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The precise relationships between neoliberalization, financialization, and rising risk are still being debated in the literature. This paper examines, and challenges, the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) developed by Hyman Minsky and his adherents. In this perspective, the level of financial risk builds over time as participants orient their behavior in relation to assessments of past levels of risk performance, leading them to overly optimistic valuation estimates and increasingly risky behavior with each subsequent cycle. However, there are problems with this approach, and many questions remain, including how participants modify their exposure to risk over time, how risk is scaled, and who benefits from changes in exposure to risk. This paper examines such questions and proposes an alternate perspective on financial instability and risk, in light of the history of risk management within Canada’s housing finance sector. The rise of financialization in Canada has been accompanied by shifts in the sectoral and scalar locus of risk within the housing sector, from the federal state, to lower levels of government, third-sector organizations, and finally, private households. In each case, the transfer of risk has occurred as participants in each stage sought to reduce their own risk exposure in light of realistic and even pessimistic (not optimistic) expectations deriving from past exposure, contradicting basic assumptions of Minsky’s FIH. This is the process that has driven the neoliberalization of housing finance in Canada, characterized by the socialization of lender risk while households increasingly take on the financial and social risks relating to shelter.

Compares and contrasts the views of Hyman P. Minsky and Thorstein Veblen concerning the systematic development of financial crises in capitalistic economies. Advances the argument that Minsky and Veblen have both successfully met the challenge of providing a reasonable explanation for the speculative mania and related excesses critical to any theory of cyclical fluctuations. They agree that upturns tend to euphoria and ultimately, over‐capitalization and subsequent economic decline. Their rationales differ. Veblen stresses the effects of rising prices on collateral values and argues that the cumulative effect is over valued assets. Minsky seems to emphasize the ever‐growing fragility of financial structures. In the view of the authors, this article places Veblen′s contributions in a contemporary setting and ties Minsky more closely to the institutionalists.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on financial fragility in non-financial corporations, using Nishi’s operationalization of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. Specifically, the study investigates the influence of board size, board independence, CEO duality and audit quality on the financial fragility of non-financial companies (NFCs).

Using a panel logit regression model, the authors analyse annual data from (66) NFCs listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, spanning over the period 2015–2021. This methodology enables us to assess the relationships between the identified CG mechanisms and the categorical proxy of financial fragility.

The findings of this study reveal that a large share of NFCs fall within Minsky’s “Ponzi” classification, indicating elevated levels of financial vulnerability. Remarkably, the analysis demonstrates that larger board sizes and the CEO-Chairman duality exacerbate financial fragility within these firms. Conversely, the study results suggest that board independence and audit quality exhibit limited effects on financial fragility. In addition, profitability, firm size and financial leverage are identified as key predictors of financial fragility.

This study adds to the current literature by using a financial fragility index grounded in Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. The constructed index is then used to examine specific CG factors in relation to financial fragility, which offers new insights into the dynamics influencing the default exposure of NFCs. Furthermore, the study findings have direct implications for policymakers and stakeholders aiming to enhance CG practices and foster financial stability in the private sector.

This chapter considers financial instability as a phenomenon endogenous to the functioning of capitalism. Consequently, it seeks to identify the main sources and different forms of the latter in financialised capitalism. According to Keynes, capital assets prices are conceived as the expression of financial conventions. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between the returns expected by company directors, bankers, holders of equity titles, risk-takers and, in contrast, risk-averse holders of debt securities. Minsky enriches the analysis by attributing a decisive role to the leverage effect, at the origin of an accumulation of financial weaknesses in the balance sheets of non-financial agents during the expansion phases preceding financial crises. Regulation theory leads to the introduction of a distinction between the financial accelerator and the leverage effect. The first establishes a procyclical relationship at the macroeconomic level between the price of capital assets and the debt ratio of non-financial agents; the second acts at the microeconomic level through shareholder corporate governance, which determines the institutional conditions inciting firm directors to integrate shareholder expectations into their return forecasts. The empirical analysis identifies three forms of financial instability in financialised capitalism: the long-term financial cycle governed by the debt ratio of non-financial agents; the business cycle governed by the impact of stock prices on investment; and the short-term or even very short-term expected return revisions of financial actors. Its originality is to show that these three forms of instability acquire different characteristics depending on the national economy considered.

The chapter contains a methodology for formalized evaluation of the role of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) in ensuring monetary and financial sustainability with the help of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and its inflation target regime. The significance of the research of the Bank of Russia operations to ensure financial sustainability is due to a number of circumstances: the uniqueness of the Bank of Russia that appeared only 27 years ago and experienced several devastating events related to the 1998 financial crisis, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, and the stagnation of the Russian economy in 2014–2016, as well as high volatility of world prices for Russian commodity exports and the latest contra-Russian sanctions that significantly affected the volatility of the Russian ruble. Taking into account all the above, the issue of the Bank of Russia’s effective activities in the long run is aggravated by the fact that there are still more open questions than proven relationships of causes and effects regarding the potential of specific monetary policy instruments in the context of low-growth and high-volatility environment. The modeling of the Bank of Russia strategic and operational targets has been based on the parameters’ dependencies presented by the money (credit) multiplier in the interpretation of G. Schinasi (2006) and on the instability of stable economy hypothesis of H. Minsky (2008). As a result, there have been established the marginal levels of definite indicators of the banking system performance that could allow the Bank of Russia to ensure financial sustainability in the low-growth and high-volatility environment.

This paper focuses on two books that Robert Heilbroner wrote with Peter Bernstein on public finance – A Primer on Government Spending (1963) and The Debt and the Deficit (1989). It also discusses how the economic world changed between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, and how these changes affected their books. Primer introduced Keynesian economics, and the possibility that government policy and deficits could be forces for good in the world. Debt focused exclusively on government deficits and public debt. Changing circumstances made this work a more difficult undertaking. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, government budget deficits were small, growth was sluggish, and Keynesianism was the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics. Primer explained Keynesian public finance, why tax cuts would spur spending and growth, and why we should not worry about government debt under these circumstances. By the 1980s, Keynes was vanquished, deficits were ballooning, and Keynesian public finance was under attack. Contrary to the conventional wisdom at the time, Debt advocated government deficits along the lines proposed by Keynes but not along the lines enacted during the Reagan administration. Nonetheless, there were many similarities in these two works. Both made a case for an active government role in creating a good society; and both argued that when done correctly deficit spending created no economic problems and had many benefits.

This study aims to find out how institutional investors use momentum in making investment decisions, and whether their actions are consistent with the Financial Instability Hypothesis of Hyman Minsky.

The study discusses the findings of interviews with 25 professional investors from the Hong Kong offices of five global financial institutions. All of the participants have several years of practical experience in global and regional markets.

Nearly all the managers interviewed said they use momentum in making investment decisions, and they do this in ways that are consistent with the Financial Instability Hypothesis, in which markets alternate between stable and unstable states. The participants are aware they may contribute to this, but they cannot avoid doing it because of short-term constraints in the present financial system.

This study adds to our knowledge of how professional investors use momentum in their investment strategies. It complements findings of quantitative studies that show momentum strategies have been profitable in many market settings. It also adds evidence that supports the Financial Instability Hypothesis.

The purpose of this article is to highlight the need for renewed collaborative efforts between linguists and economists to develop a multidisciplinary approach to discourse studies to single out, in the case at hand, how financial media discourse might reflect either a prevailing mainstream or a Minskian conceptual apparatus in financial crisis related papers.

The paper conducts exploratory research by focusing on semantic analysis, so as to indicate how the latter might possibly indicate a shift in the prevailing framework in contemporary financial media discourse. After a clear exposition of a theoretical dichotomy between the Minskian and mainstream approaches, it relies on Tropes software to conduct applied discourse analysis and discover evidence for the aforementioned shift. It exploits a set of three crisis-related articles from the Financial Times written by Martin Wolf. The selected corpora consist of opinion articles, a genre believed to be both emblematic of financial media discourse and subject to the influence of underlying theoretical frameworks.

The paper has identified a convincing Minskian vs mainstream dichotomy that may be substantiated by a set of disciplinary criteria. It argues that these criteria can be further used in applied discourse analysis. It demonstrates the relevance of our methodology from the exploratory test conducted. Eventually, these exploratory results, although they remain embryonic, suggest that a shift in the conceptual frameworks underlying the media discourses has taken place, from the Mainstream in fair weather conditions to (possibly) a more Minskian framework in times of crisis and financial instability.

The sample size is extremely restricted (albeit acceptable in an exploratory research context); these limitations are inherent in exploratory research and do not preclude the validity of the broader interdisciplinary research agenda. In our proposed theoretical dichotomy, the mainstream approach is subject to caution insofar as no single and consensual definition of the latter exists to date in the literature.

This article has highlighted the need for further multidisciplinary collaborative research endeavors (in particular, linguistics and economics). It has also touched the issue of crisis prevention and early warning systems, which may include financial press monitoring.

There exists a powerful media sphere within which financial discourse may exert an influence on decision-makers through the influence of underlying theoretical frameworks, eventually shaping real economic outcomes. The research program initiated, by combining the insights of economics and linguistics; therefore, aims to uncover the modus operandi of financial media discourse.

Among divergent approaches to understand the global financial crisis, Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis has gained increased attention. In part, the chapter draws upon Minsky's notion that the seeds of instability are sown when banks, households, and firms move from hedge to speculative and then into Ponzi financial positions. Financial innovations such as securitisation contribute to this transformation. In addition, the paper will discuss the findings arising from an analysis of interviews that focus on securitisation related issues after the sub-prime crisis with practitioners who were closely involved in regulation and risk-management. The paper highlights the need for fundamental reform in the financial sector with a more consistent regulatory platform and enhanced supervision, to facilitate rapid healing from the damage arising from the financial crisis in Australia.

There are two influential interpretative positions in the current debate on the crisis among Marxists. The first understands financialization as a consequence of the tendential fall of the rate of profit. The other interpretation, prevalent among those influenced by Keynesianism and Neoricardianism, refers to the tendency toward the crisis of realisation, because of the squeeze on the wage bill and the insufficiency of consumer demand. In both cases, the current crisis is the crisis of a feeble capitalism, permanently stagnationist. A Marxian interpretation of the crisis cannot be separated from the tendential fall of the rate of profit. This latter, however, cannot be accepted as it is presented by Marx, and it must be rethought as a meta-theory of the crisis, including within it the different crisis theories that can be derived from Capital. This article first provides a personal survey of Marx's crisis theories, often presented as opposed to each other. Second, it seeks to integrate the different positions into a unitary discourse, within a nonmechanical reading of the fall of the rate of profit. This discourse then mutates into an historical sketch of the long dynamic of capital: from the Great Depression of the end of the nineteenth century, to the Great Crash of the 1930s, to the Social Crisis in the immediate processes of valorisation of the 1960s–1970s (the Great Inflation). Finally, the “new” capitalism (the Great Moderation) and its recent crisis (the Great Recession) are read – integrating Marx and Minsky – as the conjunction between the real subsumption of labour to finance and the fragmentation of labour.