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The motivation to participate in crowdsourcing (CS) platforms is an emerging challenge. Although researchers and practitioners have focused on crowd motivation in the past, the results obtained through such practices have not been satisfactory. Researchers have left unexplored research areas related to CS pillars, such as the evolution of the crowd’s primary motivations, seekers applying effective policies and incentives, platform design challenges and addressing task complexity using the synchronicity of the crowd. Researchers are now more inclined to address these issues by focusing on sustaining the crowd’s motivation; however, sustaining the crowd’s motivation has many challenges.

To fill this gap, this study conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) to investigate and map the challenges and factors affecting sustained motivation during CS with the overcoming implications. Studies that satisfied the inclusion criteria were published between 2010 and 2021.

Important sustainable factors are extracted using the grounded theory that has sustained participation and the factors' cohesion leads to the identification of challenges that the pillars of CS face. Crowds being the most vital part of CS contests face the challenge of engagement. The results reported the factors that affect the crowd’s primary and post-intentions, perceived value of incentives and social and communal interaction. Seekers face the challenge of knowledge and understanding; the results identify the reason behind the crowd’s demotivation and the impact of theories and factors on the crowd's psychological needs which helped in sustaining participation. Similarly, the platforms face the challenge of being successful and demanding, the results identify the latest technologies, designs and features that seekers proclaim and need the platforms designer's attention. The identified task challenges are completion and achievement; the authors have identified the impact of trait of task and solving mechanisms that have sustained participation.

The study identifies, explores and summarizes the challenges on CS pillars researchers are facing now to sustain contributions by keeping participants motivated during online campaigns. Similarly, the study highlights the implication to overcome the challenges by identifying and prioritizing the areas concerning sustainability through the adoption of innovative methods or policies that can guarantee sustained participation.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of four different incentives in improving hedging effectiveness and propose an alternative regulatory mechanism for China’s futures market.

The research method that this study uses is a laboratory experiment, and this study follows the basic norms of experimental research. In addition, this paper designs and conducts a game experiment between hedgers and futures brokerage firms (FBFs) under different incentive mechanisms.

By analyzing the experimental data, it is found that compared with other incentive mechanisms, hedgers’ willingness to hedge and FBFs’ regulatory intention are both significantly higher for the dynamic linkage updating mechanism, indicating that hedgers have a stronger willingness to follow their hedging plan, and FBFs are more responsible for their regulatory behaviors. Additionally, the dynamic linkage updating mechanism has a long-term impact on effective hedging in the futures market.

The findings suggest that the dynamic linkage updating mechanism is beneficial for effectively restricting both hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ regulatory slack and improving the hedging efficiency of the futures market.

To solve the problem of inefficient hedging in China’s futures market, i.e., hedgers’ over-speculation and FBFs’ passive collusion with hedgers, the regulators of China’s futures market should reform the existing incentives and adopt a dynamic linkage updating mechanism to encourage all the participants to actively improve hedging effectiveness.

This paper analyzes and verifies, for the first time, the role of the dynamic linkage updating mechanism in the investing behaviors of hedgers and the regulatory behaviors of future brokerage firms. The futures market experiment that was designed and used in this study is a pioneering and exploratory experiment that applies game theory and mechanism design theory to the field of behavioral finance.

This study aims to demonstrate how agent-based simulation (ABS) may provide a computational testbed for mechanism design using concepts of bounded rationality (BR). ABS can be used to systematically derive and formalize different models of BR. This allows us to identify the cognitive preconditions for behavior intended by the mechanism and thereby to derive implications for the design of mechanisms.

Based on an analysis of the requirements of the decision context, the authors describe a systematic way of incorporating different BR concepts into an agent learning model. The approach is illustrated by analyzing an incentive scheme suggested for truthful reporting in budgeting contexts, which is an adapted Groves mechanism scheme.

The study describes systematic ways in which to derive BR agents for research questions where behavioral aspects might matter. The authors show that BR concepts may lead to other outcomes than the intended truth-inducing effect. A modification of the mechanism to more distinguishable levels of payments improves the results in terms of the intended effect.

The presented BR concepts as simulated by agent models cannot model human behavior in its full complexity. The simplification of complex human behavior is a useful analytical construct for the controlled analysis of a few aspects and an understanding of the potential consequences of those aspects of human behavior for mechanism design.

The paper specifies the idea of a computational testbed for mechanism design based on BR concepts. Beyond this, a systematic and stepwise approach is shown to formalize bounded rational behavior by agents based on a requirements analysis, including benchmark models for the comparison and evaluation of BR concepts.

A serious problem in the pandemic days is that in this period many firms face difficulties with remaining on the market. It causes that the entrepreneurs do not undertake activities which could result in introducing innovations. In this context, the authors examine new mechanisms which lead competitive economy to the long-run equilibrium under the assumption that producers are change-averse.

The results have the form of theorems with rigorous proofs and provide the ideas on the way of developing the economic policy in respect of firms in the pandemic days.

As a result, the authors justify that in some cases it is worth leading an economic sector or a whole economy to the long-run equilibrium state.

The authors show that there exists a mechanism in the sense of Hurwicz which transforms the economy into an economic system being in the long-run equilibrium as well as the authors determine optimal mechanisms, under the criterion of distance minimization, in some subsets of the mechanisms designed.

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants.

This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors’ understanding of family firm dynamics.

The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity.

This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy.

Wall climbing robots' volume is needed to be very small in fields that workspace is limited, such as anti‐terror scouting, industry pipe network inspecting and so on. The purpose of this paper is to design a miniature wall climbing robot with biomechanical suction cups actuated by shape memory alloy (SMA) actuators.

Based on characteristics of biologic suction apparatuses, the biomechanical suction cup is designed first. Theory analysis of the suction cup is made considering elastic plate's deflection and SMAs constitutive model. A triangular close linkage locomotion mechanism is chosen for the miniature robot because of its simple structure and control. The robot's gait, kinematics, and control system are all illustrated in this paper.

Experiments indicate that the suction cup can be used as an adhesion mechanism for miniature wall climbing robots, and the miniature robot prototype with biomechanical suction cups can move in straight line and turn with a fixed angle on an inclined glass wall.

This paper describes how a miniature wall climbing robot with biomechanical suction cups actuated by SMA without any air pump is designed.

The Balinese have been successful for centuries in sustaining cooperation among the members of local communities in order to provide public goods through individual contributions. The purpose of this paper is to review and highlight the Balinese mechanism's remarkable features.

The paper surveyed the experimental literature on public goods and highlighted those features of the Balinese tradition that have been proven to be both effective in the experimental laboratory and successful in deterring free‐riding on the field.

The most prominent features discussed are decentralization, democratic decision making, the use of two currencies, supervision, and the possibility of imposing severe sanctions for free‐riding.

The paper's findings not only can help to preserve the high level of cooperation among inhabitants in Bali threatened by migration flows and the increasingly intense reliance on the market mechanism, but they also provide general insights both for theoreticians and practitioners on how to create successful communities. In addition, the literature review sheds light on several features of public‐good games that have not been satisfactorily explored yet by experimental economists.

The novelty of the paper's approach lies in looking at the Balinese tradition through the glasses of mechanism design theory and aligning the related findings of experimental economics in order to understand its success and problems.

This paper aims to explain the design of a novel leg mechanism for SLEGS robot. SLEGS means both “S”-shaped for the legged robot and “O”-shaped for the wheeled robot. It is a reconfigurable/transformable mobile robot.

First, a novel robot leg is designed by inspiration from previous studies. Second, the SLEGS robot’s leg is modeled using 3D computer model, and kinematics analysis performed on the leg mechanism. Finally, the prototype of the novel leg was developed for the SLEGS robot.

The robot leg mechanism has both flexible and self-reconfigurable modular features. All legs automatically take the form of both a rotating wheel and a walking leg with a self-reconfigurable modular feature.

The modeled leg is original in terms of its novel locomotion mechanism in both the walking and wheeled configurations.