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Let there be two individuals: “rich,” and “poor.” Due to inefficiency of the income redistribution policy, if a social planner were to tax the rich in order to transfer to the poor, only a fraction of the taxed income would be given to the poor. Under such inefficiency and a standard utility specification, a Rawlsian social planner who seeks to maximize the utility of the worst-off individual will select a different allocation of incomes than a utilitarian social planner who seeks to maximize the sum of the individuals’ utilities. However, when individuals prefer not only to have more income but also not to have low status conceptualized as low relative income, and when this distaste is incorporated in the individuals’ utility functions with a weight that is greater than a specified critical level, then a utilitarian social planner will select the very same income distribution as a Rawlsian social planner.

Culture is a central concept broadly studied in social anthropology and sociology. It has been gaining increasing attention in economics, appearing in research on labor market discrimination, identity, gender, and social preferences. Most experimental economics research on culture studies cross-national or cross-ethnic differences in economic behavior. In contrast, we explain laboratory behavior using two cultural dimensions adopted from a prominent general cultural framework in contemporary social anthropology: group commitment and grid control. Groupness measures the extent to which individual identity is incorporated into group or collective identity; gridness measures the extent to which social and political prescriptions intrinsically influence individual behavior. Grid-group characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We hypothesize that these attributes allow us to systematically predict behavior in a way that discriminates among multiple forms of social preferences using a simple, parsimonious deductive model. The theoretical predictions are further tested in the economics laboratory by applying them to the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games. We find that these predictions are confirmed overall for most experimental games, although the strength of empirical support varies across games. We conclude that grid-group cultural theory is a viable predictor of people’s economic behavior, then discuss potential limitations of the current approach and ways to improve it.

A substantial part of airports’ revenues relates to charges covering the costs of services supplied by the airport. Charges are imposed on carriers, which in turn pass them or a percentage of them, on to passengers. In the present chapter, special attention is given to regional airports characterized by low traffic volumes, enabling only one or a few carriers to serve each destination. A classic economic model is presented to analyze how the pass-on rate depends on supply and demand characteristics and market structure. Some illustrative examples assuming combinations of common specifications for market characteristics are also presented, showing pass-on rates ranging from 50% to more than 100%. Consequently, market structure and characteristics of carriers and passengers are decisive for how passengers experience changes in airport charges. The differences between the optimal charge from the perspectives of the airport and the welfare of society are specifically addressed. It is demonstrated that knowledge of the pass-on rate in the monopoly cases may be sufficient to infer how the mark-up will be affected by a change in marginal costs. Consequently, the understanding of the pass-on rate is relevant for airport owners and for decision-makers when considering the welfare of passengers and other politically stated goals.

Since Piore’s (1979) seminal work on ethnic economies, there has been significant development in our understanding of the grouping process of immigrants and co-ethnics into economic, social, and political units, and the behavior of immigrant entrepreneurs within these groups. During the past two decades a number of sociologists have contributed several important concepts to the study of ethnic entrepreneurship such as social capital (e.g. Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 1996, 2000), social embeddedness and network ties (e.g. Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Rath, 2002), and fine tuning the definitional distinctions between levels of co-ethnic cohesiveness, such as ethnic neighborhoods, ethnic economies, and ethnic enclaves (e.g. Light & Gold, 2000; Waldinger, 1982; Waldinger et al., 1990). More recently, business theorists have started to examine the problem of ethnic economic activity, incorporating more economic and entrepreneurship strategy concepts such as resource dependency (Greene, 1997), buyer-supplier relationships (Galbraith et al., 2003), access to financing (Smallbone et al., 2002), and differential marketing systems (Iyer & Shapiro, 1999). What appears to be sometimes lacking in modern discussions of ethnic economies and entrepreneurial behavior, however, is an underlying and unifying theoretical paradigm.