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The purpose of this paper is to analyze interest-bearing checking (IC) account policies, including the monthly fee, and minima to avoid the fee or to earn interest, as shrouded equilibria in the sense that low-income depositors subsidize higher income depositors. The authors ask whether behavior is consistent with low-income depositors being myopic, and analyze the role of competition and bank size.

IC policy data from RateWatch cover more than 600 single-market banks from 2008-2012, and are matched to FDIC SOD data and call report data for testing. Hypotheses assuming low-income depositors are myopic are tested, as are the effects of bank size and competition with local market and multi-market banks.

IC policies represent locally shrouded equilibria, with low-income depositors subsidizing higher income depositors up to a well-defined threshold, with depositors above that threshold subsiding all other customers. IC policy patterns are consistent with low-income customers being myopic, with banks generally avoiding drawing their attention, attempting to confuse them, and with policies consistent with a present orientation among low-income depositors. Local market competition does not meet the traditional expectation of favoring consumers. Additionally, larger banks report higher fees and minima, with the difference growing during the period.

IC policies have not received regulatory attention, yet the fees likely fall mainly on low-income individuals, and may continue to grow.

The analysis of IC policies is novel, as is the locally shrouded equilibrium model, and findings regarding competition.

Purpose – The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted the need for reform of financial regulation in several jurisdictions across the globe, including the United Kingdom and the United States. This chapter argues that the reforms need to be comprehensive and will therefore have to cover several aspects of financial regulation.

Design/methodology/approach – The chapter critically examines some of the areas where reforms are most needed. This involves consideration of the merits and demerits of multi-functional or universal banking. It also involves consideration of the systemic and other problems that arise as a result of the increasingly international nature of banking and other financial services. Moreover, it examines the need for regulators to understand and keep pace with financial innovation. Furthermore, it involves discussion on the need to improve corporate governance and remuneration policies in banks and other financial services providers as well as the need for adequate arrangements for dealing with bank insolvencies and collapses.

Findings – Market fundamentalism and over-reliance on the alleged self-correcting powers of the market have led to excessive deregulation and liberalisation in world financial markets. Financial regulatory reforms will therefore have to be substantial and comprehensive to properly address the problems caused by excessive financial liberalisation.

Originality/value – The chapter examines significant issues that academics, regulators and policy makers should consider when devising or implementing reforms designed to prevent, or reduce the impact of, financial crises in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the Chinese banking industry. This study also investigates the role of various other factors in the risk-taking channel.

This study used panel data from 2000 to 2012, and a dynamic panel model (Difference GMM) was applied.

The empirical findings of this paper suggest that loose monetary policy rates increase bank risk-taking. Unlike previous studies, the results of this paper suggest that the bank-specific factors (size, liquidity and capitalization) do not significantly affect the risk-taking channel. However, the market structure does have a stabilizing effect on monetary policy transmission and the risk-taking channel. Higher market power weakens the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission.

Of significance to the policymakers' point of view is that loose monetary policy induces banks to take excessive risks. However, such effects can be mitigated by encouraging a proper level of market power in banking markets.

This study investigated the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission for the Chinese banking industry. Due to the unique features of the People's Bank of China (PBC, Central Bank of China) policy, this study also contributes to the literature by comparing price-based and quantity-based monetary policy tools and their effectiveness in financial stability and monetary policy transmission. Furthermore, the role of market structure is also investigated in the risk-taking channel.

This paper aims to test whether a change in the reporting location of income, and other comprehensive income (OCI) components, in a statement of comprehensive income (SoCI) under International Financial Reporting Standards affects their value-relevance and use by financial analysts.

The study tests the associations between CI, OCI, share returns and financial analyst forecast revisions.

Results show that comprehensive income is less value-relevant than net income, regardless of reporting location. Changing the reporting location of OCI components to the SoCI does not provide incremental improvement for financial analysts or stock prices. Finally, the paper finds that analysts use OCI components to revise forecasts.

The paper addresses the question of which OCI components should be reported, and the importance of reporting location. The paper extends the examination of OCI components to financial analysts as expert financial report users.

This study seeks to examine the extent to which strands of inflationary related conditions (inflation expectations, inflation uncertainty and realized inflation); macroeconomic uncertainty and the likelihood of recessionary conditions influence performance indicators in the US banking sector over a specified time period.

The study adopts seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR) advanced by Zellner (1962) in its examination of how specific strands of inflationary conditions, and other adverse macroeconomic conditions influence performance dynamics in the US banking sector.

Empirical evidence suggest that among various adverse macroeconomic conditions examined, inflation expectations and macroeconomic uncertainty tend to have significant constraining impact on key performance indicators in the US banking sector than other conditions examined. Comparatively, this study finds that inflation expectations and macroeconomic uncertainty tend to have much more constraining impact on return on equity, than on return on assets in the US banking sector. Results further suggest that among the three bank performance indicators examined, net interest margin is the least vulnerable bank performance indicator to various adverse macroeconomic conditions examined in the study.

Apart from the various empirical results noted above, this study's findings are projected to help inform strategic planning decisions among institutions in the banking sector. The various findings could, for instance, inform policies and operational strategies geared toward reducing vulnerability associated with specific performance indicators such as return on equity. This reduction could be achieved by critically examining how the various performance indicators react to individual adverse macroeconomic conditions examined in this study. The process could ultimately help in developing tailored measures/procedures aimed at reducing how susceptible key performance indicators are to the various adverse macroeconomic conditions. This study's findings could also provide the platform for more adaptive policies aimed at minimizing the effects of noted macroeconomic conditions on operational efficiency in the banking sector.

The uniqueness of this study, compared to related ones found in the literature, stems from its treatment of three variant of related strands of macroeconomic condition (different variant of inflationary conditions) in the same framework in its empirical analysis.

本研究旨在探討與通貨膨脹有關的狀況的組成部分(通脹預期 、通脹不確定性及體現了的通脹), 宏觀經濟不確定性及經濟衰退狀況的可能性、在一段特定時間內對美國銀行業的表現指數有何種程度的影響。

研究採用塞爾納 (Zellner) (1962) 提出的看似無關迴歸模型 (SUR)，去探討通脹狀況的特定組成部分及其它不利的宏觀經濟狀況如何影響美國銀行業內的績效動態。

實證證據暗示在被研究的各個不利宏觀經濟狀況中，通脹預期及宏觀經濟不確定性，對美國銀行業內的主要業績指標的約束影響, 與其它被探討的狀況相比，往往會較重大。相對地、本研究結果顯示通脹預期及宏觀經濟不確定性，對美國銀行業資本回報率的約束影響、往往遠多於資產收益率。研究結果進一步顯示，在被探討的三個銀行業績指標中，就本研究所探討的各個不利的宏觀經濟狀況而言，淨息差是脆弱性最小的銀行業績指標。

除了上述各實證結果外，本研究結果預期會給銀行業內機構間作戰略規劃的決定時提供資料，譬如，各項研究結果或可在制定旨在減少與特定業績指標如資本回報率相聯繫的脆弱性的政策和經營策略時提供資料。這脆弱性的減少，是透過嚴謹地研究各個業績指標，如何對在本研究中被探討的個別不利宏觀經濟狀況作出反應而達致的。這程序或許最終會幫助建立一個以減少各個不利宏觀經濟狀況對主要業績指標的影響為目的的量身定制措施／程序。本研究的結果，或許亦可為更多旨在減弱眾所周知的宏觀經濟狀況對銀行業運營效率的影響的適應性政策提供平台。

與文獻中可見的相關研究比較，本研究的獨特性源於其實證分析，是涉及在同一個構架內處理宏觀經濟狀況相互有關的組成部分的三個變體 (通脹狀況的不同變體) 。

In this chapter the author subjects some aspects of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” to critical analysis, demonstrating the limits to reform given the power of “vested interests” as articulated by Thorstein Veblen. While progressive economists and others are generally favorably disposed toward the New Deal, a critical perspective casts doubt on the progressive nature of the various programs instituted during the Roosevelt administrations. The New Deal was shaped by the institutional forces then dominant in the U.S., including the segregationist system of the South. In the end, “vested interests” dictated what transpired, but what did transpire required a modification of the understanding of the standard ideological perspective of capitalism, “liberalism.”