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The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that relative to a cash acquisition, a stock acquisition would increase the bidder’s investor base and lower Merton’s (1987) shadow cost, which in turn contributes positively to the bidder announcement return.

Using the number of registered shareholders and measures of institutional ownership as the proxies for investor base and investor recognition, this paper compares their changes and the changes in shadow cost between bidders using different methods of payment. The authors examine the relation between the shadow cost reduction and bidder announcement return in a multivariate framework.

This paper finds that given the target type, bidders using stocks experience significantly larger increases in their investor bases and investor recognition than bidders using cash. Additionally, only bidders using stocks experience significant decreases in their shadow costs. In a multivariate framework, the change in the shadow cost has a negative and significant effect on the bidder announcement return in the sample of stock acquisitions and the subsample of bidders using stocks to acquire private targets. These findings support the authors’ hypothesis and suggest that the less established bidders acquiring private targets in particular benefit from the shadow cost reduction.

This paper provides the direct evidence that investor recognition matters in mergers and acquisitions. The findings also provide a complementary explanation for the documented positive bidder returns when bidders use stocks to acquire private targets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the abnormal stock return of Hong Kong real estate firms following news of land acquisition and identify determinants to the abnormal stock return.

The paper employs the event‐study methodology and multivariate regression to test factors that are hypothesized to have effects on the abnormal return.

The paper indicates that on land acquisition announcement there is a significant positive price reaction. Also the market capitalization and debt‐to‐equity ratio of a firm is associated negatively with the level of abnormal price reaction.

This study has identified significant positive abnormal stock return following the news of land acquisitions by developers in the context of Hong Kong. It has also documented negative correlation between abnormal stock return and two specific factors of a firm, namely, market capitalization and debt‐to‐equity ratio.

This paper identifies significant positive abnormal stock return pursuant to land acquisitions by firms.

The purpose of this paper is to measure and observe stock market and investor reactions (benchmark adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)) to the announcement of Marriott’s acquisition of Starwood and related merger and acquisition (M&A) news and related activities over a two-year period.

Empirical models and quantifications were developed and tested through event study analysis to test the Marriot-Starwood M&A news and related activities and to observe the abnormal stock return patterns. Several data sources were employed including Factiva by Dow Jones, Wall Street Newspaper, CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged files, and ValueLine Research.

This paper provides financial insights and outcomes of pre-, during, and post-Marriot-Starwood merger. While equity returns to Starwood were mostly flat, Marriott experienced negative returns around the acquisition announcement and anytime a news article appears following the announcement. However, performance proxies showed that Marriott’s shareholders gained superior buy and hold returns following the acquisition in the long run.

Short-term event study methodology might be less than perfect in examining the stock returns to acquisitions. Therefore, future research is encouraged to test and observe Marriot-Starwood merger using longer time periods with predictive analysis to check the further usability of the results.

The study’s findings practically signal that overreaction in the short term is followed by a correction with an improvement in returns and sales performance of Marriot. In the majority of the acquisitions, integration process is not planned until after the acquisition announcement or the deal completion.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the financial issues, challenges, and outcomes of the biggest merger in the history of the global lodging industry.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether bank mergers are driven by equity overvaluation and management compensation incentives.

To test whether equity mispricing drive bank mergers, the authors employ two alternative price-to-residual income valuation (P/V) measures for bidders and targets while the authors control for their growth prospects with the price-to-book (P/B) (two years before) ratio. The intrinsic value (V) is estimated using the three-period forecast horizon residual income model of Ohlson (1995) and perpetual residual income model that does not rely on analysts’ forecasts of future earnings prospects. The latter measure allows the authors to estimate V for a much larger sample of banks. The empirical analysis is supplemented with a standard event analysis and assessment of the long-term performance of bank mergers subsequent to the announcement date.

The evidence shows that bidders are overvalued relative to their targets, especially in equity offer deals. The authors also find that highly valued bidders: are more likely to use stock than cash; are willing to pay more relative to the target market price; are more likely to acquire private than public targets; earn lower announcement-period returns; fail to create synergy gains; experience long-term underperformance; and reward their top managers of with large compensation increases subsequent to mergers.

This study provides results consistent with the view that behavioral and managerial incentives play an important role in motivating bank mergers.

The authors examine how a firm’s risk change around an international acquisition is related to the managerial equity interest in the firm. Focusing on the international acquisitions made by bidding fi rms that have weak monitoring from outside shareholders, those that make an acquisition in an unrelated industry, and those that experience negative stock returns around announcements, the authors find that managers of these firms tend to undertake risk‐decreasing international acquisitions with the increase of managerial equity ownership and previously granted stock options. The evidence suggests that managerial incentives to use foreign acquisitions to reduce the risk of their personal wealth are more often utilized in the absence of shareholder monitoring.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between ownership structure, earnings management (EM) preceding mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and the acquiring firm's subsequent long‐term market performance.

The authors measure the magnitude of discretionary current accruals using two methodologies, that of Teoh et al. and that of Kothari et al. The latter methodology is used to control for the presence of extreme performance prior to the event. The calendar‐time Fama‐French three‐factor model was used to evaluate long‐term stock performance and to minimize potential problems related to the cross‐sectional dependence of the returns.

It was found that firms using stock as a financing medium exhibit significant positive discretionary accruals during the year preceding the M&A and during the year of the acquisition. It was also documented that voting right concentration and control‐enhancing mechanisms are not associated with any significant level of earnings management. Finally, a negative association was found between EM and abnormal stock returns over a three‐year period following the acquisition.

These results suggest that the concentrated ownership alignment effect dominates the entrenchment motives and acts as a deterrent mechanism to prevent controlling shareholders from managing earnings in stock‐financed M&A.

The authors’ results highlight the importance of maintaining good legal and extra‐legal protection of minority shareholders. Regulators can play an important role in preventing dominant shareholders from engaging in opportunistic EM in stock‐financed M&A.

The paper extends prior literature by taking a closer look at dominant shareholders’ motivations to manage earnings in stock‐financed M&A. Large shareholders have strong incentives to manage earnings upward prior to stock‐financed transactions to limit the dilution of their controlling position.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive initial evaluation of the wealth transfer hypothesis as applied to the second‐stage events and announcements that follow carve‐outs during the period from 1983 to 2004.

Using daily security prices, such combinations are shown to have multi‐faceted wealth transfers and wealth creation.

In contrast with the wealth losses found in previous studies, wealth increases are observed for parent stockholders and bondholders in the spin‐off announcement and event phases for combination carve‐outs and spin‐offs. Also, the spin‐off is the most prevalent second divestiture choice for parents with traded debt.

This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, in contrast with recent wealth transfer studies that use monthly bond returns, daily stock and bond returns are used to examine the wealth effect for parent stockholders and bondholders during the announcement and ex‐dates of second‐stage events. Second, in contrast with previous studies that found a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders in the spin‐off phase, statistically significant wealth retention was observed for bondholders and for stockholders at spin‐off and other second event announcements. Third, the results reflect that increased collateral from the carve‐out phase lessens the potential for bondholder wealth loss in the spin‐off phase.

This study aims to examine whether particular corporate governance mechanisms influence the performance of mergers and acquisitions.

Regression analyses investigating 1,596 recent acquisitions in the US market completed over the five-year period from 2009 to 2013 are performed.

The results show that board independency, CEO duality and level of CEO fixed compensation have an impact on the return of acquisitions. Moreover, the findings indicate that acquisitions significantly create value for bidders delivering a positive cumulative abnormal return upon announcement. Finally, also focusing on the 690 relative larger deals, there is a clear evidence of a positive influence of good corporate governance mechanisms over the quality of acquisitions completed.

To our knowledge, this is the first paper trying to identify corporate governance mechanisms related to the best acquisition decisions, by using specifically the three corporate governance variables (CEO duality, CEO fixed compensation and board independency).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the long‐term post‐acquisition share performance of Malaysian acquiring firms over the period 2000‐2004.

The authors use the event‐type methodology to analyse acquirer returns in relation to target status, method of payment and other firm characteristics, using both univariate and multivariate analyses. In total three performance measures are used to identify the long‐term share performance of acquiring firms: cumulative market‐adjusted abnormal returns, the buy‐and‐hold market‐adjusted and buy‐and‐hold matched‐sample abnormal returns.

The results show the existence of negative abnormal returns to acquirers over two‐ and three‐year periods after acquisition. The study also finds that acquirers of private targets earn negative returns, while acquirers of public targets earn insignificant returns. It is also found that under‐performance is limited to the small size acquirers and to large relative‐size acquisitions. Furthermore, the results indicate that acquirer's long‐term performance is not related to the method of payment and book‐to‐market ratio of the acquirer.

The Malaysian stock market is relatively small compared to the US and UK markets where most previous research has been carried out. The current study allows us to assess the robustness of the models and whether the findings in developed markets may be generalized to the smaller developing markets. This paper contributes to the present body of knowledge by offering evidence of acquirer's post‐acquisition performance from a developing market.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of acquisitions on the number of shareholders of the acquirer (the shareholder base) and relate that effect to the method of payment and the ratio between the target’s and acquirer’s shareholder bases prior to the acquisition.

Using 348 acquisitions from 1993 to 2013 for which both parties are public, American firms, the paper measures changes in the acquirer’s shareholder base from before announcement through to four years after completion. OLS regressions, together with an instrumental variables approach addressing the endogeneity of acquisition payment, indicate the determinants of those changes.

Acquisitions completed partly or entirely in stock lead to large increases in the shareholder base, and the increases mostly endure over the four-year window examined in the study. Regression results indicate that the target to acquirer shareholder ratio has a much greater impact on the acquirer’s base for stock acquisitions than for cash acquisitions. The ratio is also associated with changes in beta.

Because existing theoretical and empirical literature shows that the shareholder base impacts the risk, liquidity, and market value of stock, managers evaluating potential targets and modes of payment may wish to consider the likely impact on their firms’ shareholder bases, as may investors contemplating the effects of an acquisition announcement.

This is the first work documenting both a short- and long-term impact of acquisitions on the shareholder base and the first to investigate the determinants of the change in the base.