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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the indirect relationship between board gender diversity and capital structure decisions and to examine whether the capital structure is affected by the type of approach used to promote women’s participation in the boardroom.

Based on a sample of French non-financial listed companies over the period 2006–2019, this paper uses structural equations modeling, difference-in-differences using propensity score matching and chow test to highlight these effects.

This paper finds that the relationship between the board gender diversity and the capital structure is mediated through the information transparency channel and firm risk taking channel. Furthermore, the results show that the effect of board gender diversity on capital structure decisions varies through the approach adopted (voluntary, enabling or coercive).

This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study is to the knowledge the first to examine whether and how board gender diversity affects capital structure decisions through two mediations channels, namely, the information transparency and the firm risk taking. Second, the study is one of the first to examine whether the capital structure is affected by the type of approach used to promote women’s participation in the boardroom: coercive, enabling or voluntary approach.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the Chinese banking industry. This study also investigates the role of various other factors in the risk-taking channel.

This study used panel data from 2000 to 2012, and a dynamic panel model (Difference GMM) was applied.

The empirical findings of this paper suggest that loose monetary policy rates increase bank risk-taking. Unlike previous studies, the results of this paper suggest that the bank-specific factors (size, liquidity and capitalization) do not significantly affect the risk-taking channel. However, the market structure does have a stabilizing effect on monetary policy transmission and the risk-taking channel. Higher market power weakens the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission.

Of significance to the policymakers' point of view is that loose monetary policy induces banks to take excessive risks. However, such effects can be mitigated by encouraging a proper level of market power in banking markets.

This study investigated the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission for the Chinese banking industry. Due to the unique features of the People's Bank of China (PBC, Central Bank of China) policy, this study also contributes to the literature by comparing price-based and quantity-based monetary policy tools and their effectiveness in financial stability and monetary policy transmission. Furthermore, the role of market structure is also investigated in the risk-taking channel.

The extant literature provides evidence that single CEOs are less risk-averse. Building on the theory of risk aversion, the authors argue that the risk aversion trait arising from CEO’s marital status partially explains capital allocation efficiency. The paper aims to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency.

The primary sample includes 9,671 observations from 1,264 US firms. The authors apply multivariate regression and a series of endogeneity tests to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency.

Single-CEO firms have higher capital allocation inefficiency than those with married CEOs. The findings continue to hold after a series of endogeneity tests such as propensity score matching, change analysis and instrumental variable regression analysis and are robust to alternative proxies for capital allocation inefficiency. The capital allocation inefficiency in single-CEO firms arises from overinvestment but not underinvestment, and corporate risk-taking channels the effect.

The study is limited to the effect of CEO marital status, not CEO marital quality.

The findings imply that besides information asymmetry and agency conflicts, CEO marital status should receive special attention for capital allocation efficiency. Also, marital status influences the CEOs’ commitment to the general good of society, affecting the potential conflict of interest with different stakeholders from inefficient capital allocation.

This study extends corporate finance literature on CEO marital status by providing novel evidence on the effect of single CEOs on capital allocation efficiency. The authors conclude that CEOs’ personality traits, such as marital status, matter in corporate policy choices.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of monetary policy on bank risk in the banking system in some MENA countries. It explores how some economic and credit indicators affect the level of risk in the banking sector. It combines many factors that could affect banks’ risk appetite such as macroeconomic conditions, banks’ credit size and lending growth. The authors use nonperforming loans as a proxy for banking sector risks. At first, the authors have analyzed the linear relationship between monetary policy and credit risk. As mentioned above, nonlinearity is expected in the underlying relationship, and, thus, they have investigated the nonlinear relationship to deeply analyse the relationship using the dynamic panel threshold model, as stimulated by Kremer et al. (2013). Threshold models have gained a great importance in economics and finance for modelling nonlinear behaviour. Threshold models are useful in showing the turning points in the behaviour of financial and economic indicators. This technique has been applied in this study to study the effect of monetary policy on credit risk.

This paper is divided into the following sections: Section 2 which previews the recent literature; Section 3 which includes some stylized facts about the relationship between credit risk and monetary policy; Section 4 which deals with the model and methodology; Section 5 which handles the data sources and discusses the results, and finally Section 6 which is the conclusion. The paper adopts dynamic panel threshold model of Kremer et al. (2013).

The results show that the relationship between monetary policy and credit risk is positive and significant to a certain threshold, 6.3. If the lending interest rate is higher than 6.3, this increases the credit risk in the banking sector, because increasing the lending interest rate imposes huge burdens on the borrowers, and, therefore, the bad loans and nonperforming loans become more likely. Thus, the MENA countries need to decrease the lending interest rate to be less than 6.3 to reduce the effect of monetary policy on credit risk. Further, these results are qualitatively robust regarding the inclusion of additional control variables, using alternative threshold variables and further endogeneity checks of the credit risk, such as Risk premium and the squared term of the lending interest rate. The results of taking the risk premium and the squared term of the lending interest rate as a threshold served the analysis and confirmed the positive relationship between monetary policy and credit risk above a certain threshold. As for the risk premium, the relationship below the threshold was negative and significant. Other related research points might be a good avenue for the future research such as applying this approach to micro data of banks from different MENA countries. Also, more sophisticated approaches like time-varying panel approach to assess the relationship over the time can be applied.

The importance of this paper lies in the fact that it does not only study the effect of time, but it also focuses on the panel data about some economic and credit indicators in the MENA region for the first time. This is because central banks in the MENA region have common characteristics and congruous level of economic growth. Therefore, to study how the monetary policy affects those countries’ credit risks in their lending policies, this requires careful analysis of how the central banks in this region might behave to control default risks.

This study aims to examine the impact of activity restrictions in shaping the risk-taking behaviour of banks through the channel of competition in different economic conditions.

The authors use a dynamic panel regression method, particularly a two-step system generalised method of moments to address the risk-taking persistence of banks and endogeneity of activity restrictions and competition with banks’ risk-taking using financial freedom and property rights as instrumental variables. Activity restrictions are computed by constructing an index based on the survey results of Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013a). Competition is measured by the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic and risk-taking behaviour are measured by non-performing loan ratio and lnZ-score. In the investigation process, the authors control bank characteristics – size, efficiency, ownership and loan composition and macroeconomic factors – gross domestic product growth and inflation, and use 2,527 bank-year observations from 180 commercial banks of Association of the Southeast Asian Nations-five countries over the 1990–2014 period.

This study finds that activity restrictions exacerbate the risk-taking behaviour of the banks leading to changes in the channel of competition because of the “risk-shifting effect” of competition. The finding is robust by considering the financial crisis and alternative specifications.

This study contributes to bank literature and policy formulation regarding the effect of activity restrictions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks, which is an issue of concern amongst bank regulators, policymakers and academics, especially in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.

Understanding how the competition plays a role in the relationship between activity restrictions and the risk-taking of banks in different economic situations.

This study provides new insight into the bank literature by investigating the moderating role of competition on activity restrictions and the risk-taking behaviour of banks in a different economic environment.

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and corporate risk-taking in emerging markets where corruption is considered as “public enemy number one.”

The study measures corruption based on Corruption Control Index annually published by World Bank and examines how corruption affects corporate risk-taking in emerging markets covered in MSCI Emerging Market Index.

With a sample of 75,338 observations from 8,326 firms across 20 emerging stock markets during the period 2005–2016, the author finds that corruption negatively affects corporate risk-taking. Robustness checks with a reduced sample without China and India, alternatives of corruption measures, various measures of risk-taking and Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator also show consistent results. Moreover, additional analysis shows that information disclosure mitigates the effect of corruption on risk-taking.

The extant literature implies that corruption may decrease corporate risk-taking behavior through two channels including operational cost and debt financing cost.

The relevance of economic freedom in influencing bank risk taking has not been adequately addressed in the literature. In this connection, employing bank-level data for 2000-2012, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of economic freedom on risk taking by MENA banks.

Given the cross-sectional time-series nature of the data, the author employs panel data techniques to explore this issue. In addition, the author examines the robustness of the results using instrumental variable techniques.

The findings appear to suggest that economic freedom exerts a significant and non-negligible impact on bank risk taking. Among the sub-components of economic freedom, it is observed that higher levels of both business and monetary freedom increase variability of profits and, thereby, raise the risk appetite of banks. Risk taking by banks appears to be reliably lower after the crisis than in the period prior to it, although there was a substantial increase in bank risk taking during the crisis.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is one of the earliest studies to explore the interlinkage between economic freedom and bank risk taking for MENA banks.