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We investigate the determinants and consequences of nonprofit lobbying activity by analyzing 501(c)(3) nonprofit lobbying choices as reported on the primary tax form, Form 990. Under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), nonprofits may lose their tax exempt status if they engage in a substantial amount of lobbying. We examine lobbying choices across three dimensions: (1) the test used to determine whether lobbying activities are substantial (i.e., making an H-election) (2) whether lobbying activities are directly related to the mission of the nonprofit (i.e., program related) (3) whether an affiliate nonprofit lobbies on behalf of a nonprofit. Results indicate lobbying choices are associated with the amount of lobbying reported and the amount of contributions received. Additionally, our results provide some evidence that nonprofit lobbying choices allowed under the IRC are underutilized.

Firms influence a government to their advantage in one of two ways: either through lobbying a government to change the rule, or through bribing bureaucrats to circumvent the rule. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and under what conditions do corporate political activities facilitate firm growth in a multinational context, especially in developing economies.

This study is based on the data of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, conducted by the World Bank in the 2002 to 2006 period in 12 countries. To deal with a multilevel structure, the authors applied multilevel regression as the main analysis method.

The analysis reveals that both political activities are prevalent in emerging markets, but they play very different roles on firm growth. The authors also find that the effect of lobbying is more pronounced in politically durable countries where firms can secure their vested benefits by lobbying.

The paper contributes to the corporate political activities literature by investigating the distinguishing and contingent role of bribery and lobbying on firm performance.

This paper aims to prepare executives to pilot a US lobbying effort within the bounds of the US Federal law. Lobbying law may be thought of as the “regulation of regulation”, as it defines the ground rules for those wishing to have a direct impact upon all other regulatory systems. The article outlines what the US lobbying law requires, what it forbids and, perhaps most important, what the law does NOT regulate.

The paper takes the full spectrum of US laws and regulations relevant to lobbying – including the Internal Revenue Service Code (tax code), the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate, the US Criminal Code and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act – and organizes them into a single 2 × 2 matrix, explaining what all parties must do as well as what they must not do. Via this approach, the rules that govern the “marketplace” for lobbying in the USA are explained. The competition to shape US government policy transpires within this marketplace.

Few activities the executive may engage in carry the potential payback of a well-executed lobbying campaign: empirical estimates range to returns on investment in the thousands of per cent. But the uninitiated may easily step over the line and invite both legal and public relations (PR) nightmares.

Effective lobbying can afford a corporation or industry a lasting competitive advantage. Every well-rounded business strategy should include such a component, and every well-rounded executive should be capable of performing in this arena. A solid grounding in the legal matrix forming the boundaries of this activity is a prerequisite for effective performance.

The paper organizes and outlines lobbying law in a fashion digestible by executives without legal training. It is of value to anyone wishing to engage in lobbying activities targeted at the US Government.

Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities.

Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity.

Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported).

This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in unpredictable policy environments, specific managerial choices play a vital role in designing lobbying capabilities through the choice of levels of investment in human capital, network relationships and structural modification.

Using an inductive case study approach, data were collected through 42 in‐depth, semi‐structured interviews and documented archival data. Cross‐case pattern sequencing was used to construct an interpretive model of lobbying capability design. Data were framed by the dynamic resource‐based theory of the firm.

Heterogeneous lobbying capabilities are adapted differently in private and state‐owned airlines as a result of diverse ownership structures and time compositions that interplay with organizational processes. The result is a divergence between private‐ and state‐owned airlines in how they engage with governmental actors and policies.

The paper contributes to ongoing discourse in and between the dynamic capabilities and corporate political activity literatures, particularly on how state/non‐state‐owned airlines design their political lobbying capabilities. The research is limited in so far as it only studies the European airline industry.

The paper illustrates how a specific and far‐reaching unanticipated external policy stimulus (the 9/11 terrorist attacks) impacted on management choices for lobbying design in the European airline industry.

Reviews a variety of academic and practitioner opinions on different types and definitions of lobbying and the purposes for which it is used, ranging from government relations to marketing communications. Distinguishes between what is termed loud lobbying, typically a highly visible media relations campaign providing an information subsidy to carefully targeted media, for marketing purposes; and quiet lobbying, discreet use of links with legislators, in order to encourage or block legislation. A model is given to aid clarification. The distinction is illustrated using examples of loud and quiet lobbying, including a case study of the campaigns for and against resale price maintenance (RPM). This shows Asda’s lobbying campaign to have been essentially a key element of the company’s marketing strategy. Concludes that the objectives of a lobbying campaign are crucial in determining whether loud or quiet lobbying would be more appropriate.

Presents a modern definition of lobbying suitable for the use of organizational lobbyists and a theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation which arouses ethical considerations. A contingency model of effective lobbying strategies and dynamics of lobbying is developed and tested in a multiple‐case study. Finnish interest group representatives are interviewed to construct cases based on their lobbying efforts on political issues at the national and the EU‐level of political decision making. It is concluded that the definition of lobbying corresponds well to the activities of the interviewees' associations and that it is fruitful to apply the theory of conflict resolution in the study of lobbying. The new model of lobbying reflects the reality excellently. It can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying in different political issues and at different levels of political decision making.

Drawing on the work of Niccolo Machiavelli and his appreciation of management and power, this paper explores the contemporary role of public affairs in UK organisations and the type of roles enacted by practitioners. The paper reviews how public affairs and, particularly, the corporate lobbying function have been treated by researchers and outlines recent research into the role played by public affairs practitioners based within a number of leading UK organisations. This study forms part of a longer‐term research programme designed to examine the functioning of in‐house public affairs departments within the UK. The paper explores how the role of public affairs practitioners can be conceptualised and suggests that public affairs and corporate lobbying have gained increasing recognition as strategically important activities, particularly within the more regulated sectors of industry.

Parallel with business and society relationships, the business and government relationship needs greater attention. Business and government relations beyond short‐term lobbying could be seen as a strategic activity aimed at creating sustainable value for the company. As such it would become much easier to achieve competitive advantage and align the company's commercial with the public interest. This paper seeks to examine this issue.

The paper aims to scan the issue with a view to further research.

The economic crisis and the imminent new wave of regulation make a new approach to lobbying more pressing.

The paper is based on political and economic writings and on practical experience in the public and private sector.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the institutional context on the awareness and practice of responsible lobbying and to compare relevant factors in the USA and the EU. This paper aims at integrating corporate social responsibility (CSR) and lobbying research.

A conceptual framework is presented and exemplified by the USA and the EU context. The research is informed by institutional theory that points to external factors creating profoundly different contexts in which firms operate.

The degree of responsible lobbying is likely to vary across nations and regions, particularly due to factors that impact responsible lobbying by shaping the relation between the state and firms, i.e. type of government and lobbying system as well as degree of government intervention, and factors that have indirect effects by shaping the degree to which stakeholders such as employees, consumers and non-governmental organizations push responsible lobbying.

The link between lobbying and CSR has been long neglected by scholars and practitioners, but is now gaining more attention. Research on this topic is valuable because it helps to ensure the credibility of CSR and alleviate public criticism of lobbying.