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A substantial part of airports’ revenues relates to charges covering the costs of services supplied by the airport. Charges are imposed on carriers, which in turn pass them or a percentage of them, on to passengers. In the present chapter, special attention is given to regional airports characterized by low traffic volumes, enabling only one or a few carriers to serve each destination. A classic economic model is presented to analyze how the pass-on rate depends on supply and demand characteristics and market structure. Some illustrative examples assuming combinations of common specifications for market characteristics are also presented, showing pass-on rates ranging from 50% to more than 100%. Consequently, market structure and characteristics of carriers and passengers are decisive for how passengers experience changes in airport charges. The differences between the optimal charge from the perspectives of the airport and the welfare of society are specifically addressed. It is demonstrated that knowledge of the pass-on rate in the monopoly cases may be sufficient to infer how the mark-up will be affected by a change in marginal costs. Consequently, the understanding of the pass-on rate is relevant for airport owners and for decision-makers when considering the welfare of passengers and other politically stated goals.

It is demonstrated how an analysis of airports’ cost structures and the calculation of long-run marginal costs (MCs) of serving passengers and airplanes can be used as a basis for setting airport charges according to the principles of welfare economics. Based on Norwegian data, the MC for an extra passenger (PAX) and extra air traffic movement (ATM) are used to set airport charges under the assumption that the charges should be equal for all airports in the country. When adjusting the estimates to meet revenue restrictions and comparing the estimates to current charges, we observe that PAX should be charged more and ATM less. This finding is in line with recommendations from the International Air Transport Association (IATA). When allowing charges to vary between airports, we demonstrate how a Ramsey pricing approach can be applied to set differentiated PAX and ATM charges, considering both the supply side (the competitive conditions between the airlines operating at the airports) and the demand side (the passengers’ price elasticity of demand).

If banks solve an inter-temporal problem under adverse selection and moral hazard, then bank specific factors, regulatory and supervisory features, market structure, and macroeconomic factors can be expected to affect banks’ loan interest rates and their spread over deposit interest rates. To examine interest rate pass-through for Indian banks in a period following extensive financial reform, after controlling for all these factors, we estimate the determinants of commercial banks’ loan pricing decisions, using the dynamic panel data methodology with annual data for a sample of 33 banks over the period 1996–2012. Results show commercial banks consider several factors apart from the policy rate. This limits policy pass-through. More competition reduces policy pass-through by decreasing the loan rate as well as spreads. If managerial efficiency is high then an increase in competition increases the policy pass-through and the vice-versa. Reform has had mixed effects, while managerial inefficiency raised rates and spreads, product diversification reduced both. Costs of deposits are passed on to loan rates. Regulatory requirements raise loan rates and spreads.

One of the several claims that Seligman makes for Rooke is that he should be accorded priority in the discovery of the correct, that is Ricardian, doctrine of rent:there seems little doubt that the doctrine of rent was developed practically simultaneously by Malthus, West, Torrens and Rooke in 1814, but so far as the priority of actual publication is concerned, the above list should be reversed. And in the interests of historical accuracy, Rooke and Torrens must hereafter be accorded the position which they deserve. (Seligman, 1903, p. 512)¹

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Uses input‐output tables to quantify the effect of business rates on consumers′ expenditure, exports, investment and government consumption. Updates data from the 1979 tables to indicate that the burden of business rates on consumers′ expenditure is likely to have risen by around 30 per cent in real terms over the last decade. Concludes that the 1990 revaluation has increased the rates bills on the service sector and is likely to have made the uniform business rate less regressive.

The purpose of this article is to investigate the asymmetric impact of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) on employees' wages via consumer prices in 15 major oil-exporting countries from sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1996-2017 using the panel threshold regression model.

The methodology used in this article was built on non-linear panel threshold regression models developed by Hansen (1996, 1999) threshold regression. The authors first tested for the existence of threshold-effect in ERPT and wage nexus using 1,000 bootstrap replications and 400 grid searches to obtain an optimal threshold. We also estimated that asymmetric ERPT on employees' wages reacts differently when the inflation-threshold exceeds beyond a 15.12% threshold level.

Our findings showed that asymmetric ERPT is incomplete and indicates that an increase by one standard deviation in real exchange rate causes a decline in employees' wages by 2.69%.

The policy implications of our results are drawn from the significant threshold estimates. However, a significant threshold value of 15.12 is an inflation-threshold estimates that split our 330 observations into the lower (upper) regimes. Further, an inflation rate beyond the threshold value is likely to have an asymmetric ERPT on employees' wages in the 15 major oil-exporting sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.

The practical implication of the study is when ERPT exceeds the threshold, the effect of real exchange rate variations is passed on to employees' wages. It is widely believed that labor productivity increase with increased minimum wages. Nevertheless, there is contention as regards the effects on employment and poverty. As rising goods prices make the minimum wage increased homogeneous of degree zero.

Considerable increased ERPT on imported goods reduces employees' wages purchasing ability from import-dependent countries through import prices. Once it has documented, this also reduces welfare via deteriorations of marginal propensity to consume (MPC) and marginal propensity to savings (MPS).

This article integrates labor purchasing power into the analysis of ERPT using non-linear dynamic panel heterogeneous threshold regression. It extends the Hansen (1996, 1999) dynamic panel threshold models to exchange rate pass-through in SSA economies.

Low interest rates around the world due to adaptive monetary policy regulations for some time a source of concern for the banking sector and depositors of the bank. In this environment, interest rates have raised concerns about nominal deposit interest rates which cannot be lowered below zero without destroying bank customers. Bank loans are becoming less vulnerable to lower interest rates on deposits approaching zero, indicating that the financial channel is weakened when interest rates are close to zero. Demographic pressures associated with longer life expectancy, China's gradual integration into global financial markets and changes in supply and asset requirements are attributed as reasons for low interest rates. Volatility of CPI inflation, interest rates on bank deposits attracting income tax and discontented depositors due to lower rates are cited as reasons for the suffering of bank depositors. This chapter thus discusses the impact of negative rate on economic growth and bank customers besides discussing the future trends of negative interest rates.