Corruption and Congressional Design: The Federalist's Dual Fear of the Abuse of Power and Abuse of Liberty

Abstract

Corruption is a fundamental concern for all political regimes, but particularly for republics where power is vested primarily in a legislative body. While political thinkers across times and places have grappled with this perennial problem, this chapter focuses on the modern American republic and its founders. The authors begin with a brief historical sketch that illustrates the continuity and evolution of corruption discourse, spanning the distance between ancient political philosophy and modern political science. Turning to the American founding, and focusing particularly on the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the essays of The Federalist, the authors show how the framers of the US Constitution engaged with this tradition as they confronted the threat of corruption head on. Although these early American documents provide an ambiguous definition of corruption, the authors endeavor to parse the separate but intertwined meanings of corruption: constitutional, institutional, and moral. While the framers' system draws upon both ancient and modern approaches, their final position is that correct institutional design can provide the solution to political corruption. Ultimately for the framers, this comes down to the design of the legislature and its relationship to the other branches. The authors suggest that while contemporary readers may find much to be dissatisfied with in the framers' proposed solutions, their subtle and wide-ranging conceptualization of the problem of corruption might usefully inform contemporary theory building in this area.

Citation

Hoss, K. and Hoss, L. (2022), "Corruption and Congressional Design: The Federalist's Dual Fear of the Abuse of Power and Abuse of Liberty", Pomante, M.J. (Ed.) Scandal and Corruption in Congress, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 13-29. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-80117-119-920221001