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This study investigates the relationship between financial participation plans, that is profit sharing, share plans and option plans, and firm financial performance using a longitudinal panel data set of non-financial listed companies for the period 1992–2009 comprising 2,216 observations. In addition, it makes a distinction between financial participation plans that are narrow based, directed to top management and executives only, and broad based, targeted to all employees. The panel data also allow us to take into account time lag effects, as profit sharing is usually said to have short-term effects while stock options and share plans are more targeted to longer term impact. Our results show that broad-based profit-sharing plans and combinations of broad-based profit sharing and share plans are positively related with many firm financial performance indicators relative to companies without these plans. However, the results consistently show negative associations between both narrow- and broad-based option plans and firm financial performance.

Given the continued growth in the globalization of production, working conditions in global supply chains have come under increased scrutiny. Although there has been much debate about corporate codes of conduct and monitoring procedures, the question of how buyers influence their suppliers’ working conditions at the factory level remains poorly understood. Using a unique data set based on monitoring by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and original survey data collected in Cambodia's garment sector, this study shows that the main channel linking buyers and supplier compliance performance is the nature of their relationships. Market-based relationships mediated through sourcing agents are systematically associated with poorer compliance performance. In particular, when a reputation-conscious buyer is sourcing from a factory, it has a positive effect on compliance, and their presence appears to condition relationship variables. Deterrence and learning channels are not supported by the evidence. The findings signal the need to pay more attention to the nature of buyer–supplier relationships if we seek to improve labor standard compliance. Market-based relationships motivate neither buyers nor suppliers to invest their time and resources to tackle the root causes of poor working conditions. Rather, the results here indicate the need to develop collaborative relationships marked by open dialogue, trust, and commitment, which in turn help to foster an environment supportive of continuous improvement in working conditions.

This chapter examines the UK and the Nigerian approach to reducing emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the environment as a result of gas flaring utilising the market-based regulation. Determining how different jurisdictions fare in the quest to reduce GHG emissions associated with the oil and gas industry is essential because: policy makers have realised the advantages of market-based regulation over the command-and-control regulation; and in the light of various pledges different countries have made in different forum to reduce the emission of GHGs, particularly in the wake of the recently held Paris climate change conference.

Library-based approach is used, providing conceptual and theoretical understanding of climate change, GHG emissions and various market-based regulatory tools utilised in the United Kingdom and Nigeria in regulating emission associated with operations in the oil and gas industry.

The study reveals the significance of environmental regulations that encourage region integration and flexibility in the implementation of environmental policies. Moreover, it finds that the Paris Agreement re-affirms the utilisation of market-based regulations and indicates a future for investment in the oil and gas industry.

The study revealed that there are lacunas in regulations and strategies for the implementation of environmental regulations which need to be addressed in order to achieve zero or a significant decrease in gas flaring.

This study provided an ample opportunity to theoretically examine market-based regulatory tools utilised in the oil and gas industry in a developed country in relation to a developing country.

This paper focuses on the role of manufacturer brands for resellers within retail channels. This topic is important because of the strategic value of manufacturer brands and the increasing influence of resellers within channels of distribution. Much of the branding research emphasizes a customer-brand knowledge perspective; however, emerging perspectives suggest that brands are also relevant to other stakeholders including resellers. In contrast, channels research recognizes the manufacturer sources of market power, but does not consider the impact of manufacturer “push and pull” strategies within channels. Existing theoretical frameworks, therefore, do not address the reseller perspective of the brand. As a result, the research approach is a multi-method design, consisting of two phases. The first phase involves in-depth interviews, allowing the development of a conceptual framework. In the second phase, a survey of supermarket buyers on brands in several product categories tests this framework. Structural equation modeling analyzes the survey responses and tests the hypotheses. The structural model shows very good fit to the data with good construct validity, reliability, and stability. The findings show that manufacturer support, brand equity, and customer demand reflect the manufacturer brand benefits to resellers. A key contribution of this research is the development of a validated scale on manufacturer brand benefits from the point of view of a reseller. This research shows that the resources that relate to the brand, not just the brand name itself, create value for resellers in channel relationships.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

Post-crisis policy measures in Asia have focussed on banking sector and market reform. The paper argues that in order to propel growth, banking and market reform in Asia must be undertaken with the view that they are not mutually exclusive competitive tradeoffs. Rather banks and markets must be viewed as complementary supportive pillars in a financial system. Additionally, legal and functional reform must be undertaken simultaneously. The paper proposes that a likely consequence of doing so will enable creating a four-pillared multi-dimensional growth paradigm in the region to help restore and promote growth.

Marketers frequently lament the lack of representation of marketing in the boardroom and the short tenure of CMOs. The most common explanations offered are that marketing is not perceived as a strategic discipline and that marketers do not demonstrate a strong enough understanding of how the business makes money.

Financial accounting is how “score is kept” in terms of business performance. It is, therefore, in the self-interest of marketers to become familiar with financial reporting. Doing so will allow them to understand how marketing activities are recorded. In addition, academic researchers need to understand the meaning of the financial measures that they often use as the metrics of success when researching marketing strategy questions.

This is especially important since financial reporting generally does not recognize assets created by marketing investments. In order to substantiate a claim that “brands are assets”, marketers must be able to explain how the financial accounting rules misrepresent economic reality and why managers might use a different set of principles for management reporting.

We argue that the misrepresentation of market-based assets has two forms of negative impact for marketers: external and internal. The external problems are that financial statements are not especially informative about the value of marketing for the providers of capital and do not provide a true portrait of the economic resource base of the company. The internal problems are that marketers cannot point to valuable assets that they are creating, nor can they be effectively held accountable for the way that these assets are managed given that the assets are not recorded.

We do not expect immediate radical changes in financial reporting because financial accounting rules are designed with the specific interests of the suppliers of capital (debt and equity) in mind. To influence financial accounting developments, such as encouraging greater disclosure of marketing activity in the notes to the published accounts, marketers must be able to communicate in language understood by accountants and the current users of financial accounts. To aid this we provide guidance for marketers on the purpose and practices of accounting. We also discuss how academic marketing researchers might wish to adjust financial accounting data to capitalize a proportion of marketing expenses for companies where marketing is a primary driver of business performance.

Social media networks make their services freely available to all users. Users pay for the service received with the time and attention taken by the advertisements. This chapter argues that social media platforms are a unique form of monopoly driven by “the more the merrier” effect (i.e., network effects) in users' consumption. These monopolies exercise market power, not by charging higher prices to users but by “tying” larger amounts of advertising to their content. Traditional antitrust instruments designed to address excessive pricing and reduced output by monopolies need to be reframed to tame the attention economy problems in the social media industry. This chapter discusses five antitrust instruments grouped in three categories: structural, behavioral, and market-based remedies. Market-based solutions are the least explored in the literature, despite being the most promising instruments to lower the attention costs imposed on users, while preserving the economies of scope in production and the network effects in consumption, and possibly maintaining free access to social media, as we know it today.

Williamson's systematic treatment of transaction costs in explaining governance structures has rarely been applied to the field of environmental economics. The aim of this chapter is to address this oversight by analysing how transaction cost economics can help choose among environmental policy tools.

We apply the analytical framework of discrete structural alternatives – market, hybrid forms and hierarchy – to the choice of environmental policy instruments. Environmental-related transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with categories of policy instruments, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction costs economizing – result.

First, we suggest defining the transaction as the trading of property rights to the use of natural resources. Second, the characteristics of the transaction are described as mainly measurement costs. Third, we determine the conditions under which a particular ‘governance structure’ that is a policy instrument is chosen.

A major contribution of our analysis is to question the relevance of many economists’ prescription in favour of incentive-based instruments. Indeed, in some plausible circumstances a command-and-control instrument may be more efficient by economizing on transaction costs.

Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. Our chapter is a first step towards an operationalization à la Williamson of Coase's (1992, p. 778) ‘fundamental insights’ in the environmental realm.

In fraudulent conveyance cases, plaintiffs allege that by entering into a complex leverage transaction, such as an LBO, a firm’s former owners ensured its subsequent collapse. Proving that the transaction rendered the firm insolvent may allow debtors (or their proxies) to claw back transfers made to former shareholders and others as part of the transaction.

Courts have recently questioned the robustness of the solvency evidence traditionally provided in such cases, claiming that traditional expert analyses (e.g., a discounted flow analysis) may suffer from hindsight (and other forms of) bias, and thus not reflect an accurate view of the firm’s insolvency prospects at the time of the challenged transfers. To address the issue, courts have recently suggested that experts should consider market evidence, such as the firm’s stock, bond, or credit default swap prices at the time of the challenged transaction. We review market-evidence-based approaches for determination of solvency in fraudulent conveyance cases.

We compare different methods of solvency determination that rely on market data. We discuss the pros and cons of these methods and illustrate the use of credit default swap spreads with a numerical example. Finally, we highlight the limitations of these methods.

If securities trade in efficient markets in which security prices quickly impound all available information, then such security prices provide an objective assessment of investors’ views of the firm’s future insolvency prospects at the time of challenged transfer, given contemporaneously available information. As we explain, using market data to analyze fraudulent conveyance claims or assess a firm’s solvency prospects is not as straightforward as some courts argue. To do so, an expert must first pick a particular credit risk model from a host of choices which links the market evidence (or security price) to the likelihood of future default. Then, to implement his chosen model, the expert must estimate various parameter input values at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer. In this connection, it is important to note that each credit risk model rests on particular assumptions, and there are typically several ways in which a model’s key parameters may be empirically estimated. Such choices critically affect any conclusion about a firm’s future default prospects as of the date of an alleged fraudulent conveyance.

Simply using market evidence does not necessarily eliminate the question of bias in any analysis. The reliability of a plaintiff’s claims regarding fraudulent conveyance will depend on the reasonableness of the analysis used to tie the observed market evidence at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer to default prospects of the firm.

There is a large body of literature in financial economics that examines the relationship between market data and the prospects of a firm’s future default. However, there is surprisingly little research tying that literature to the analysis of fraudulent conveyance claims. Our paper, in part, attempts to do so. We show that while market-based methods use the information contained in market prices, this information must be supplemented with assumptions and the conclusions of these methods critically depend on the assumption made.