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The literature on corruption and whistleblowing is increasing over the past years. However, the authors contend that individual reactions to a corrupt proposal could differ from the mentioned behaviours. On these grounds, the authors contend that a “grey zone” between accepting corruption and whistleblowing does exist. This paper aims to explore what are the behaviours defining this “grey zone” as nuanced behaviours adopted to react to a corrupt proposal.

The authors draw from Miceli and Near’s process of whistleblowing to open the scope for the comprehension of grey behaviours in the decision-making process following to a triggering event. The authors adopted a qualitative and explorative approach by interviewing 27 Italian public servants through open questions and storytelling to explore what kind of behaviours could define the grey zone.

The findings unveil nuanced behaviours in the grey zone configuring neither as corruption nor whistleblowing, ranging from ignoring the corrupt proposal to explicit contraposition. Also, they reveal different social and individual outcomes affecting future relationships in organizations. The findings allow to extend Miceli and Near’s process of whistleblowing to the wider spectrum of response behaviours to triggering events such as receiving or assisting to a corrupt proposal.

Limitations might be recognized in that the situations detected could be only a part of a possible wider “grey zone”. However, the authors believe that the findings could encourage future research to continue exploring the grey zone to enrich its comprehension. Also, the paper offers useful and interesting insights on an undebated issue that has a prominent value under the theoretical, practical, social and policymaking perspectives.

From the practical and policymaking perspective, the advancement of a debate contending the existence of a grey zone made of nuanced behaviours between corruption and whistleblowing could provide support both for organizations and policymakers to a better understanding of individual behaviours and improving actions and policies to prevent corruption and encourage whistleblowing.

As the authors are at least unaware of studies debating on the grey zone with specific reference to corruption and whistleblowing, the paper advances a discussion on the grey zone between corruption and whistleblowing as a continuum of nuanced behaviours that could provide a starting point for further fine-grained analyses.

This paper aims to investigate the factors affecting local government officials’ susceptibility to corrupt behavior among Indonesian local government officials.

This study uses a self-report survey and collected 449 questionnaires from 65 village government districts in Central Java province, Indonesia. This study uses a simple and partial correlation to measure the relationship between the susceptibility to corrupt behavior and the independent variables. Binary logistic regression was used to investigate which independent variables were best to explain the local government officials’ susceptibility to corrupt behavior.

The results show that the factors that best explain corrupt behavior’s susceptibility are the officials’ moral conviction to refrain from corrupt behavior, the perceived opportunity of corruption and the perceived benefit of engaging in such behavior. Further, this study finds an appealing crossover interaction between the perceived cost and social norms on corrupt behavior, such that when officials perceive the cost of engaging in corrupt behavior as low, they will rely more on social norms to decide whether to commit corrupt behavior.

This study provides actionable information for policy formulation. In particular, this study indicates that improvement of internal control can deter corrupt behavior. In addition, the findings of this study also suggest that changing the way we convey the message about corruption might be a promising intervention to mitigate corrupt behavior among government officials. More specifically, a more persuasive-positive-tone message that emphasizes the benefit of not engaging in corrupt behavior or that most people are against corruption can deter corrupt behavior.

The present study provides empirical evidence on the determinants of local government officials’ corrupt behavior from Indonesia’s perspective, which is currently limited.

The literature states that rationalization strategies contribute to a spread of corruption in organizations. They are supposed to serve not only as post hoc justifications but also as ex ante determinants of corrupt behavior. This empirical study aims at challenging this theoretical assumption.

The authors gained empirical data in a business simulation game where participants had the opportunity to act corruptly. The sample included both university and high school students.

The results show that post hoc rationalizations primarily highlight the “positive” intention behind corrupt action. As relationships with important person‐based determinants of corruption are lacking, it is questionable whether rationalization strategies possess potential as ex ante determinants of corrupt behavior.

The design of the study only assesses rationalization strategies post hoc. Therefore it does not allow for examining causal effects, only the investigation of relationships. Future research should aim at addressing this issue, including both ex ante and post hoc assessment of rationalization strategies.

The paper is a first attempt to examine empirically the function of rationalization strategies in the context of corruption in organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to explore behavioural factors which are perceived to influence corrupt action in the Australian construction industry.

The paper draw on Rabl and Kühlmann’s Model of a corrupt action and the results of face-to-face interviews with 23 people working in the Australian construction industry.

The results suggest that corruption is ambiguously defined yet perceived to be very common and primarily associated with personal gain rather than breaking the law. The main forms of corruption were identified as kickbacks, fraud and bribery and this behaviour is perceived to be driven by high goal feasibility, by conducive attitudes and supportive subjective norms and by high perceived behavioural control over being caught.

The research is based on a relatively small sample of 23 respondents and the use of snowball sampling may have meant that the respondents would tend to present a particular view of the industry. It is also important to point out that this research took place within a highly politicised environment coinciding the with launch of the third Royal Commission into corruption in the construction industry and is based on the respondent’s perceptions of corruption rather than incontrovertible evidence of corruption in practice. Nevertheless, given the care the authors took to avoid these biases, it does provide a useful window in the incidence and types of corruption in construction and the behavioural factors that might influence it.

In terms of tackling corruption, it is recommended that greater attention be given to exploring the culture of the industry which appears to normalise corrupt behaviour and to the hidden informal “institutions” which appear to be undermining the many formal policies and procedures which have been put in place to tackle corruption in the construction industry.

The global construction industry has been identified by Transparency International as the most bribery-prone of 19 industries it rated. The cost is huge with scarce resources being diverted from much needed urban regeneration, community concerns about development being ignored, individual human rights being abused, productivity and efficiency being compromised and important environments, cultures and heritage being destroyed. In Australia, concerns about corruption in the construction industry have led to an unprecedented three Royal Commissions which have argued that there is a culture which encourages, accepts and rewards this behaviour.

By using Rabl and Kühlmann’s Theory of a corrupt action this paper throws new light on how corruption is defined by members of the construction industry. The findings suggest that while formal technical and procedural solutions to corruption are important in addressing corruption they are likely to be undermined by strong cultures and informal institutions which dictate the “rules of the game” on the ground. There is a clear need to better understand how these informal institutions work to constrain formal rules devised to bring about reform.

This study aims to examine how corruption influences the voluntary disclosure of corporate governance (CG)-related information by developed country multinationals (DC-MNEs) and emerging market multinationals (EM-MNEs) investing in six Latin American countries.

The study uses information from 300 MNEs included in the 2018 ranking of the 500 Largest Latin American companies (America Economía, 2018). Each MNE’s final annual report for the financial year ending 2018 was examined and coded to obtain the corporate governance disclosure index. Fractional probit regression was applied to test the hypotheses of the research.

DC-MNEs disclose more CG-related information in corrupt environments than EM-MNEs. This differentiated behavior occurs because DC-MNEs face higher legitimacy pressures in corrupt environments than EM-MNEs and because EM-MNEs are more experienced than DC-MNEs in dealing with such corrupt environments.

While both EM-MNEs and DC-MNEs need to continue investing in corrupt countries to grow, they need to disclose CG-related information as a strategic tool to manage the legitimacy issues triggered by corruption in the markets they operate.

Despite corruption being pervasive in emerging markets, its implications for firms’ strategic behaviors are still under-researched. This paper extends the scope of corporate governance and international business fields by studying how MNEs respond to relevant dimensions of the macro environment. This research shows that voluntary disclosure of CG-related information is a strategic response of the MNEs to gain legitimacy in corrupt environments.

Because cultures operate in very different ways, different activities are corrupting in different parts of the world. Taking the view that corruption is an activity that tends to undermine a cultural system, this paper aims to examine this issue.

The paper analyzes real‐life situations in Japan, Taiwan, India, China, North America, sub‐Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Korea to distinguish actions that structurally undermine a cultural system from those that are merely inefficient or are actually supportive.

Cultures have fundamentally different behavioral norms due to their different conceptions of human nature. They can be broadly classified as rule‐based and relationship‐based, distinguished by the fact that behavior is regulated primarily by respect for rules in the former and authority figures in the latter. Corrupting behavior differs around the world partly because of different norms, and partly because cultural systems break down in different ways. Activities such as nepotism or cronyism that are corrupting in the rule‐based cultures of the West may be functional in relationship‐based cultures. Behavior that is normal in the West, such as bringing lawsuits or adhering strictly to a contract, may be corrupting elsewhere. Practices such as bribery that are often corrupting across cultures are nonetheless corrupting for very different reasons.

The paper provides culturally sensitive guidelines not only for avoiding corruption but also for understanding the mechanisms that make a culture work.

Existing experimental and quasi-experimental results have demonstrated that both anticorruption initiatives that provide information and/or authority to the recipients of government programs – so-called “bottom-up” interventions – and initiatives that rely on government agencies for enforcement – “top-down” interventions – can be effective in some settings. Yet, in other instances, both forms of intervention have been found to be ineffective in combating corruption. These contrasting results strongly suggest that the effectiveness of both “top-down” and “bottom-up” anticorruption interventions is conditional on other factors. Unfortunately, the existing literature says little regarding the conditions conducive to the success of either forms of intervention. Assessing the conditional effects of anticorruption treatments poses substantial challenges for researchers – particularly for those employing experimental or quasi-experimental approaches. This chapter (1) discusses factors that may condition the effectiveness of both top-down and bottom-up interventions; (2) illustrates the difficulties in assessing these conditional relationships, with particular reference to experimental and quasi-experimental settings; and (3) suggests approaches that might mitigate these problems.

I provide an overview of the literature that explores whether there are gender differences in corruption using economic decision-making experiments designed to simulate corrupt transactions usually involving acts of bribery between a firm and a government official. A primary focus of the chapter is to critically examine this evidence with a view to addressing the following question: will increased female participation in public life – both in government and bureaucracy – lead to reduced corruption? I find that across a wide variety of experiments, studying different aspects of corruption, it is either the case that women behave in a more pro-social and less corrupt manner than men or that there are no significant gender differences. There are no studies that find men to be less corrupt. Consequently, I conclude by arguing that we can answer the question posed above in the affirmative.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the analysis of corruption must distinguish between corruption in organizations where this kind of behaviour is widespread and corruption in organizations where it is rare, and must also distinguish between corruption as the outcome of an economic cost-benefit analysis and corruption induced by social-psychological factors.

This is a conceptual paper.

In order to be effective in combating corruption, a fit is needed with the main determinants of corrupt behaviour: first, at the individual level in which either personal morality, social or economic considerations are at stake; second, at the organizational level in which social-psychological factors might be determinative; and third, at the contextual level in which economic prosperity, the nature of the political system and cultural features are important.

Especially in systems where corruption is widespread, policymakers could benefit from theories in social psychology to combat corruption.

To see corruption as the result of an individual cost-benefit analysis or as a lack of morality often misses the point in cases of widespread corruption.

The paper points at the added value of social psychology approach to corruption as compared to the approaches at present dominant in public administration.

This paper aims to examine the effect of differential leadership on organizational corruption by developing a measure of organizational corruption and proposing a moderated mediation model. The model focuses on the mediating role of moral disengagement underpinning the relationship between differential leadership and organizational corruption, and the moderating role of organizational justice in influencing the mediation.

The authors collected 210 responses from online participants with full time work experience and 57 MBA students answered the survey offline.

Results showed that differential leadership was positively associated with organizational corruption. Furthermore, moral disengagement fully mediated the relationship between differential leadership and organizational corruption. Besides, distributive justice negatively but procedural justice positively moderated the indirect effect of moral disengagement.

Testing the moderated mediation model helps to advance the theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the effect of differential leadership on organizational corrupt behavior.

This empirical study provides preliminary evidence of the mediating role of moral disengagement in the positive relationship between differential leadership and organizational corruption. The mediated moderation also extends the finding by adding organizational justice as the moderator to explain how the effect of differential leadership on organizational corruption. Finally, this study provides initial evidence for organizational corruption measure.