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The impact of the deregulation movement in the United States on commercial banks and other depository institutions is evaluated and their strategic responses to the intensification of non‐bank competition on the financial services industry are considered.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between estimated default frequencies (EDFs) and a government index that proxies for takeover defense provisions for publicly‐traded financial institutions from 2002 to 2004.

Using a sample of publicly‐traded financial institutions, the effect of anti‐takeover provisions on EDFs was analyzed.

It was found that financial institutions with multiple takeover defenses tend to have lower EDFs compared with those with fewer takeover defenses. This result is robust to a variety of specifications and is supportive of the wealth distribution hypothesis. Further, it appears that the result is primarily driven by non‐depository institutions. This may imply that regulation of depository institutions mitigates takeover defense effects on managerial behavior.

This paper adds to the corporate finance literature, which reports mixed findings on the relationships between takeover defenses and firm value.

This paper examines the effectiveness of the three macro-prudential measures introduced by the Korean government in 2010 and 2011: (i) introduction of limit for FX forward positions of domestic banks and foreign bank branches, (ii) reintroduction of tax on foreign investors' earnings from Korean government bonds, and (iii) imposition of macro-prudential stability levy on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities appeared in bank balance sheets. The results show that the three measures were not successful: The limits of FX forward position did not lead to the decrease in foreign borrowings. The reintroduction of the tax did not reduce foreign investments in Korean government bonds. Lastly, the levy on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities did not lower the foreign borrowings from the banks and did not result in more financing through deposits for banks. The ineffectiveness of the capital flow management system in controling the amount of foreign capital flows implies that the system might not be effective in mitigating the pressure on exchange rate caused by excessive volatility of foreign capital flows.

This paper first generally discusses United States bank liquidations under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), and addresses the purposes and impact upon US financial institutions of FIRREA. It also addresses the role and powers of the FDIC as affected by FIRREA. The second section discusses the use of ancillary bankruptcy petitions in the United States to aid in the liquidations of foreign financial institutions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the availability of plenary bankruptcy relief for foreign bank holding companies and foreign banks not engaged in banking business in the United States.

There is an ongoing controversy over whether or not to extend commercial banks' nonbanking powers. Although the Glass‐Steagall Act of 1933 and the McFadden‐Pepper Act of 1927 restrict commercial banks' activities, the technological and financial innovations of the last several years have raised new questions. Whether banks should be allowed to undertake nonbanking activities? How profitable are these businesses? Whether banks will gain monopolistic powers? Will they increase FDIC's liabilities? And several other related questions. This study looks at the nonbanking activities of bank holding companies using a relatively new data source, i.e. FR‐Y11AS reports for the years 1989 and 1990. The performance of nonbanking subsidiaries is then compared with that of commercial banks and bank holding companies. Some meaningful inferences are drawn on issues such as market concentration, profitability, capitalization, and level of problem‐loans of nonbanking and banking subsidiaries, as well as, consolidated bank holding companies. Results from two prior studies are further utilized to look for possible trends. Since these studies have used the same data source (FR‐Y11Q and FR‐ Yl1AS) for the years 1986 through 1988, this facilitates a trend analysis over a five year period 1986–90. The main conclusions are that the BHC's nonbanking activities are heavily concentrated among the top five or ten firms within each activity. However, both the number of firms as well as total assets held in most nonbanking subsidiaries have declined over the five year period. Activities considered traditional, e.g. commercial and consumer finance and mortgage banking have suffered significant losses in terms of total assets and number of firms. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, due to the growing liberalization in interstate banking laws, BHCs can now carry on these activities in their bank subsidiaries and do not have to acquire a nonbanking subsidiary in order to capture business across state lines. Second, the glass walls separating banking from commerce may be cracking. Several states have started allowing banks to carry out some of the nonbanking activities, hence, considerably neutralizing the Glass‐Steagall Act. Insurance agencies and underwriting business of BHCs show the most significant growth over the five years, 1986–1990. Securities brokerage has held constant. Another finding is that the return on equity (ROE) for nonbanking firms has been lower than both the banking firms as well as the BHCs. However, this is mainly due to the relatively low equity capital levels for banks and BHCs. The nonbanking subsidiaries show fairly stable and relatively high capital ratios. Finally, for most part, nonbanking subsidiaries have a higher rate of problem‐loans.

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the structure, regulation, and performance of banks in the EU and G‐10 countries. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the structure of banking in the nineteen separate countries comprising these two groups. The regulatory, supervisory, and deposit‐insurance environment in which banks operate in each of these countries is also compared and contrasted. This enables one to identify any significant differences in the regulatory environment that may help explain the structure of banking in the various countries. Beyond this, the effect of the overall structural and regulatory environment on individual bank performance is investigated in order to evaluate the appropriateness of existing regulations in individual countries and any proposals for reforming them. Hence, an exploratory empirical analysis based upon a sample of banks in the different countries is conducted to assess the effect of the different “regulatory regimes” on the performance of individual banks, controlling for various bank‐specific and country‐specific factors that may also affect bank performance. In this way, the paper attempts to contribute to an assessment of the appropriate balance between market and regulatory discipline to ensure that banks have sufficient opportunities to compete prudently and profitability in a competitive and global financial marketplace. In the process of conducting such an assessment, the paper necessarily provides information as to whether the U.S. is “out‐of‐step” with banking developments in other industrial countries.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze a particular segment of the US “shadow banking” market and its revival since the recent credit crisis, namely, lending to the private Middle Market, defined as financings of $5-100 million to non-public, unrated operating entities or pools of assets with not more than $50 million in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

The analysis includes a review survey of a segment of capital markets and primary evidence from direct participation in two examples of actual private, non-bank lending between 2011 and 2012 executed by a Middle Market US investment bank.

While there have been considerable challenges, historically, in providing credit for small-and mid-sized businesses in the USA, private Middle Market capital is (post the recent credit crisis) finding opportunities, notwithstanding, constraints imposed by market and other forces, including systemic crises, cyclical forces and changes in regulatory regimes.

Any generalization is limited due to the absence of disaggregated survey data for the US capital markets and the limited examples examined.

The capital markets segment and non-bank financial institutions examined in this paper are developing as an alternative source of credit/lending from commercial banks for mid-sized companies.

The mid-sized firms financed by the shadow credit market are a significant source of job creation in the US economy making non-bank credit a lifeline to job growth in the financial crisis.

Direct participation is unique to the firms studied. Value is in developing a general framework to analyze different segments of the capital market.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the crisis, its causes and the corrective policy actions with the aim of drawing up from that a set of economics policy and substantive implications and conclusions.

To throw into sharp relief the causes and particular features of the financial crisis, the paper traces the combined evolution of financial innovations and globalization which underscores the eruption of the crisis. It then analyzes the recession and the ensuing policy actions. The US actions are examined in detail by analyzing the pertinent technical, macroeconomics, and political issues. Thereafter, elements of reforms are outlined, which in part draw on the work of the Bank of International Settlements. This leads into substantive and policy conclusions of great significance.

The paper elucidates the major historic changes observed in monetary policy design and execution. It also brings out the changes in the empirical size of the various fiscal policy lags as compared with the received literature. It is argued that if the policy actions succeed the empirical relevance of the modern quantity theory and new classical macroeconomics would be thrown into question. Other set of conclusions involves setting up an internationally coordinated of financial regulations and bank supervision. It is argued that reforming the international monetary system has become unavoidable. There are also a host of specific other conclusions.

The conclusions and analysis contained in this paper are totally new. Given their comprehensiveness and global orientation, they will presage in future work, an overdue revision in received macroeconomic theory and financial supervision not seen since the 1960s.

Money is the lifeblood of all domestic and international organised crime groups regardless of whether the criminal activity giving rise to the proceeds is drug trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism or white‐collar crime. The flow of criminally tainted money through the international banking and trading system is what sustains these criminal activities. Systemically, however, money laundering harms every legitimate business transaction that it touches. On a macroeconomic level, policy makers have emphasised that it impedes international trade and finance to such an extent as to present a serious threat to the world economy. On a microeconomic level, it can damage an institution's good reputation, the public's confidence, revenues and employee morale. This is why the world has attached heightened significance to the money‐laundering problem.

The author assembles three hypothetical regulatory regimes and deploys computer simulations to contrast different banking systems based on conventional strategies for appointing risk-based capital minimum thresholds. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The author instigates cascading failure models within numerous directed graphs and measures the inflicted costs, the accumulated bank failures, and the general robustness of the networks following various economic shocks.

The author finds that a homogeneous regulatory regime is an inferior approach. However, a selected too-big-to-fail scheme portrays the best defensive banking model with the lowest number of total bank failures and the fewest banks' costs and social costs.

The author can only theoretically examine this topic.

The author overcomes some obstacles in prior studies including the use of a large and complex network and the proportional allocation of funds upon a bank failure.