Search results

This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by empirically investigating the impact of digital competitiveness and technology on corruption under the moderating effect of some cultural and economic control variables and providing evidence on the links between corruption and various cultural dimensions at the country level.

The cross-sectional sample covers 61 countries (41 high-income and 20 lower-income countries) during the 2016–2020 period, and the analysis was carried out for both the full sample and the subsamples.

The results provide clear evidence supporting the hypothesis that digitalisation and technology significantly affect the perceived level of corruption under the moderating role of cultural framework and economic development. Furthermore, the most significant cultural dimensions of corruption are individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint, even if, in some cases, its influence might be felt differently when the results are estimated on subsamples. Thus, in the case of indulgence versus restraint, high-income countries with higher indulgence scores would register higher scores for the corruption perception index and thus a better control of corruption, while for lower-income countries, the more indulgent these countries are, the weaker the corruption control will be. Furthermore, our results validate a powerful and significant correlation between the index of economic freedom and corruption in both digitalisation and technology.

This study may have relevant implications for policymakers who need to recognise the role of digitalisation and technology in the fight against corruption but considering the cultural and economic characteristics specific to each country.

To the authors' knowledge, the relationship between digital competitiveness, technology and corruption within an economic and cultural framework, while highlighting the differences between high-income and lower-income countries, has not been previously documented in the literature. Thus, this article argues that the level of digital competitiveness and the adoption of technology would significantly impact the level of perceived corruption, although this impact could be felt differently by countries in the high-income category compared to countries in the lower-level income category.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between the level of sustainability and tax evasion and test whether the level of corruption moderates such a relationship.

The sample consists of 65 developed and developing countries. Tax evasion is measured using a macro indirect approach used by Schneider et al. (2010). The sustainability level and corruption variables are collected from The Global Competitiveness Report for 2012-2013.

This study finds that the level of tax evasion is negatively associated with the level of sustainability (overall score and social and environmental score) and the quality of infrastructure. When we distinguish between low- and high-corruption countries, we find that this negative association is significant for low-corruption countries and insignificant for high-corruption countries. These results imply that the level of corruption may reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and trust their government in general and comply with the tax rules in particular.

Our empirical findings have policy implications for governments with high levels of tax evasion, as they highlight the importance of states’ engagements towards their citizens in reducing tax evasion.

The paper aims to develop a theoretical model to explain the exact process through which the scale effect works to create a possible wedge between a perception-based ranking like the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ” and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking of economies with low enforcement against corruption.

The paper takes into account corruption both at the “high” and “low” levels of bureaucracies, where the bribes are paid sequentially at the two levels. The bribes are endogenously determined at the equilibrium using a sequential game approach.

The paper finds that in the absence of coalition between the two levels of bureaucrats, both the absolute level of corruption and the welfare level of the economies are expected to vary inversely with the perceived corruption frequency. The paper also explores the possibility of a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats and shows that with the perception of a stable coalition being formed, the negative monotonic relation between the corruption frequency and the absolute size of corruption breaks down.

First, the paper argues that the ranking of the economies with low enforcement against corruption on the basis of perceived corruption frequency may not reflect the ranking of the economies according to their absolute size of corruption; it points out that the perceived higher corruption frequency in an economy as reflected in CPI can be an indicator of both the lower size of “high” level corruption and absolute size of corruption in the economy. Particularly, this happens in economies where coalition between the “high” and “low” level officials does not form. Second, it identifies the exact way in which the scale effect works to create a difference in the CPI ranking and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking and explains why similar difference would exist if “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking is derived from all the sources of hard data on corruption. Third, it explains why a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats in economies with low enforcement does not usually form.

This study researched how corruption affects the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). With the help of a qualitative methodology, the results of the analysis show that firms headquartered in countries where corruption is high have an advantage when operating in a foreign country with a similar institutional environment. The reason for this advantage is that such firms may possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrary and pervasive dimensions of corruption at home. On the other hand, firms from countries with lower corruption levels than the host country are more affected by corruption in a highly corrupt host country. Finally, even though this study found evidence that all firms operating in a highly corrupt country might participate in corrupt deals, those headquartered in highly corrupt countries are more willing to do so. This claim is based on the fact that firms from less corrupt countries might face stronger pressures from their headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals, whereas firms from more corrupt countries might not encounter such pressures.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corruption level in steering the business–government relations (BGRs) in developing countries. It also examines the moderating effect of firm size.

Using robust tobit and probit models, this study tests the response behavior of 9787 firms from 23 African countries to their government's policy and regulations and the direct effect of corruption control level in their response decisions. The authors also perform several other additional analyses to ensure the robustness of the findings, including change analysis, two-stage model and recursive bivariate model.

The result shows that corruption level is among the significant factors that drive BGRs exponentially. The finding points out that, there is a strong alliance of business and government in more corrupt countries. Moreover, the impact of corruption level exacerbates when the firm is bigger.

Managers should focus more on activities that create long-term sustainable advantage. Valuable time of the senior managers should not waste on negotiating government policies to earn a short term advantages.

It is evident that legal and transparent government alliances can lead to economic rent for firms. However, it is important to note that any alliance based on corruption and illegality is short-lived and ultimately detrimental to long-term prosperity. Therefore, it is crucial for firms to prioritize ethical business practices and build relationships with governments that prioritize transparency and accountability.

Given the detrimental impact of corruption on economic progress, it is crucial for Africa policy-makers to prioritize reforms aimed at reducing its adverse effect. By implementing ethical and transparent business practices, countries can attract more investment and promote economic growth.

This study contributes to the existing literature on the passive form of political connectivity/activity and to what extend corruption level affect the political activities of firms.

Macedonian municipalities should pass anti‐corruption ordinances in order to reduce corruption. The purpose of this paper is to review the legal issues involved in drafting such ordinances and provide legal advisors to local councils with the legal and economic analysis needed to tackle some of the more difficult and detailed questions.

The most important issue revolves around the creation of a model ordinance which Macedonian municipalities (or the Association of Units of Local Self‐Government of the Republic of Macedonia) could adopt in order to set‐up and run municipal‐level anti‐corruption agencies. The location of such agencies as well as their competencies (to monitor conflicts of interests, oversee asset declarations, and conduct corruption risk‐audits among others) are analysed. The paper also provides legal interpretations of Macedonian legislation and their likely impact on municipal council ordinance design in the area of anti‐corruption – providing the legal basis for positive administrative silence, the splitting of municipal procurement contracts, and (most controversially) qui tam rewards at the municipal level.

A brief regulatory impact analysis of the ordinance shows a gain of €162,900 in social welfare if such a programme were rolled‐out in Macedonia.

The present paper provides some of the legal analysis which previous papers lack.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness) project national cultural dimensions of values and practices and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).

Most empirical research on culture dimensions and corruption is based on Hofstede's dataset of culture conducted more than 25 years ago. Evidence from a more recent dataset of culture dimensions is needed before current generalizations can be made. The GLOBE project is based on the perceptions of 18,000 individuals.

The results provide empirical support for the influence of uncertainty avoidance values, human orientation practices, and individual collectivism practices on the level of corruption after controlling for economic and human development, which, in turn, adds to the efforts to build a general theory of the culture perspective of corruption.

The findings offer valuable insights on why cultural values and cultural practices should be distinguished as they relate to corruption.

International policy makers as well as managers at multinational corporations can benefit from the findings of this research study.

The research reported is among the first to investigate the issue of corruption from the perspective of national cultural values and practices.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether firms from countries presenting higher levels of corruption are more likely to have higher levels of earnings management than their counterparts from countries with lower levels of corruption. It also explicitly examines how this relationship compares between emerging and developed economies.

Using multiple regression analysis, this study tests the hypothesis of positive association between the countries’ level of corruption and the level of earnings management using a sample of foreign firms with American Depositary Receipts in the US market.

Findings indicate that higher corruption perception is related to higher incentives for firms to manipulate earnings in the case of emerging countries. Such results are not identified in developed countries where the level of minority investors’ protection is higher. Findings also indicate that in developed countries earnings management is negatively related to investor protection, which is not the case for emerging countries.

As far as the authors are aware, this study is the first to examine the effects of corruption on earnings management on the basis of accounting firm-level data.

The accounting literature suggests that the use of accounting standards with greater quality promotes the financial reporting quality and enhances accountability. This study aims to investigate the effect of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) adoption, by official development assistance (ODA) beneficiary countries, on the reported level of their perceived corruption.

We investigate a sample of ODA beneficiary countries (168 country-year observations) facing rising levels of corruption. We apply a panel regression analysis for these countries during the period from 2015 to 2018.

The findings suggest that the IPSAS’ adoption can significantly influence the level of perceived corruption and implement important evidence about promoting transparency factor for underdeveloped countries.

This study contributes to the accounting literature by examining the theoretical and empirical insights about the impact of the of IPSAS’ adoption on the level of corruption, which can be considered as a new area of accounting literature and a useful signal for stakeholders in countries seeking adequate solutions to combat and fight corruption activities.