper is the first paper to explore new methods of calculating the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and to examine whether the high speed of financial reform in developing countries has an undesirable impact on financial stability.

The purpose of this study is to examine how banking regulation and supervision affect the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). It proposes performance of the MFIs from the aspect of social and financial efficiency because the MFIs nowadays not only view to sustain the social role of poverty eradication but in the same time they must strive the financial sustainability to maintain the operation in long run. This study also includes the macroeconomic condition and firm level variables to control for social and financial efficiency of the MFIs.

The data consists 168 MFIs from five countries in Southeast Asia from year 2011 to 2017. First stage of analysis is to identify level of social and financial efficiency by using data envelopment analysis approach. Second stage is to examine impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency by applying panel regression analysis and generalized method of moments for robust estimation methods.

The finding shows the MFIs own lower social efficiency and higher score in financial efficiency. This indicates in pursuing financial sustainability, the MFIs in Southeast Asia countries have lost sight of their original mission of poverty reduction. Furthermore, the result also presents a significant impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency of the MFIs. However, the results appear in different direction when more negative effect is associated with social efficiency. This specifies that bank regulation and supervision are not appropriate to accommodate the social needs, thus hampering the effort of poverty reduction by the MFIs.

The present study only concentrates on the impact bank regulation and supervision to the performance of the MFIs. As the operation of the MFIs currently has been largely exposed in banking operation, it is suggested that future studies to look for other special issues such as country governance that might influence specifically in social and financial aspect of the MFIs.

The empirical findings from this study could be useful and may have significant implications for the regulators. The regulators or policymakers could establish the new regulation framework that fulfil the dual needs (social and financial) of the MFIs. Furthermore, the empirical findings also could serve as guidance to regulators and decision-makers in designing new policies for a sustainable and competitive sector of the MFIs. Although the MFIs recently brings a similar role as commercial banks, they need to retain the social aspects as that is the original mission of the MFIs

The present study proves that the bank regulation and supervision have brought a significant influence to the performance of the MFIs in ASEAN 5 countries.

The FSA will become the most powerful financial regulator in the world as a single agency responsible for the regulation and supervision of the full range of financial services. While questions of institutional structure raise important issues, they are of second‐order importance compared with the general approach, style and intensity of regulation and supervision that regulators apply. The objective of the paper is to outline some general principles to guide the regulation and supervision of banks so as to maximise the probability of objectives being achieved, while at the same time minimising the potential costs.

This paper aims to find the effects of regulatory and supervisory policies on bank risk-taking. The same regulation and supervision have different effects on bank risk-taking depending on influence factors. These factors were considered and a sample of the largest European banks from France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain and Greece was used over the period 2005-2011.

In this paper, the author analyses the effects of regulation and supervision on risk-taking. The author uses a sample of the biggest banks from six European countries (France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece) over the period 2005-2011. Because the applicable entry of IFRS was in 2005, thus data of European banks are not available before this date. For each country in the sample, the 10 largest banks (defined by total assets) that lend money to firms were identified. The author does not include central banks or postal banks, which generally do not lend money to firms and are described as non-banking institutions (La Porta et al., 2002).

It was found that restrictions on bank activities, supervisors’ power and capital adequacy decrease risk-taking. Thus, regulation and supervision enhance bank’s stability. While, deposit insurance increases the risk due to its association to moral hazard. Finally, it was found that strengthening regulatory and supervisory framework raises the risk-taking and weakens the stability of European banks.

The author contributes to existing empirical analyses in three ways. First, the existing literature has drawn a lot of attention on US banks. However, the purpose of this paper is to examine the biggest banks of three European leaders (France, Germany and UK) and three more European countries influenced by the recent crisis (Spain, Italy and Greece) over the period 2005-2011. Second, most studies focus mainly on the relationship between regulation and profitability, yet seldom on the relationship between regulation, supervision and risk-taking. The author focuses on this relationship. Third, this study applies the two-step dynamic panel data approach suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) and also uses dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) method to address potential problems. The two-step GMM estimator that the author uses is generally the most efficient.

This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

This paper considers what purposes regulation and supervision of financial institutions are designed to serve. Historical experience with regulation and supervision is considered, and it is argued on the basis of that examination that a fairly ‘light touch’ in regulation is likely to achieve the objectives that governments and citizens require regulation to achieve. Accordingly, the paper concludes that when regulation is evaluated and compared against unregulated systems, one should be careful to compare fallible regulation with fallible markets, rather than implicitly assuming regulation is perfect. Otherwise over‐regulation will result.

The purpose of this paper is not only seek to trace developments that have contributed to the importance of risk in regulation, but also to justify why risk has become so significant within regulatory and governmental circles.

This task will be facilitated through a consideration of theories associated with risk, and by reference to two forms of risk regulation, namely risk‐based regulation and meta regulation. As well as a consideration of the application of both in jurisdictions such as the UK, the paper adopts a comparative approach through references to the their application in jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy, and the USA, and also through a comparison between meta‐regulatory strategies and risk‐based regulation.

This paper concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels. Meta‐risk regulation has not only assumed such a prominent position in regulation through its application in Basel II, but also is preferred to risk‐based regulation – not only because of the element of ambiguity which risk‐based regulation introduces into its assessment (through a consideration of the external environment of the firm), but also because of its impact of the use of external auditors in regulation and supervision.

The practical implications of a move towards risk‐based regulatory strategies, and meta‐regulatory strategies in particular, is that courts are simply not adequately equipped to deal with the pace with which some financial instruments, such as derivatives, operate.

This paper not only introduces originality through its comparative approach and the choice of jurisdictions involved, but also through the attention it draws to the need for more innovative techniques such as meta regulation. Meta regulation can be considered to be the most evolved and collaborative form of regulation, which is best suited for such an ever‐evolving and changing regulatory environment that currently exists.

This paper aims to assess the topography of financial regulation, supervisory styles and performance of banking systems across the world.

The author gains insights by comparing regulatory and supervisory practices and their impact on banking system performance before and after the global crisis. The study illustrates the differences in regulation/supervision among crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries. Even as capital ratios increased, bank governance and supervision regimes were strengthened, the private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.

The results show that the crisis-countries had weaker regulatory and supervisory frameworks than those in emerging countries during the crisis period. BRICS countries as a distinct block have demonstrated uniqueness in their regulatory/supervisory styles that are similar neither to those in the crisis-countries nor to those in the non-crisis countries.

The originality of this study lies in its unique approach to assessing the bank regulation and supervision styles around the world and their impact on banking system profitability, as it uses a robust database. Further, this study provides not only a general assessment but also a comparative analysis of the BRICS and emerging economies. Regulatory agencies around the world would greatly benefit from systematic evidence on the relationship between bank performance and regulatory/supervisory systems.