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The media is described as a fourth estate of the realm due to its ability to frame and shape discussions on governance and provide a stimulus for fighting corruption. But is the media really an effective tool for fighting corruption? This question arises due to the possibility of the media being used for propaganda, biased reporting and media owners’ and journalists’ engagement in corruption. The current study addresses the question by exploring the relationship between the media and corruption from the perspectives of Ghanaian justice and anti-corruption officials.

The study adopts a qualitative approach by interviewing justice and anti-corruption officials across three administrative regions in Ghana.

The results show that while justice officials describe the media as a medium for accusing officials unjustifiably and exaggerating the scale of corruption, anti-corruption officials believe the media helps to fight corruption. In addition to uncovering and exposing public officials’ corruption, the media is also a double-edged sword characterised by intra-vigilance: the media hold “their own” (i.e. journalists fighting corruption) accountable through criticism and exposure of wrongdoings.

The double-edged nature of the media can strengthen and enhance the fight against corruption because anti-corruption actors and journalists will be cautious as misjudgements or errors committed will not be overlooked or concealed by the media. Therefore, anti-corruption agencies in Ghana can collaborate with the media to uncover and expose corruption committed by public officials and even journalists or media owners.

This study is the first in Ghana to explore the relationship between the media and corruption from the perspectives of justice and anti-corruption officials. The approach, frameworks and methodology adopted in this study can be applied in similar studies in other countries on the African continent and beyond.

We review the existing laboratory experimental studies on corruption that have generated results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the role that both monetary incentives and nonmonetary motivations may play in corruption decision-making, and, hence, in the fight against corruption.

With the analysis of the causes of corruption, this study aims to investigate specific anti-corruption measures that can be implemented to reform the political system and the social climate of China.

This study examines 97 severe corruption cases of high-ranking officials in China, which occurred between 2012 and 2015. As this insinuates that both institutional and social corruption are major problems in China, the analysis delves into multiple facts of corruption, including different types, four primary underlying causes, and suggestions regarding the implementation of three significant governmental shifts that focus on investigation, prevention tactics and legal regulations.

China’s corruption is not only individual-based but also it has developed into institutional corruption and social corruption. Besides human nature and instinct, the causes of corruption can be organised into four categories, namely, social customs, social transitions, institutional designs and institutional operations. For the removed high-ranking officials, the formation of interest chains was an important underlying cause behind their corruption.

This study makes a significant contribution to the literature because this study provides a well-rounded approach to a complex issue by highlighting the significance of democracy and the rule of law as ways to regulate human behaviour to combat future corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the anti-corruption campaign, “Hunting the Tigers,” incurs a significant short-term loss of shareholders’ returns.

A sophisticated event study approach is employed.

The results show that the “Hunting the Tigers” has incurred a significant short-term loss of investment returns for shareholders in China’s main stock market board. In addition, the beginning of a new assault on China’s official mogul corruption in another round of political anti-corruption cycle after the 18th National Congress of the CPC has reduced this price significantly.

This finding should be perceived as the price of the corruption of official-business collusion within capital markets in contemporary China.

This paper aims to investigate the factors affecting local government officials’ susceptibility to corrupt behavior among Indonesian local government officials.

This study uses a self-report survey and collected 449 questionnaires from 65 village government districts in Central Java province, Indonesia. This study uses a simple and partial correlation to measure the relationship between the susceptibility to corrupt behavior and the independent variables. Binary logistic regression was used to investigate which independent variables were best to explain the local government officials’ susceptibility to corrupt behavior.

The results show that the factors that best explain corrupt behavior’s susceptibility are the officials’ moral conviction to refrain from corrupt behavior, the perceived opportunity of corruption and the perceived benefit of engaging in such behavior. Further, this study finds an appealing crossover interaction between the perceived cost and social norms on corrupt behavior, such that when officials perceive the cost of engaging in corrupt behavior as low, they will rely more on social norms to decide whether to commit corrupt behavior.

This study provides actionable information for policy formulation. In particular, this study indicates that improvement of internal control can deter corrupt behavior. In addition, the findings of this study also suggest that changing the way we convey the message about corruption might be a promising intervention to mitigate corrupt behavior among government officials. More specifically, a more persuasive-positive-tone message that emphasizes the benefit of not engaging in corrupt behavior or that most people are against corruption can deter corrupt behavior.

The present study provides empirical evidence on the determinants of local government officials’ corrupt behavior from Indonesia’s perspective, which is currently limited.

The purpose of this paper is to apply Moore’s public value model into the context of e-government research by examining online financial transparency as both an organizational goal and as a driving force for financial sustainability and public officials’ corruption. The empirical context comprises the state governments in the USA.

Structural equation modeling is used to examine the relationship between specific contextual factors of the authorizing environment, financial sustainability, public official corruption and online budget transparency.

The results show that contextual factors like population explain online financial transparency, while financial sustainability and corruption had moderating and negative effects.

Governments that struggle with issues of financial sustainability and corruption will rely more on online financial transparency. Transparency increases detection of public corruption.

The effects of financial transparency and financial sustainability on corruption have been studied separately. This study fills the gap of understanding the effects of both on corruption as one phenomenon.

Official corruption has always plagued the conduct of public affairs and taxed every generation to keep it within reasonable bounds. Concerned governments have tried to apply whatever available remedies came to hand with varying success. Yet whenever one of corruption's many manifestations seemed to diminish, so another would demand attention. Combating it was and remains a tireless affair requiring continual vigilance and experimentation. This paper seeks to address these issues.

The paper studies the history of official corruption and efforts to combat it.

This checkered history of anti‐corruption efforts shows how the repertoire of techniques expands and how the corrupt evade their application. This everlasting battle of wits depends much on how seriously people and governments take the challenge of corruption, the nature of how public power is exercised, the triumph in governance of self‐interest over the general public interest, the level of personal integrity particularly at the apex of society, and fortune in selection of right targets. Nothing succeeds like success which, given institutional and human weaknesses in local cultures, is so difficult to achieve.

The paper provides an original study of the history of official corruption, efforts to fight it and the problems that are encountered.

Willard A. Hanna's astute observation above about the institutionalization of corruption in Indonesia was published in August 1971, five years after President Soeharto assumed power. The origins of corruption in Indonesia can be traced to the Dutch colonial period as bribery was rife among the lowly paid personnel of the Dutch East India Company (Day, 1966, pp. 100–103). However, corruption became institutionalized during President Soeharto's 32-year reign as his cronies and family “made an art form of creaming off many of Indonesia's most profitable ventures … while being protected by monopoly regulations and their relationship to the president” (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 202). Raymond Bonner (1988, p. 80) has used the euphemism “the family business” to describe “the corruption surrounding members of the Suharto family,” which was “a public secret” in 1988.

This paper aims to answer the following two research questions: Do corruption cases present different features before and since the new administration in China? How are criminal penalties affected by these corruption features?

The investigation is based on the online disclosure of 269 state corruption audits and their consequences, which have been made public by China’s National Audit Office since 2011. By manual coding, these official reports were analyzed, and an appropriate-sized sample of corruption cases was chosen. The authors then adopted Welch’s t-test and regression model methods to test the research hypotheses relevant to the two research questions.

The authors find that larger embezzlement or bribery amounts and more organizational corruption cases have been detected and punished since the anti-corruption campaign was launched by the new administration. They also conclude that significantly tougher criminal penalties were given to corruption cases involving large monetary amounts, that bribery cases were more harshly punished compared to other occupational crimes and that individual perpetrators received tougher criminal penalties than organizational criminals. In addition, the authors observe a trend that criminal penalties for corruption have been increasingly harsher in recent years.

The limitations of this study are quite clear as the Chinese corruption cases in this sample only include state corruption audit cases and does not refer to high-profile corruption cases investigated by the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection. However, this study suggests that state corruption audit results are a good research sample, which can be used to extend empirical tests to archival data acquired from state audit practices and can encourage more studies on public sector auditing and occupational financial crime.

State corruption audits can be an effective approach to successful anti-corruption campaigns, and the conclusions can be useful to policy makers and legislators in China and other developing countries.

This paper bridges some gaps in the existing financial crime literature. First, this study on corruption features is located within the context of a political administrative change; second, the state audit is highlighted as a supervising agency in the anti-corruption campaign; and third, the authors’ contribution adds to the empirical testing of data sets of state corruption audits within the existing financial crime literature.