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This paper aims to investigate the impact of political stability on corruption by drawing upon a sample encompassing both developed and developing European and Asian countries.

The dataset, sourced from the Refinitiv database, spans from July 2014 to May 2022. Panel data techniques, specifically pooled estimation and dynamic panel data [generalized method of moments (GMM)] are employed. The analysis encompasses both fixed and random effects models to capture country-specific cross-sectional effects. To validate our findings, we perform a robustness test by including in the investigation four control variables, namely poverty, type of governance, economic freedom and inflation. To test heterogeneity, the dataset is further divided into two distinct subsamples based on the countries’ locations.

Empirical findings substantiate that political stability (viewed as the risk of government destabilization) has a positive and significant impact on corruption in all analyzed samples of European and Asian countries, though some differences are observed in various subsamples. When we take into account the control variables, these analysis results are robust.

This research provided a panel data analysis with GMM, while other empirical methodologies could also be used, like the difference-in-difference approach. However, our results should be validated by extending the time and the sample to a worldwide sample and using alternative measures of corruption and political stability. Moreover, our focus was on a linear and unidirectional relationship between the considered variables, but it would be interesting to test in our further research a non-linear and bidirectional correlation between them. Furthermore, we have introduced in the robustness test only four economic variables, but to consolidate our findings, we plan to include socioeconomic and demographic variables in future studies.

These outcomes imply that authorities should be aware of the necessity of implementing anti-corruption policies designed to establish effective agencies and enforcement structures for combating systemic corruption, to improve the political environment and the quality of institutions and to apply coherent economic strategies to accelerate economic growth because higher political stability and sustainable development determine a decrease in levels of corruption.

At the microeconomic level, the survival of organizations may be in danger from new types of corruption and money laundering. Therefore, in order to prevent financial harm, the top businesses worldwide should respond to instances of corruption through strengthened supervisory procedures. This calls for the creation of a mechanism inside the code of conduct where correct reporting of suspected situations of corruption would have a prompt procedure to be notified of. To avoid corruption in operational procedures, national plans and policies should be developed by government officials, executives and legislators on a national level, as well as by senior management and the board of directors on an organizational level. This might lower organizations' extra corruption-related expenses, assure economic growth and improve global welfare.

A novel feature of our research resides in its broad examination of a sizable sample of European and Asian countries regarding the nexus between corruption and political stability. The paper also investigates a less explored topic in economic literature, namely the impact of political stability on corruption. Furthermore, the study depicts policy recommendations, outlining effective and reasonable measures aimed at improving the political landscape and combating corruption.

Citizens are demanding better performance from governments and they are increasingly aware of the costs of poor management and corruption. In view of scarce resources and the major transformations already underway in the global economy, identification and awareness of good governance and preventing corrupt practices have become key to ensuring structural reforms and critical investments necessary for encouraging, sustaining, and enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, social, and environmental structures.

Government corruption and secrecy are not new phenomena in Africa; however, international scrutiny has grown as nations end decades of conflict and seek to develop, donor nations consider providing more aid, and investors and transnational corporations look to the area for oil and other resources. Given that corrupt government activities account for millions of dollars diverted from public coffers each year in developing nations and lead to unfair benefit distribution to citizens, the chapter examines the global network of actors attempting to advance the international norm of government accountability to constrain corruption through advocating for the adoption of access-to-information legislation. The chapter also explores the relationship between perception of corruption in Africa and four political institutions of vertical accountability. The findings indicate that perception of corruption is inversely correlated with news media rights, civil liberties, and political rights. However, adopting access-to-information legislation or planning to adopt the law was not correlated with the perception of corruption.

Most Americans are keenly aware of the costs political corruption extracts on system support, fiscal policies and economic development, and ultimately, government effectiveness. Among a list of 10 challenges facing the nation, the public ranks political corruption as the nation's biggest crisis Samussen (2019). Importantly, this issue cuts across partisan and demographic lines. Members of both political parties and independents consistently cite political corruption as a serious problem facing the country.

However, there is a specific kind of political corruption that is disturbing for the health of American democracy – the corruption of Congress. Most Americans appear to have little faith in lawmakers to do the right thing. Majorities believe that Congress is out of touch with average Americans, focused on the needs of special interests, and is corrupt. To be sure, political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, and social structures. This chapter considers the problem of congressional corruption including what forms it takes, where it arises, what anti-corruption reforms are needed, and what these findings mean for the future of American democracy. More specifically, this chapter will permit us to examine if and how perceptions of congressional corruption influence citizens' interactions with government and provide a better understanding of citizens' policy preferences for regulating political corruption.

This study investigates how perceived political corruption, a generally overlooked corruption type, relates to firms' new product development (NPD) through perceived regulatory obstacles. It also examines firms' perceptions of business association support in this relationship, considering these associations' potential support for NPD.

This study conducted an empirical analysis of 1,663 firms in Turkey, a country noted for a history of legislative corruption, and in which there are strong business associations. Drawing the data from the World Bank's 2019 Enterprise Surveys Dataset, this study tested the hypotheses via the two-stage factor score regression method.

This study finds that perceived political corruption significantly relates to NPD negatively through perceived regulatory obstacles. It also finds that the perceived support of business associations to NPD is significantly greater when firms perceive regulatory obstacles but only slight political corruption.

As far as political corruption is concerned, this study reveals that corruption can also be the cause of regulatory obstacles, expanding the common view of corruption as a means of overcoming regulatory obstacles to NPD. In addition, it introduces the role of business associations in this relationship by revealing their support to NPD for different levels of perceived political corruption and regulatory obstacles.

Given the interest in better understanding the economic effects of political connections and political corruption on auditor behavior, this paper aims to review empirical studies in the accounting and finance domain dealing with these topics.

Keywords used to search for relevant studies include “political connections or political corruption” with “audit fees, audit report lag, audit independence and audit opinion.” This paper consults several editorial sources including Elsevier, Electronic Journals Service Elton B. Stephens Company, Emerald, Springer, Palgrave Macmillan, Sage, Taylor and Francis and Wiley-Blackwell. The search yields 16 published studies since 2006.

The review reveals that the majority of studies dealing with the economic effect of political connections are conducted in an Asian setting. Political connections increase the likelihood of receiving a favorable audit opinion and they are associated with higher audit fees longer audit delays. However, they can compromise auditor independence. Studies dealing with the economic consequences of political corruption on auditing are mostly based in the US setting. The findings of the reviewed studies suggest that political corruption is associated with higher audit fees, longer audit delays and increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion.

The synthesis suggests that political connections can adversely (compromise auditor independence) or beneficially (reduce the likelihood of issuing a going concern audit opinion) impact auditor behavior depending on the legal, institutional and cultural characteristics prevailing in a particular setting. Political corruptions increase audit assessed risks leading to a higher probability of issuing a going concern audit opinion and increased audit effort (audit fees and audit delays). It should be noted here that the literature linked to political corruption and auditor behavior is still in its infancy and much remains to be learnt if this stream of research is examined outside the US setting.

The review discusses the political connections and political corruption literature specifically devoted to auditor behavior. It identifies some limitations of this literature and offers guidance for future research avenues.

In recognition of corruption as a major obstacle to the development processes of poor countries, the search for effective strategies in combating the phenomenon in developing countries has become a major preoccupation of the international donor community, particularly since the early 1990s. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of “political will” in combating corruption in Hong Kong, Singapore and Ghana with the view to drawing significant lessons for all developing and transition countries in their anticorruption crusades.

The findings in this paper are based on an extensive review of relevant literature and personal experiences in Ghana.

This paper concludes that controlling corruption in a sustained manner requires a consistent demonstration of genuine commitment on the part of the top political elite towards the eradication of the menace. Where the commitment of the top political leadership to the goal of eradicating corruption in a country is weak, as has been the case in Ghana, governments are only likely to engage in “zero tolerance for corruption” talk but continue to play a “tolerant corruption” game. Anticorruption reforms, in this regard, are bound to fail.

The paper highlights a number of lessons from the successful anticorruption crusades of Singapore and Hong Kong that are significant for Ghana and other developing countries in their fight against corruption. These include the need for anticorruption reform initiatives to be participatory and inclusive of all stakeholders including public and private sectors as well as civil society; the need to provide adequate budgets and staff for specialized anticorruption agencies and grant them independence in the execution of their mandates; and the need to establish effective mechanisms for: providing positive incentives for those who comply with anticorruption laws; and exposing and sanctioning compromised individuals and institutions.

Whilst studies on the role of political will in combating corruption in developing countries abound, most of these have either not provided in‐depth country experiences or relied on single country cases. One major departure of this paper from extant literature is its cross‐country comparative nature.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the significant association between political institutions and the control of corruption.

This study uses ordinary least squares model to examine the following: quality of political institutions; the association between the strength of democratic institutions and control of corruption; the association between government effectiveness and control of corruption; and the association between legal institutions and control of corruption.

The result shows that there is positive association between democratic institutions, government bureaucracy and rule of law with the control of corruption. From the political perspective, stronger democratic institutions are found to be associated with higher ability to control corruption in a country. When viewed from country’s economic and social well-being perspective, highly effective government bureaucracy is positively associated with ability to control corruption. Finally, rule of law is also associated with the control of corruption.

This study points toward clear priorities for reform as stronger democratic institutions, efficient government bureaucracy and adherence to the rule of law improve the control of corruption. The results show that stronger democratic institutions, highly effective government bureaucracy and rule of law are associated with higher control of corruption. This supports the theory that quality political institutions reduce corruption in the long-run. In addition, this study shows that press freedom, regulatory quality and political stability further enhance the capacity of such institutions to combat corruption. Conversely, crony capitalism systems undermine this positive association.

Corruption is a fundamental concern for all political regimes, but particularly for republics where power is vested primarily in a legislative body. While political thinkers across times and places have grappled with this perennial problem, this chapter focuses on the modern American republic and its founders. The authors begin with a brief historical sketch that illustrates the continuity and evolution of corruption discourse, spanning the distance between ancient political philosophy and modern political science. Turning to the American founding, and focusing particularly on the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the essays of The Federalist, the authors show how the framers of the US Constitution engaged with this tradition as they confronted the threat of corruption head on. Although these early American documents provide an ambiguous definition of corruption, the authors endeavor to parse the separate but intertwined meanings of corruption: constitutional, institutional, and moral. While the framers' system draws upon both ancient and modern approaches, their final position is that correct institutional design can provide the solution to political corruption. Ultimately for the framers, this comes down to the design of the legislature and its relationship to the other branches. The authors suggest that while contemporary readers may find much to be dissatisfied with in the framers' proposed solutions, their subtle and wide-ranging conceptualization of the problem of corruption might usefully inform contemporary theory building in this area.