Search results

This paper aims to examine the effect of product market competition on firms’ unethical behavior (FUB) in the Chinese insurance industry and to further explore the boundary conditions of the main effects. On the basis of China’s commercial foundation, the study constructs a conceptual framework of FUB by drawing from the perspective of horizontal competition.

Data were collected from 52 property insurance firms at the branch level observed over the six-year period, 2011-2016. Within this framework, market power and market concentration were used to describe product market competition at firm and industry levels, respectively. The moderating effect of market munificence was analyzed to reveal the theoretical boundaries of the main effect. By drawing upon cost–benefit analysis and social network theory, the study used negative binomial model and Poisson model to quantitatively examine the relationship.

The relationship between product market competition and FUB is curvilinear. Especially at the firm level, market power exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB; at the industry level, market concentration exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB. In addition, market munificence positively moderates the impact of firm’s market power on FUB, whereas, market munificence negatively moderates the impact of industrial market concentration on FUB.

This paper explored a new type of unethical behavior that concerns consumers or the third party by emphasizing horizontal competitive contexts; it also provides a better understanding of the FUB–financial performance relationship from the perspective of competition. The moderating effects suggest that when the cause of FUB is different (market power vs market concentration), firms may make opposite ethical choice. However, the sample is from a single industry; it will be fruitful to further verify these findings in other industries such as the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the definition of FUB is confined to explicit forms such as participation or collusion but there is no way to measure the implicit forms of FUB.

First, the governance of FUB should not only focus on the firms themselves, but also take into account the industrial market structure. Second, proper use of governance measures for FUB can increase firms’ benefits from “compliance with the law”, enticing firms to decrease FUB. The third, firms with weak market positions, facing fierce competition, should not be involved in FUB for short-term benefit; indeed, a low-cost strategy can be adopted as the dominant competitive strategy. While, in cases of highly concentrated market structure, firms should strive to avoid involvement in FUB through collusion with other rivals.

As it is a very common phenomenon that firms in competitive relationships may adopt FUB toward third parties or consumers, this trend has become a hot topic in the economic and social development in China. The study’s conclusions reveal that a more proactive and ambitious ethical decision is desirable for all kinds of firms; moreover, firms should make a rational choice between “short-term interest” and “long-term survival”. When firms identify the compliance of business ethics as an opportunity to differentiate themselves and perceive the benefits of decreasing FUB as outweighing the costs, the level of FUB will be inhibited, and social welfare will increase.

The primary contribution of this research resides in identifying product market competition as a previously unexplored predictor of FUB, thus revealing the dark side of product market competition. In addition, nonlinear relationships between product market competition and FUB indicate that situations of competition exert an important influence on FUB both at the firm and industry level. This paper’s conclusion provides a more meticulous theoretical explanation for FUB. This research demonstrates that the traditional ethical framework is not sufficient to explain FUB in a horizontal competitive context. Indeed, resource constraints and competitive pressures should also be considered.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate market competition for three product types of salmon (smoke, fresh and whole salmon) to understand whether supermarkets are exercising market power over salmon consumers in the UK retail market.

Competition and the corresponding pricing conduct among supermarkets are tested by applying dynamic structural simultaneous system equations and using similar data set used by Jaffry et al. (2003).

The results indicate that the market is competitive for fresh fillets and whole salmon but retailers appeared to exert some level of market power for smoke salmon. The hypothesis that market power is the same for all three products in the study was rejected; further indicating that the market for fresh products are competitive while retailers may be exercising market power over consumers for smoke salmon.

Current data limitations did not allow the investigation to cover the past few years in the modelling process. However, the results are still relevant as there have been no major structural changes in aquaculture products retailing landscape in the recent past.

Concerns over the supermarkets’ exercise of market power over consumers have prompted the competition authorities to continue investigating the situation in the UK supermarket sector since 1996. The most recent investigation by competition authorities was in 2006. In all cases, no evidence of market power was found despite increased market concentration. Results from this study generally uphold the claim of the competition authorities in the UK.

This is the first study to use a model within a structural econometric framework of firms to test for competitiveness of salmon products in the UK market place.

Examines the exercise of market power in vertical channels. Reviews the development of food systems over the past century. Presents neoclassical models arising from the work of Adam Smith, George Stigler, Harold Demsetz and John Spengler that are in juxtaposition to the more commonly advanced agency theoretic explanation of vertical organization and performance. Develops a structural model of price transmission in a channel that has differentiated product oligopolies at two stages. Increasing concentration at successive stages creates a problem of double marginalization. Vertical trading partners reduce it by avoiding vertical Nash (arms length) pricing via the use of trade promotions and other coordination methods such as private label. Finally, the rise in retail‐buyer concentration (six supermarket chains now control 52.6 percent of supermarket sales in the USA) portends a possible shift to the European model in which food retailers develop and promote their own brands.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how and why a firm’s product market power affects its dividend policy.

This paper uses three measures of market power? The degree of import competition, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and Lerner Index? To examine how a firm’s product market power affects its dividend policy. Further, it proposes and tests a risk-based explanation for this impact.

This paper shows that market power positively affects the dividend decision, in terms of both the probability of paying a dividend and the amount of dividend payment. It also provides evidence that the route through which market power affects the dividend decision is business risk: firms with less market power are riskier and hence less likely to pay dividends than firms with more market power.

The results show that product market power may have played an important role in reshaping dividend policy of corporate America.

This study documents the relevance of market power behind dividend policy and therefore adds to the knowledge on the relationship between product markets and corporate financial policies, which is an important and understudied area of corporate finance.

The existing literature has established the importance of industry concentration in explaining firm performance and information environments. However, little is known about whether and how industry concentration affects investors’ ability to anticipate future earnings. This paper aims to investigate this query by identifying and testing two channels, product market power and intra-industry information transfer, through which industry concentration affects the informativeness of stock returns about future earnings.

The paper measures the informativeness of stock returns about future earnings by the future earnings response coefficient (FERC)). This study estimates the FERC using a firm-level sample from 38 economies.

The authors find that industry concentration significantly enhances investors’ ability to predict future earnings. Further tests show that both product market power and intra-industry information transfer contribute to explaining the positive association between industry concentration and the FERC, with the former playing a more salient role. Finally, the authors show that a country’s effective competition law attenuates the positive impact of industry concentration on the FERC by weakening the economic impact of the two underlying channels.

This study contributes to the growing literature on the price-leading-earnings relation, industry concentration and international corporate governance.

Servitization has been used widely by manufacturing firms to secure strategic positions in industrial transformation. However, its impact on firms’ market power remains to be investigated, especially in developing countries. This study aims to investigate servitization’s impact on firms’ market power, along with the moderating roles of research and development (R&D) intensity and firm size.

Using the two-stage least squares with instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) method, the authors conduct an empirical analysis of servitization in China based on panel data for 1,797 publicly traded manufacturing firms during the period 2012–2018.

The findings show that servitization helps increase a firm’s market power. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis suggests that embedded servitization increases a firm’s market power, whereas hybrid servitization reduces it. The findings also indicate that this effect varies depending on critical firm conditions. Servitization’s effect on firms’ market power increases with R&D intensity but decreases with manufacturer expansion.

This study describes the positive effects of servitization on firms’ market power in response to calls for research that will adopt a comprehensive business performance perspective on the servitization field.

The findings provide guidance for what type of servitization manufacturing firms should choose and how it fits with their size and R&D capabilities.

This pioneering empirical study uses a large longitudinal data set and the 2SLS-IV method to examine the effects of embedded servitization and hybrid servitization on firms’ market power. The findings provide a new perspective on ongoing discussions of “desertification” and the “service paradox.”

This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition and firms’ water information disclosure and how firms’ ownership type can affect this relationship in China, offering new insights into corporate water management.

The authors investigated 303 Chinese listed companies in highly water-sensitive industries to examine how product market competition influences corporate water information disclosure by subdividing the product market competition into market competition at the firm level and the industry competition intensity at the industry level.

The results show that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between industry competition and water information disclosure; enterprises with the highest market power in a mildly competitive industry are more willing to voluntarily disclose water information and play an industry benchmarking role. Further tests demonstrate that the relationship between industry competition intensity and water information disclosure is stronger for state-owned enterprises than for private enterprises.

The current water resources regulations in China are relatively lax and the water risk awareness of firms is weak, which may affect the applicability of the results. In addition, water information disclosure research is a relatively new field and a quantitative index system for water information disclosure is still in the exploratory stage. Further developments, including the selection, definition and measuring methods of a water index are required.

The authors developed a new direction of enterprise water management activities from the perspective of market competition. Based on the market conditions in China, the authors also investigated the impact of the ownership type of the enterprises on the relationship between market competition and water information disclosure.

The authors suggested that the government should improve laws and regulations and adopt incentive mechanisms to encourage enterprises to implement water resource management. In addition, the government should encourage high market status enterprises to actively fulfill their environmental responsibilities so that the entire industry is encouraged to follow suit.

This study represents an important development in the field of environmental accounting and is the first research on corporate water information disclosure; it also extends the research on the influence mechanisms of market competition on the environmental management practices of enterprises.

Academic research has intensively analyzed the relationship between market concentration or market power and banking stability but provides ambiguous results, which are summarized under the concentration-stability/fragility view. We provide empirical evidence that the mixed results are due to the difficulty of identifying reliable variables to measure concentration and market power.

Using data from 3,943 banks operating in the European Union (EU)-15 between 2013 and 2020, we employ linear regression models on panel data. Banking market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), and market power is estimated by the product-specific Lerner Indices for the loan and deposit market, respectively.

Our analysis reveals a significantly stability-decreasing impact of market concentration (HHI) and a significantly stability-increasing effect of market power (Lerner Indices). In addition, we provide evidence for a weak (or even absent) empirical relationship between the (non)structural measures, challenging the validity of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Our baseline findings remain robust, especially when controlling for a likely reverse causality.

Our results suggest that the HHI may reflect other factors beyond market power that influence banking stability. Thus, banking supervisors and competition authorities should investigate market concentration and market power simultaneously while considering their joint impact on banking stability.

The effect of market power on allocative efficiency is one of the most important topics in industrial organization and has undergone rigorous investigation since the 1970s. However, empirical studies based on firm-level data are relatively rare, especially with regard to China's tobacco and food industries. Accordingly, this research measures market power and allocative efficiency loss (AEL) of the main tobacco and food industries in China with micro data at firm level. Subsequently, it conducts a comparative analysis on them.

This research applies the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) model, consisting of five pricing and demand simultaneous equations to measure market power, and the AEL model to measure AEL induced by market power. To match with the micro data at firm level, the study implements a change in the traditional NEIO model by abandoning the aggregating process.

Empirical results show that China's tobacco industry, among five sectors selected, has the largest market power and thus the highest degree of AEL, whereas other sectors have apparently smaller market power and lower levels of AEL. Comparative analysis demonstrates a coarse positive correlation between market power and AEL in the selected industries. In general, the results accord well with the existing empirical findings and the reality.

This study has some deficiencies. First, owing to the limitation of high-quality data, the sectors analyzed in this research are insufficient to sum up all the characteristics and rules of China's whole food industry. Second, this research only analyzes seller market power and leaves out buyer market power, which could be a direction for future research.

The relevant administrations should strictly limit the monopoly behaviors of enterprises and establish a favorable and competitive market environment, especially for the tobacco industry. This suggestion is precisely an important content of China's Supply-side Reform.

The research improves the NEIO model in that it can be estimated with micro data at firm level. To the best knowledge of the authors, very few empirical and comparative analyses exist on market power and AEL for China's tobacco and food manufacturers using micro data.

Research on the relationship between customer bargaining power and supplier performance in supplier–customer relationships has flourished in recent decades. This study aims to empirically investigate whether product market overlap (PMO) in a supply chain moderates the effect of customer bargaining power on supplier profitability.

This study uses large-scale secondary data from multiple databases. Econometric panel data techniques are used to test the hypotheses.

The results show that PMO in a supplier–customer relationship and PMO in supplier–supplier relationships both exacerbate the negative effect of the bargaining power of customers on supplier profitability.

This study contributes to the field of supply chain management. This study brings new insights into the ongoing debate surrounding the relationship between customer bargaining power and supplier profitability. The study also contributes to the literature on supply chain networks by showing the impact of indirect supply chain relationships.