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This chapter critically surveys recent advances in the methodology of measuring corruption in the field. The issue of measurement is central in the corruption literature, and the choice of method can significantly influence our thinking about the determinants, the mechanics, and the impact of corruption on the economy. We provide a conceptual categorization of different methods of measuring corruption ranging from surveys to direct observation of bribe payments in the field, while discussing the methodological and conceptual advantages and disadvantages of each method. Finally, we highlight areas of complementarity across methods and discuss avenues for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that corruption is inherently unmeasurable. Measures of corruption produced by different sources are highly unsatisfactory. Useful measures may be possible for specific purposes in limited contexts. Reasons why highly unsatisfactory measures are in use have to do with politics and power, rather than utility of these measures.

The paper shows that different dimensions of corruption cannot be reduced to a single number without serious loss of information. For example the number and size of bribes cannot be reduced to a single index. The difference between perceptions of corruption and the reality also makes most popular indices useless.

The paper shows that commonly used measures of corruption are useless for their ostensible purposes. Evidence is presented that they are calculated and used for political purposes. In particular, they provide convenient excuses for the widespread failure of the structural adjustment programs of IMF and World Bank.

The paper's findings cast doubt on the vast amount of research which takes the corruption measures as objective and factual, and attempts to find causal factors for corruption, as well as effects of corruption on growth and other variables.

Citizens are demanding better performance from governments and they are increasingly aware of the costs of poor management and corruption. In view of scarce resources and the major transformations already underway in the global economy, identification and awareness of good governance and preventing corrupt practices have become key to ensuring structural reforms and critical investments necessary for encouraging, sustaining, and enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, social, and environmental structures.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) to support qualitative evaluation of corruption prevention initiatives, especially those focusing on behavioral changes. To achieve this objective, this paper applies the principles of qualitative inquiries to establish a foundation for developing effective means for evaluating behavior-oriented corruption prevention initiatives in Indonesia.

Through exploratory study, this paper assesses current corruption prevention evaluation practice in the Indonesian public sector to highlight major deficiencies thereof primarily through examination of publicly available documents on anti-corruption practice in Indonesia. Furthermore, this paper also discusses how qualitative methods using CAQDAS may strengthen the existing anti-corruption regime by aiding decision-makers to better evaluate the success or failure of their corruption prevention initiatives in particular those aiming for behavioral changes. To illustrate how a qualitative data analysis application can support anti-corruption evaluators, NVivo will be used as a reference from which multiple analytical tools will be discussed to highlight their potential for qualitative qualitative analysis analysis in corruption prevention evaluation.

The author establishes that the existing quantitative measures of evaluation are insufficient in generating a comprehensive picture of the success or failure of the existing anti-corruption initiatives in Indonesia. Evidences suggest that the existing quantitative measures appear to be unable to cope with the growing complexity of various corruption problems in the country in particular to those related to organizational culture and behavior. Despite the numerous behavior-oriented initiatives to reduce the risk of corruption in the Indonesia public sector, it is still unclear if such initiatives actually have made a difference in preventing corruption, as many of their elements cannot be measured quantitatively. Therefore, the author believe that deeper insights into corruption problems can be obtained through proper qualitative assessments in which evaluators play the role as the primary analytical instrument. To enhance evaluators’ capability in obtaining and analyzing qualitative data, the author proposes the use of CAQDAS and the evaluation of corruption prevention initiatives. With a special reference to NVivo, the author argues that using CAQDAS will enable evaluators to conduct qualitative analysis more efficiently to identify patterns within the data, as it offers various tools to look deeper into context, diversity, nuance and process so as to gain deeper understanding of the meaning of human action and how it may affect the risk of corruption within organizations.

This study is self-funded and is relying primarily on documentary analysis in assessing the existing corruption prevention evaluation measures in Indonesia. Future studies may benefit from in-depth interviews with anti-corruption evaluators in particular from the country’s anti-corruption agency.

This paper contributes to the development of corruption prevention strategy by proposing a framework for systematically performing qualitative evaluation on behavior-oriented corruption prevention initiatives.

This paper highlights the importance of qualitative measures in evaluating behavior-oriented corruption prevention initiatives in the Indonesian public sector.

This paper aims to raise awareness of the potential misuse of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) within the financial services industry and outline the potential negative impact this may have on society in certain developing countries.

This piece of research adopted a mix-method approach across three strands; an online line anonymous survey, consisting of 24 questions, face to face interviews with 10 anti-bribery and corruption compliance officers and three focus group, one in Hong Kong, India and Mexico.

The results of the research have evidenced that there is a lack of understanding of the methodology used to compile the CPI within the financial services industry and there is a potential adverse impact if misused.

A potential limitation was the fact that the survey was written in English yet was distributed to some countries where English was not the respondents’ first language. As such, it was accepted that there may have been context challenges or a misunderstanding of what the question asked.

By raising awareness of the methodology of the CPI and the advantages and disadvantages of its use, it will enable the financial service industry to better understand the implications of using such an index and the impacts of its misuse.

This research highlights that through the potential misuse and lack of understanding of the CPI by the financial services industry this may have an adverse financial, growth and development impact on societies in low ranked countries.

This paper draws on a sub-set of results from a wider piece of research that was undertaken for a Professional Doctorate. This research combined academic knowledge with practitioner research skills, providing an original contribution to knowledge surrounding corruption from a more targeted focal point, particularly with input from anti-bribery and corruption compliance officers in the financial service industry.

As a Nordic country, Finland is known as a nation with a low level of perceived corruption. This chapter analyzes how corruption is controlled in Finland by asking first, how the different forms of corruption can be identified, including the context and risk areas of corruption; second, what the policies, authorities, and tools for curbing corruption are; and third, how effective are these measures for controlling corruption in Finland. This chapter describes the different aspects of corruption and the corruption control system in Finland, including the level of perceived corruption, anti-corruption regulations, tools and instruments for curbing corruption, and the main watchdog institutions. The main finding is that the control system has worked well so far but it needs reform in the future. The concluding section deals with some challenges facing the control system.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of perceived corruption on debt financing and ownership structure decisions of firms within the context of ten African countries.

The paper analyses 15-year (1996-2010) data pertaining to 556 non-financial firms drawn from ten African countries using models that link firm financing, ownership structure, and perceived corruption. It uses robust procedures including system-generalized method of moments, general least square, and Logistic (LOGIT) regression.

The study finds evidence that perceived corruption is important in shaping debt financing and ownership structure decisions of firms in Africa. Particularly, it finds that: first, higher levels of perceived corruption lead to firms using higher levels of short-term leverage, lower levels of long-term leverage and debts with shorter maturities and second, firms in countries with higher levels of perceived corruption respond to weaknesses in the law enforcement institutions through higher ownership concentration and controlling block shareholding.

As in most empirical studies, this study focused on listed firms. Nonetheless, future studies that focus on non-listed firms could add additional insights to the extant literature.

The study provides empirical support for the argument that perceived corruption in a country distorts corporate governance. The policy implication of the findings is that governments, by taking steps that curb corruption, could enhance corporate governance by inducing firms into optimal debt financing and ownership structure decisions.

The study focuses on firms in African countries for which studies such as this are non-existent.

The primary aim of this chapter is to offer an overview of corruption and state capture in Albanian public administration and to describe the solutions adopted to fight corruption by the government since 1998. Conflict of interest is a new aspect of concern in the policy agendas. OECD countries have recently adopted some guidelines for managing the phenomenon, which will be then transferred to eastern European countries. Given this novelty, this chapter does not deal directly with conflict of interest situations. Corruption is rarely treated as a management problem, in part because for obvious reasons as data are scarce and also because the literature is thin and tentative, with few theoretical frameworks. Also rare is analysis of how corruption has been or might be reduced. The state of research on corruption is such that there is little inductive theory or statistical evidence about the kinds of policies that work under particular conditions.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate empirically that corruption causes significant and sizeable macroeconomic costs to countries in terms of economic activity and economic growth. The authors modeled corruption building on the endogenous growth literature and finally estimated the baseline (bribes paid to public officials) macroeconomic cost of corruption using Argentina 2004-2015 as a case study.

The authors laid the foundations of a new methodology to account corruption losses using data from the national accounts and judiciary investigations within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) non-observed economy (NOE) instead of subjective indicators as in the earlier literature. They also suggested a new method to compute public expenditures overruns, including but not limited to public works.

The authors found the costs stand at a minimum accumulated rate of 8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) or 0.8 per cent yearly. These findings provided a corruption cost floor and were consistent with earlier research on world corruption losses estimated at 5 per cent by the World Economic Forum and with the losses estimated at between a yearly rate of 1.3 and 4 per cent and 2 per cent of GDP by Brazil and Peru’s corruption, respectively.

The authors would need to extend the application of their new suggested methodology to further countries. They are working on this. They would need to develop the methodology in full to compute the public works overruns input to future econometric work.

In this paper, the authors make a threefold contribution to the literature on corruption and growth: first, they laid the foundations toward a new methodology to make an accounting of the corruption costs in terms of GDP consistent with the national accounts and executed budgets; on the one hand, and the OECD NOE framework, on the other. The authors named those corruption costs as percentage of GDP the “corruption wedge.” Second, they developed an example taking corruption events and a component of their total costs, namely, the bribes paid to public officials, taking Argentina 2004-2015 as a case study. Finally, they plugged the estimated wedge back into an endogenous growth model and calibrated the growth–corruption path simulating two economies where the total factor productivity was different, at different levels of the corruption wedge.