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This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

Organizational scholars studying compensation often place an emphasis on certain employee groups (e.g., executives). Missing from this discussion is research on the compensation systems for low-wage jobs. In this review, the authors argue that workers in low-wage jobs represent a unique employment group in their understanding of rent allocation in organizations. The authors address the design of compensation strategies in organizations that lead to different outcomes for workers in low-wage jobs versus other workers. Drawing on and integrating human resource management (HRM), inequality, and worker literatures with compensation literature, the authors describe and explain compensation systems for low-wage work. The authors start by examining workers in low-wage work to identify aspects of these workers’ jobs and lives that can influence their health, performance, and other organizationally relevant outcomes. Next, the authors explore the compensation systems common for this type of work, building on the compensation literature, by identifying the low-wage work compensation designs, proposing the likely explanations for why organizations craft these designs, and describing the worker and organizational outcomes of these designs. The authors conclude with suggestions for future research in this growing field and explore how organizations may benefit by rethinking their approach to compensation for low-wage work. In sum, the authors hope that this review will be a foundational work for those interested in investigating organizational compensation issues at the intersection of inequality and worker and organizational outcomes.

This paper examines the effect of restrictions on executive pay and high CEOs’ compensation on bank performance following the “2008 UK bank rescue policy”.

Using the difference-in-difference estimation technique we assess the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks over the period 1999–2019.

Our main finding indicates that the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance declines in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Further, we document that performance continues to deteriorate in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques.

This study contributes to the literature that examines the efficacy of government bailouts during the 2008 crisis. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the long-term implications of bank rescue and pay restrictions on executive compensation and performance post–rescue.

This study aims to contribute to the ongoing assessment of executive compensation by investigating the nexus between managerial entrenchment factors, adopting a multifaceted perspective encompassing both economic and non-economic dimensions.

This research employs pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV) models with fixed effects to examine the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation.

This research identifies firm size, performance (via ROA and Tobin’s Q), and CEO characteristics (age, tenure, stock ownership, MBA degree) as significant determinants of executive compensation at the 0.05 level. In contrast, the prestige of educational institutions, doctoral degrees, and the MBA’s relevance to short-term performance, along with CEO tenure, do not significantly affect pay. Additionally, the study highlights the significance of industry type (manufacturing vs technology) in shaping compensation, emphasizing the role of firm metrics and CEO credentials in designing executive pay packages.

This research introduces an innovative approach to controlling unobserved heterogeneity and adjusting for the dynamic nature of CEO compensation attributes across diverse CEO characteristics. By integrating both pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) models, the study addresses the challenges posed by time-invariant variables and unobservable heterogeneity. Such issues have historically skewed the accuracy of traditional OLS models in identifying the comprehensive array of factors—both economic and non-economic—that influence CEO compensation. This novel methodological framework significantly advances the examination of unobservable variables that may vary not only across the firms selected for analysis but also over time periods, thereby offering a more detailed understanding of the determinants of CEO pay.

Though public sector organisations have continuously borrowed human resource management practices from the private sector, there seems to be sparse evidence on the effectiveness of financial rewards for public sector employees, especially in developing countries where pay remains low. Therefore, the objective of this research is to test the effectiveness of financial rewards on the job performance of those working in the Maldives civil service from the perspective of a developing country where public sector pay, especially civil pay, remains comparatively low. Additionally, this study tested the mediating effect of organisational commitment on the relationship between financial rewards and job performance.

A cross-sectional study was conducted using quantitative design methodology, whereby data were collected from 341 employees working in the Maldives civil service and analysed using structural equation modelling.

The findings indicate that financial rewards negatively affect civil service employees’ job performance. However, financial rewards improve organisational commitment, which reduces the negative effects, although the effect sizes of the mediator are not very significant.

The results of this study present critical theoretical and practical contributions to public administration researchers on using financial incentives as a mechanism to boost job performance, particularly in developing countries, where salaries and other benefits remain low. Furthermore, it presents practical recommendations for managing employees in the Maldives and other countries, where the public sector is less developed and budget constraints remain a challenge.

The authors' work aims to identify the employer-specific drivers of the college (or university) wage gap, which has been identified as one of the major determinants of the dynamics of overall wage and income inequality in the past decades. The authors focus on three employer-level features that can be associated with asymmetries in the employment relation orientation adopted for college and non-college-educated employees: (1) size, (2) the share of standard employment and (3) the pervasiveness of incentive pay schemes.

The authors' establishment-level analysis (data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), 2005–2018) focusses on Japan, an economy characterised by many unique economic and institutional features relevant to the aims of the authors' analysis. The authors use an adjusted measure of firm-specific college wage premium, which is not biased by confounding individual and establishment-level factors and reflects unobservable characteristics of employees that determine the payment of a premium. The authors' empirical methods account for the complexity of the relationships they investigate, and the authors test their baseline outcomes with econometric approaches (propensity score methods) able to address crucial identification issues related to endogeneity and reverse causality.

The authors' findings indicate that larger establishment size, a larger share of regular workers and more pervasive implementation of IPSs for college workers tend to increase the college wage gap once all observable workers, job and establishment characteristics are controlled for. This evidence corroborates the authors' hypotheses that a larger establishment size, a higher share of regular workers and a more developed set-up of performance pay schemes for college workers are associated with a better capacity of employers to attract and keep highly educated employees with unobservable characteristics that justify a wage premium above average market levels. The authors provide empirical evidence on how three relevant establishment-level characteristics shape the heterogeneity of the (adjusted) college wage observed across organisations.

The authors' contribution to the existing knowledge is threefold. First, the authors combine the economics and management/organisation literature to develop new insights that underpin the authors' testable empirical hypotheses. This enables the authors to shed light on employer-level drivers of wage differentials (size, workforce composition, implementation of performance-pay schemes) related to many structural, institutional and strategic dimensions. The second contribution lies in the authors' measure of the “adjusted” college wage gap, which is calculated on the component of individual wages that differs between observationally identical workers in the same establishment. As such, the metric captures unobservable workers' characteristics that can generate a wage premium/penalty. Third, the authors provide empirical evidence on how three relevant establishment-level characteristics shape the heterogeneity of the (adjusted) college wage observed across organisations.

This paper examines the effect of board reforms on managerial risk-taking incentive provision in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose managers are undue risk-averse.

We use the staggered implementation of board reforms in Chinese central government-controlled state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) as an exogenous shock to board governance. We collect data on board reforms for a set of pilot CSOEs during the period 2005 to 2020 from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) website by hand. We use a generalized difference-in-difference (DID) design to test the effect of staggered board reform adoption on managerial risk-taking incentive provision.

We find a positive relationship between board reforms and risk-taking inventive provision, i.e. pay-performance sensitivity, promotion-performance sensitivity and performance target difficulty. The documented relationship is stronger when the value of risk-taking is higher. We also find that board reforms lead to greater risky but value-enhancing investments and that managerial risk-taking incentive provision acts as an important channel through which board reforms improve value-enhancing risk-taking.

Our findings suggest that board reforms that improve board governance are effective in addressing risk-related agency conflicts in emerging markets. The findings also highlight the importance of managerial risk-taking incentive provision in inducing risky but value-enhancing investments.

Australian physiotherapy programs incorporate work-integrated learning within curriculum, with the aim to produce work-ready graduates. Recent research in physiotherapy has identified six domains of work readiness. The purpose of this study was to examine the association between university performance, paid work and work readiness, and explore the perceived contributions of university curriculum, work and life experiences to work readiness in those individuals transitioning into practice.

A mixed-methods design was used incorporating an online survey, and linked university performance data of completing students and recent graduates. The survey included personal and work data, a work readiness scale and Likert scales measuring perceived contributions to work readiness from university curriculum (academic and clinical), work and life experiences. University performance was calculated as the Course Weighted Average Mark. Correlation analysis examined the relationship between university performance, paid work and work readiness. Perceived contributions from university curriculum, and work and life experiences for work readiness domains were calculated as percentages of each Likert response.

Analysis included 129 surveys (51 completing students and 78 recent graduates). There was no association between university performance, work (paid and unpaid) and perceived work readiness (all p-values > 0.05). There was a high consistent trend that university academic curriculum (range 71–97%), clinical curriculum (range 89–99%) and work and life experiences (range 67–94%) contributed to all work readiness domains.

This study highlights the significant influence of university curriculum, work and life experiences on perceived readiness for practice.

Pay communication policies continue to garner attention in human resource management. This article draws on social exchange theory to examine the consequences of different types of pay information on employees' perceived organizational support (POS). Similarly, it draws on the relational model to examine whether pay level satisfaction and satisfaction with variable pay and pay raise procedures mediate the relationships between the different types of pay information and employee POS.

The hypothesized model was tested using structural equation modeling in a sample of 695 employees of Spanish firms.

The five types of pay information considered in this study did not have a direct effect on employee POS. Furthermore, distributive base pay information and distributive base pay information on other employees in the firm and in the industry had an indirect influence on POS through the multiple mediating effect of pay comparison and pay level satisfaction. Finally, procedural variable pay and procedural pay raise information were indirectly related to employee POS through satisfaction with pay procedures.

This study highlights the importance of considering the type of pay information provided to employees and the need to understand the mediating variables that explain how each type of pay information can influence employees’ POS.

While much of the literature testing for shirking by professional athletes have used performance metrics, some works have quantified shirking in dollar terms by comparing salary to estimated marginal revenue product (MRP). However, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approaches to measuring shirking by comparing salary to MRP have an endogeneity problem, as salary and contract length are determined simultaneously. We test for shirking in Major League Baseball (MLB) using an MRP approach, addressing this potential endogeneity.

This paper uses instrumental variables regression to address potential endogeneity using MLB season-level player and team data from 2010 to 2017.

Using OLS regression, the impact of an additional year of guaranteed contract on shirking is estimated at approximately $1m in 2010 US dollars, and the impact of having a long-term contract is estimated at $5m, estimates comparable to those in the literature. Using instrumental variables regression, these impacts increase to $1.6m and over $9m in 2010 dollars.

Given large, causal shirking estimates, profit maximizing sports organizations should take caution when negotiating long-term contracts. These findings also have important implications for other labor market settings where workers feel job security.

To our knowledge, this is the first work testing for shirking in sports using an MRP approach which uses instrumental variables regression to address potential endogeneity.