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In October 2008, in the midst of a financial crisis, Anthony Keating, investment manager at the Boston private bank Billingsley, Blaylock, and Montgomery, was searching for an investment strategy to recommend to his high-net-worth clients. Traditional investments in the equity markets were being decimated, and Keating’s clients would be looking to him for ideas. Inspired by the success of Paulson and Co., Keating began to explore the possibility of entering a trade that would profit as homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. The more Keating learned about the trade, the more he realized that he needed to know about mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps. The case provides instructors with a chance to introduce these financial instruments, while at the same time providing lessons applicable to students interested in value investing or real estate finance.

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

• Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

• Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

• Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

Zoe Greenwood, vice president at Foundation Investment Advisors, was glancing through the offering memorandum for a new commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) deal on April 1, 2010, a time when the opportunities for commercial mortgage investors had been bleak to the point of comical. This new CMBS deal represented the first opportunity to buy CMBS backed by loans to multiple borrowers since credit markets had shut the securitization pipeline in June 2008.

The offering gave Greenwood a new investment opportunity to suggest to her firm's latest client. She had planned to recommend an expansion in her client's traditional commercial mortgage business, but these new bonds looked intriguing. Could the new CMBS offer her client a superior risk-return tradeoff compared with making individual mortgage loans?

After students have analyzed the case they will be able to:

• –Learn how to construct promised cash flows from both commercial mortgages and commercial mortgage-backed securities

• –Understand the benefits and costs of direct lending versus indirect lending (purchase of mortgage-backed bonds)

• –Underwrite commercial mortgage loans issued by others to identify potentially hidden risks

• –Evaluate at what price a mortgage-bond investment makes financial sense

–Learn how to construct promised cash flows from both commercial mortgages and commercial mortgage-backed securities

–Understand the benefits and costs of direct lending versus indirect lending (purchase of mortgage-backed bonds)

–Underwrite commercial mortgage loans issued by others to identify potentially hidden risks

–Evaluate at what price a mortgage-bond investment makes financial sense

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

The case illustrates an entrepreneurial voyage and venture creation and through it helps in identifying the reasons and causes for that venture's failure. It also enables discussion on the importance of planning a venture, more importantly; financing, managing, growing, and ending a venture and on how to avoid the pitfalls that befall such enterprises. This case can be used in Entrepreneurship courses as well as MBA, PGP and Executive Education programmes on Entrepreneurship.

In 2011, Sherry Hunt was a vice president and chief underwriter at CitiMortgage headquarters in the United States. For years she had been witnessing fraud, as the company bought billions of dollars in mortgage loans from external lenders that did not meet Citi credit policy and sold them to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). This resulted in Citi selling to GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pools of loans that were considerably defective and thus likely to default. Citi had also approved hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of defective mortgage files for U.S. Federal Housing Administration insurance. After reporting the mortgage defects in regular reports, notifying and working closely with her direct supervisor (who was subsequently asked to leave Citi after alerting the chairman of the board to these issues) to stop the purchase of defective loans, leaving anonymous tips on the FBI's and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's websites, and receiving threats from two of her superiors who demanded that she change the results of her quality control unit's reports, the shy and conflict-avoidant Hunt had to decide who she should tell about the fraud, and how.

The case gives students the opportunity to recommend how Hunt should proceed based on their analysis of the stakeholders involved. To aid instructors, the case includes Kellogg-produced videos of Hunt—the only on-camera interviews she has ever given—explaining what happened after she reported the fraud to Citi HR and, later, the U.S. Department of Justice. Within the case, students are also briefly exposed to legislation and bodies pertinent to whistle-blowing in the United States, including the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the SEC Office of the Whistleblower.

This case won the 2014 competition for Outstanding Case on Anti-Corruption, supported by the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME), an initiative of the UN Global Compact.

• Analyze stakeholders' motivations to prepare counter-arguments to the resistance one might encounter when reporting unethical behavior

• Write a script for who to tell, how, and why

• Discuss how incentive structures, management, and culture play roles in promoting or hindering ethical behavior in organizations

• Identify behaviors that help a whistle-blower be effective

• Gain experience resolving ethical dilemmas in which two values may conflict, such as professional duty and personal ethics

Analyze stakeholders' motivations to prepare counter-arguments to the resistance one might encounter when reporting unethical behavior

Write a script for who to tell, how, and why

Discuss how incentive structures, management, and culture play roles in promoting or hindering ethical behavior in organizations

Identify behaviors that help a whistle-blower be effective

Gain experience resolving ethical dilemmas in which two values may conflict, such as professional duty and personal ethics

In January 2008, Citi and Merrill Lynch are trying to steer their ships back to calm waters. The new CEOs, Vikram Pandit (Citi) and John Thain (Merrill), have been at the helm of their companies for less than three months. This case focuses on their steps to counteract the massive losses resulting from their firms' investments in subprime-mortgage structures. What actions have these leaders taken thus far and what actions should they consider going forward? See also “Warren E. Buffett, 2008” (UVA-F-1550).

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

The case, while acknowledging the difficulty of managing a family business in view of the accompanying human issues, emphasizes that sound business practices and procedures, and clarity with regard to the goal, remain the key; a firm is a complex, interconnected system and management needs a systems viewpoint; and technology can only support underlying business processes if there is clarity with respect to these.

SomPack had survived low-cost Asian competition starting the mid-1990s, a revolt by some extended family to try and bring it down with the help of a competitor, the Turkish banking crisis of 2001, and the global economic crisis of 2008 all the while watching its suppliers, competitors and customers collapse. A focus on cost-cutting and internal discipline by the successor, who had been promoted to CEO in 2004, had exacerbated internal discontent somewhat and had led to issues with production planning, but everyone understood that times were tough. Several large customers who had left were asked to return because the alternatives had been worse. By 2012, SomPack was considering expansion into new products in collaboration with its international partners. Then one day, in July 2013, it suddenly collapsed. Could the entire approach have been wrong? What should management have done instead?

Undergraduate, graduate business management.

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CSS 7: Management Science.

This case explores how and why GM became a major user of private equity and hedge fund capital, as well as the risks and rewards of these new relationships. The Cerberus transaction, audacious in both its size and complexity, is explored in detail. What were the alternatives for GM, and what risks and opportunities lay ahead for both parties? This case investigates the benefits, disadvantages, and potential conflicts of interest that evolved as GM's many suppliers increasingly embraced low-cost, nontraditional financing from hedge funds.

To analyze the significant role that private equity and hedge funds play in providing capital to corporations, especially those in distressed industries.

In 2010 Drive Property Solutions, a special servicing firm in Chicago, had partnered with Spiner Capital to win an FDIC auction of distressed debt. Included in that auction was the defaulted mortgage note on Northwinds Community Crossing, a retail strip mall in suburban Savannah, Georgia, which had been in default since November 2009. Sam Schey, an asset manager at Drive, needed to decide how to maximize recoveries from the nonperforming loan.