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This paper aims to examine the interaction effect of regulations (monetary and macro-prudential) in explaining the possible non-linear effect of bank risk exposures (credit risk and insolvency risk) on banking stability in Africa.

The study uses a two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for a data set of banks across 54 African countries over the period 2006–2020.

The authors find that the relationships between bank credit risk–bank stability and bank insolvency risk–bank stability are non-linear and characterized by the presence of optimal thresholds, which are 5.3456 for credit risk and 2.3643 for insolvency. Contrary to their positive effects below these optimal thresholds, credit risk and insolvency risk become negatively linked to bank stability in Africa. The authors find that macro-prudential action and monetary policy both have a positive and significant relationship with bank stability. The authors provide evidence to support that the marginal effect of excessive credit risk and insolvency risk on bank stability is reduced when interacted with monetary and macro-prudential regulations, and the impact is significant in strong institutional environment.

Future research should extend data to include developing and emerging economies in the world. Also, policymakers, researchers and practitioners should consider different regulatory and institutional frameworks in explaining the relationship between the thresholds of bank risk exposures and bank stability in the world.

Regulatory authorities should have to deeply reform their financial systems, develop risk-based regulatory framework and effective supervision mechanism relating to appropriate techniques that maintain an optimal and desired level of bank risks and risk-taking behaviours required to ensure a stable banking system.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine how different regulatory frameworks shape the non-linear impact of bank risk exposures on bank stability in Africa.

This article aims to provide insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe.

First the authors define the potential changes in financial markets and then the tools available for the regulator to tame them. Finally, they build five scenarios according to the main evolutions observed on the financial markets and on the tools used by the regulator to modify these trends.

Among the five scenarios defined, two present highly unstable features since the regulator refuses to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance in order to preserve financial stability. Three of them achieve financial stability. However, they are more or less efficient or feasible. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst, because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.

Foresight studies on financial markets and regulation are quite rare. This may be explained by the difficulty to forecast what will be their evolution in the coming decades, not least because finance is fundamentally unstable. This paper provides a framework to consider what could be the best strategy of regulators in such an unstable environment.

The global crisis, originating in the US financial sector, affected the Asian region primarily through three channels – declining trade volumes, exchange rate pressure and asset deflation. The purpose of this paper is to focus on how the crisis impacted the four major economies of South Asia, viz. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and how, by a combination of swift actions on the monetary, fiscal and exchange rate fronts, the worst consequences of the crisis were averted.

The regulatory and supervisory systems in these four economies are then benchmarked against certain desirable norms, which have emerged out of post‐crisis international deliberations.

It is felt that the South Asian regulatory systems perform fairly well vis‐à‐vis these norms.

The paper also touches upon the major highlights of the crisis impact, policy responses and post‐crisis recovery in the Southeast Asian region.

The several similarities and the few contrasts between the two regions on these aspects are also presented.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators.

This paper presents a review of existing literature.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

This paper aims to study the design of bank capital regulation and points out a conceptual downside of risk-sensitive regulation. The author argues that when a bank is better informed about its risk than the regulator, designing regulation is subject to the Lucas critique. The second-best regulation could be risk-insensitive, which provides an explanation for the leverage ratio as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements. This paper offers empirical predictions and implications for policy.

The argument in the paper is based on analytical results from mechanism design.

Optimal bank regulation could be risk-insensitive, as is observed in practice in the form of the leverage ratio rule.

Counter to conventional wisdom, the paper argues and provides a new explanation for why bank regulation should not be sensitive to the risk of the bank. The paper then offers empirical predictions and implications for policy.

This paper aims to establish the effect of bank regulations on financial stability in Kenya. Specifically, the study seeks to uncover the effect of micro and macro prudential regulations on financial stability and their trade-offs or complementarities.

Using annual time series data over the period 1990–2017, the study uses structural equation model (SEM) estimation technique. This solves the problem of approximating measurement errors, using both latent constructs and indicator constructs.

Study findings reveal that macro and micro prudential regulations are significant drivers of financial stability. Further, prudential regulations are more effective when they complement each other.

This study centers on how bank regulations affect financial stability. Future research could be carried out on the effect of Non-Bank Financial Institutions regulations on financial system stability.

Complementing macro and micro prudential regulation is more effective and efficient in ensuring stability of the financial system other than letting the two policy objectives operate independently.

Regulatory authorities should introduce prudential regulations that would encourage innovations in the banking sector. This ensures easy deposit mobilization that enhances financial inclusion. Prudential regulations that ensure financial stability will be effective when low income earners are included in the financial system.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the role of banking regulations on financial stability. This study is also pioneering in the use of SEM estimation technique, in examining how prudential regulations affect financial stability. Previous cross-country studies have focused on macro prudential regulations ignoring the importance of micro prudential regulations.

In the recent financial crisis, many observers have assigned monetary policy a central role in the crisis. Specifically, they claim that excessively easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in the first half of the decade helped to cause a bubble in housing prices in the USA. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of monetary policy within the regulatory frameworks of financial markets.

The authors show within a macroeconomic framework a possible trade‐off between price stability and financial stability by differentiating between a technology‐driven bubble and an animal spirit bubble. In their conclusion: if there is a trade‐off between price stability and financial stability, the central bank will have to make a choice between the two objectives. In that case, the question arises of which of the two objectives should take precedence: price stability or financial stability?

From this analysis, the authors conclude that a central bank which uses a lexicographic ordering favoring price stability over other objectives is likely to fuel the boom inadvertently (in the case of a technology‐driven bubble) or will decide to do nothing (in the case of an animal spirit bubble) allowing a process of excessive credit creation. The latter seems to be what happened between 2003 and 2008.

If one wants to reduce the likelihood of future major financial busts, it must be accepted that the central banks (especially the Fed and the ECB) cannot only be responsible for price stability. Maintaining financial stability by preventing excesses in financial markets should be an equally important objective.

The paper gives a new perspective on the role of monetary policy within the regulatory framework. With this macroeconomic framework, the authors are able to show possible trade‐offs between price stability and financial stability. The micro‐ and macro‐prudential approach of this paper is a useful contribution to the discussion about regulatory reforms of financial markets.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of current progress in financial sector reform and outline some of the remaining challenges.

The paper presents an analytical survey of recent developments.

The reform agenda is broad, ranging from strengthening prudential regulation; to enhancing supervision; from mitigating pro‐cyclicality to integrating micro‐ and macro‐prudential oversight; from reducing the systemic risk associated with large and complex financial institutions to expanding resolution process and fortifying financial market structure. Reforms are proceeding slowly but important building blocks have been laid down, such as Basel III; other difficult reforms are in the making, such as the resolution framework for cross‐border financial institutions or how to deal with systemically important financial institutions.

The paper presents a concise, comprehensive, and timely survey of the myriad financial reform efforts.

Basel III is a framework to protect the global banking system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a policy discussion on Basel III in Africa.

The significance of Basel III is discussed, and some ideas to consider when implementing Basel III to make it work in Africa, are provided.

Under Basel III, the African banking industry should expect better capital quality, higher capital levels, minimum liquidity requirement for banks, reduced systemic risk and differences in Basel III transitional arrangements. This paper also emphasizes that there should be enough time for the transition to Basel III in Africa; a combination of micro and macro-prudential regulations is needed; and the need to repair the balance sheets of banks, in preparation for Basel III.

The discussions in this paper will benefit policymakers, academics and other stakeholders interested in financial regulation in Africa such as the World bank and the International Monetary Fund.