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We argue that uninformed subscribers to an initial public offering (IPO) of common stocks are exposed to greater ex ante risk of trading against informed traders in the secondary market because the advent of public trading conveys hitherto private information and thereby mitigates adverse selection. The going‐public firm underprices the new issue to compensate uninformed subscribers for this added secondary market adverse selection risk. We test this market liquidity‐based explanation by investigating the ex‐post consequences of ownership structure choice on the initial pricing and the secondary market liquidity of a sample of initial public offerings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Consistent with our argument, we find that initial underpricing varies directly with the ex post trading costs in the secondary market. Further, initial underpricing is related positively to the concentration of institutional shareholdings and negatively to the proportional equity ownership retained by the founding shareholders. Finally, the secondary market illiquidity of new issues is positively related to institutional ownership concentration and negatively to ownership retention and underwriter reputation. Thus, the evidence based on our NYSE sample supports the view that the entrepreneurs' choice of ownership structure affects both the initial pricing and the subsequent market liquidity of new issues.

Contracts term of commercial sale of goods have a ‘title retention clause’, preventing the transfer of ownership till the seller is fully paid. The unpaid seller gets the right to repossess the goods from the buyer. Exigencies of businesses have led to introduction of further clauses allowing the buyer to use or sub-sell the goods even before the transfer of ownership. The United Kingdom Court of Appeal judgment in the Caterpillar Case brings out the effects of the contradictions of a title retention clause qualified by the right of the buyer to use or sub-sell.

To highlight pertinent points in the frequently-asked questions (FAQs) issued on April 3, 2018 by the US Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network concerning its Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions (“CDD Rule”), which were published on May 11, 2016 and became effective on May 11, 2018.

Discusses clarification and guidance in the FAQs concerning beneficial ownership requirements for administrative and internal accounts, claims for exclusion from the definition of legal entity customer, information requirements for pooled investment vehicles, the requirement for beneficial ownership information from foreign publicly-traded companies, information requirements for existing customers, certification of beneficial ownership information when existing accounts are renewed, requirements for refreshing existing beneficial ownership information, retention of beneficial ownership records, aggregation for currency transaction reporting, and requirements to understand the nature and purpose of a customer relationship.

Covered financial institutions and industry associations have sought clarification and guidance on a range of topics, several of which have been addressed in the FAQs.

Expert guidance from lawyers focused on regulatory, compliance and transactional issues for financial institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of audit quality and ownership structure on the degrees of accuracy and bias in earnings forecasts issued in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses in a frontier market, Bangladesh.

The paper uses both univariate and multivariate tests on the sample of 75 IPOs. The paper employs the tests to see the association between the degree of forecast bias and three corporate governance variables.

The results reveal that the magnitude of earnings forecast bias is significantly explained by issuer, auditor reputation, proportions of capital raised from domestic as well as foreign investors, and whether the IPO firm is a start-up venture. Underwriter prestige, length of the issuing firms' operating history, leverage, whether the firm went public during a stock market boom, and forecast horizon do not appear to be statistically significant in explaining the degree of forecast bias.

Although auditor reputation and the proportion of equity retained by pre-IPO owners have been investigated in several studies on IPO forecast accuracy and/or bias, no study has attributed them to corporate governance as a whole by combining auditor reputation, and ownership categories held by small private investors and foreign portfolio investors.

This study aims to compare the short-run performance of construction and non-construction initial public offerings (IPOs) that are offered in India during 2006–2015. The study also attempts to investigate the impact of ownership structure (i.e. concentrated ownership in the hand of promoters and institutional ownership) and market sentiment on the performance of construction sector IPOs in short run.

A total of 281 IPOs were listed at National Stock Exchange, India, during the study period, and 44 of those were from construction sector. The short-run performance of these construction and non-construction IPOs was compared using two indicators, i.e. monthly stock return (SR) and excess return over market benchmark (MAR). To examine the effect of concentrated ownership in the hand of promoters, institutional ownership and market sentiment on IPO performance, systematic dynamic panel regression model was developed.

The IPOs of construction firms perform significantly better than the non-construction firms. The performance of construction IPOs is significantly driven by the lag effect. This suggests a significant informational inefficiency, which results in a delayed reaction by investors. The market sentiment has a positive influence on the performance of construction sector IPOs, whereas the institutional holding has a negative influence.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine the performance of construction sector IPOs in short run. The study uses systematic dynamic panel data regression, which provides better and reliable estimates.

The traditional methods of managing human capital, creativity, innovation, and the learning culture within an organization have long over‐shadowed the management of the professional intellect. As with the resource based view (RVB) of the firm, the intangible strategic intelligence creates most of the professional intellect of an organization, and operates on the following four levels (in increasing importance): cognitive knowledge or basic mastery of a professional discipline; advanced skills or the ability to translate theory into effective execution or practice; systems understanding or the deep knowledge of the cause and effect relationships underlying the professional discipline; and self‐motivated creativity or the motivation and adaptability for success. The interaction of these factors, along with enhanced communications, allow nurturing organizations the ability to thrive in the face of today’s rapid changes and renew their cognitive knowledge, especially where it increases the loyalty of knowledge workers.

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent of alteration institutional characteristics, i.e. legal origin and corruption levels, may have on the signaling effects of auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on initial public offering (IPO) initial returns in OECD countries.

Cross-sectional data composed of 6,182 IPOs from 30 OECD countries are used for 2003-2012. Ordinary least square with multiple linear regressions is used to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that the legal framework and corruption level of a country alters the signaling effects of underwriters’ reputation, auditors’ reputation and ownership retention in an IPO environment. These three variables mitigate information asymmetry, signal firm value to potential investors and ultimately decrease IPO initial returns. This relationship is more significant in the civil law countries. Corruption levels negatively moderate the relationship in the common law and Scandinavian civil law countries but have no significance in the German and French civil law countries, indicating the importance of the signaling variables in these two civil law countries.

This study examines the extent of the alterations that the legal framework and the corruption levels cause to the signaling relationship between auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on IPO initial returns in selected OECD countries.

The aim of this paper is to explore the family firms' propensity to undertake R&D investments after going public, showing how it varies due to the ownership structure.

The analysis is based on a sample of 132 French and Italian family and nonfamily IPOs in the period 2013–2018.

The empirical findings show a positive relationship between the quantity of post-IPO shares retained by family owners and R&D investments. Furthermore, the abovementioned relationship is negatively affected by the generational stage and positively by the presence of a lone founder.

Outside investors of family firms may be assured in buying shares of founding family firms after going public because they are stimulated to undertake R&D investments and therefore create overall value in the long term. Furthermore, external managers of lone-founder and first-generation family firms can adopt innovation investments without fear of being replaced as a consequence of a hostile takeover. Lastly, private equity should support later generation family IPOs, providing them with capital and managerial skills in order to generate value for shareholders.

Past studies have mostly shown family firms' reluctance to undertake R&D investments; however, scholars have focused on private or public family firms, ruling out the analysis of family firms' innovation behaviour within the setting of an IPO. To the best of the author's knowledge, this study represents the first empirical attempt to investigate the relationship between family firms and post-IPO innovation investments, when the capital infusion relaxes the financial constraints of family firms.

Takes Avis as a case example of a company which has empowered its employees to take ownership of customer service by developing high levels of competence, combining knowledge and skill; understanding one’s role in achieving company goals; and responsibility and authority. Looks at Avis’s comprehensive training and development programmes and explains the importance of developing “cathedral” vision. Details six key organization and management processes aligned to the strategy of customer retention through empowerment ‐ goals, practices, rewards, expectation, feedback and modelling ‐ as key to Avis’ success.

This study examines compensation changes among top executives of formerly privately held stock insurers and mutual insurers at the time around an initial public offering. This study explains how CEO compensation changes following an IPO differ between these two types of insurers owing to their differing agency characteristics. The results also show that CEOs’ benefits increase materially following an IPO. The authors find evidence that reduced ownership retention by managers increases agency costs and CEOs of mutual insurers exploit their positions and increase their reward at the expense of policyholders.