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This chapter addresses the research question of whether multinational enterprise (MNE) lobbying can contribute to sustainable development.

It presents the results of two case studies, from different perspectives, whose results strengthen and complement each other. Both studies use interviews as their main source of data within triangulation, and both adopt iterative processes for their analyses: one uses data coding, the other takes a narrative approach.

The findings suggest that whilst companies see both costs and opportunities in environmental regulations, this is not perceived by their policy-making counterparts. Furthermore, company-internal communication suggests that lobbying and corporate social responsibility (CSR) are not joined up, which leads to mixed (external) messages sent from the company to policy-makers and the public.

The chapter focuses on one industry (automobiles) in one host country setting (EU).

Policy-makers, as well as companies that want to contribute to sustainability, could usefully adopt the concept of internalising external costs as a minimum proxy for sustainability. Companies that wish to promote sustainable development, or even wish to act in a consistent manner, might usefully examine their assumptions about the political process. This is particularly the case with MNEs as they operate in numerous jurisdictions.

The chapter integrates the MNE literature and the literature on international business (IB)–government interactions. The findings underline the importance of addressing both environmental issues and the relationships between policy-makers and MNEs, an area that can be further developed by extending the scope of the study to other industries in further research.

Firms influence a government to their advantage in one of two ways: either through lobbying a government to change the rule, or through bribing bureaucrats to circumvent the rule. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and under what conditions do corporate political activities facilitate firm growth in a multinational context, especially in developing economies.

This study is based on the data of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, conducted by the World Bank in the 2002 to 2006 period in 12 countries. To deal with a multilevel structure, the authors applied multilevel regression as the main analysis method.

The analysis reveals that both political activities are prevalent in emerging markets, but they play very different roles on firm growth. The authors also find that the effect of lobbying is more pronounced in politically durable countries where firms can secure their vested benefits by lobbying.

The paper contributes to the corporate political activities literature by investigating the distinguishing and contingent role of bribery and lobbying on firm performance.

The central question in this article is: do recurring types of corporate lobbying strategies exist (in the same way as for generic strategies, for example)? The objective of this research is to define a typology of lobbying strategies implemented by French and UK firms, and then to discuss to what extent firms' political strategies are universal or country‐specific.

An empirical study examined 679 lobbying campaigns (also known as “political action”) of French and UK firms. They were grouped into categories and described using statistical data analysis techniques (multiple correspondence analysis and classification).

The results highlight a pattern in the corporate lobbying phenomenon: five types of lobbying strategy (that can be described and illustrated) exist for French firms, and four for UK firms. Tentative explanations can be put forward: implementation of lobbying strategies appears to depend on the type of issues addressed (which could be universal), but also on the country's political environment (which could be country specific). The study shows the interdependent influence of organisational resources, economic structures and the political environment (laws and the role of the state) on firms' lobbying strategies. Thus, societal effects theory could be applied to firms' political strategies, which are global and local at the same time.

Lobbying public decision makers is an increasingly widespread managerial practice, but has so far attracted little research attention in Europe.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the institutional context on the awareness and practice of responsible lobbying and to compare relevant factors in the USA and the EU. This paper aims at integrating corporate social responsibility (CSR) and lobbying research.

A conceptual framework is presented and exemplified by the USA and the EU context. The research is informed by institutional theory that points to external factors creating profoundly different contexts in which firms operate.

The degree of responsible lobbying is likely to vary across nations and regions, particularly due to factors that impact responsible lobbying by shaping the relation between the state and firms, i.e. type of government and lobbying system as well as degree of government intervention, and factors that have indirect effects by shaping the degree to which stakeholders such as employees, consumers and non-governmental organizations push responsible lobbying.

The link between lobbying and CSR has been long neglected by scholars and practitioners, but is now gaining more attention. Research on this topic is valuable because it helps to ensure the credibility of CSR and alleviate public criticism of lobbying.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the awareness and practice responsible lobbying in the EU. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which responsible lobbying criteria are fulfilled and to investigate whether responsible lobbying yields concrete benefits in the political arena.

The study takes a quantitative approach combining descriptive and multivariate partial least squares (PLS) analysis based on data gained from an online survey among lobbyists in the EU. A new measurement instrument for responsible lobbying is used that grasps the multidimensional phenomenon with a formative-formative higher-order construct.

The study reveals that criteria of responsible lobbying are fulfilled to a large extent according to the lobbyists. The PLS analysis confirms the applicability of the multidimensional model of responsible lobbying, although there is only a weak link between Dimension (1), referring to the company’s stated corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitment and coherence with lobbying and the second-order construct responsible lobbying. Based on the information given by respondents, the analysis provides evidence for a positive impact of responsible lobbying on both lobbying success and corporate reputation, but also for the dependence of these two variables on additional factors.

Responsible lobbying as an aligned approach to CSR and lobbying is a long neglected research topic, which has been gaining interest recently. This study contributes to empirical knowledge on the awareness and practice of responsible lobbying in the EU by taking a quantitative approach based on a solid theoretical foundation.

Drawing on the work of Niccolo Machiavelli and his appreciation of management and power, this paper explores the contemporary role of public affairs in UK organisations and the type of roles enacted by practitioners. The paper reviews how public affairs and, particularly, the corporate lobbying function have been treated by researchers and outlines recent research into the role played by public affairs practitioners based within a number of leading UK organisations. This study forms part of a longer‐term research programme designed to examine the functioning of in‐house public affairs departments within the UK. The paper explores how the role of public affairs practitioners can be conceptualised and suggests that public affairs and corporate lobbying have gained increasing recognition as strategically important activities, particularly within the more regulated sectors of industry.

This chapter examines the ethics and business diplomacy of legal tax avoidance by multinational enterprises (MNEs).

The methodology assembles the relevant literature and examines alternative interpretations of corporate tax strategy. Key topics include business ethics and responsibility, business sustainability, economic patriotism and corporate inversions, tax havens, and possible solutions.

The debate concerns whether legal tax avoidance is unethical and/or poor business diplomacy. There are three possible strategies for MNEs. One strategy is intentional tax avoidance. Another strategy is business–government negotiation concerning tax liability. Another strategy is business diplomacy aimed at maximizing the social legitimacy of the firm across multiple national tax jurisdictions.

The chapter assesses four possible solutions for corporate tax avoidance. One solution is voluntary tax payments beyond legal obligations whether out of a sense of ethics or a strategy of business diplomacy. A second solution is international tax cooperation and tax harmonization in ways that minimize opportunities for tax avoidance. A third solution is increased stakeholder pressure emphasizing business diplomacy and tax cooperation and harmonization. The fourth solution is negotiated tax liabilities between each business and each jurisdiction.

The chapter provides an original systematic survey of the key aspects of corporate international tax avoidance in an approach in which business ethics and business diplomacy are better integrated. The value of the chapter is that it provides information and assembles relevant literature concerning corporate international tax avoidance, and addresses possible solutions for this problem.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of venture capital (VC) funding as a form of ownership on lobbying strategies of venture-backed companies.

The sample consists of venture-backed IPO companies between 1999 and 2014. The authors collected IPO data from the Thompson Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The authors collected VC data from SDC VentureXpert database and lobbying data from the Center for Responsive Politics database (opensecrets.org).

Consistent with the hypotheses, the authors find that VC-backed companies spend less on lobbying compared to non-VC-backed counterparts. However, this relationship is moderated by companies’ R&D intensity. R&D intensive VC-backed companies choose to spend more on lobbying.

The research indicates that although VC backing has a negative impact on lobbying efforts, R&D intensity creates an incentive for VC-backed companies to spend more on lobbying in order to shape public policy to their benefit. The study consists of VC-backed companies that are public. The authors believe that future research can explore political strategies of VC-backed companies during their pre-IPO stage.

The authors believe that political strategies are powerful yet underutilized resources that VC-backed companies can rely on to shift industries and invest in innovative products that challenge norms and fight the status quo. Lobbying and other forms of political involvement can help them shape public policy.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the study makes a unique contribution to the literature by exploring the political strategies of VC-backed companies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the value of corporate political connections resulting from the revolving door of employment between political office and the for-profit corporation. The authors test whether there is value to firms from political connections provided by the appointment of former politicians to corporate boards or management teams. The authors also test to see if passage through the door in the other direction, from the corporate world to public office, generates value for firms. Do firms whose former employees gain public office earn excess returns following their appointment or election to these positions?

The methodology used in this study focusses on an empirical analysis of the political connections of US firms over the sample period 1996-2011. The analysis emphasizes the wealth effects associated with the announcement of hiring former politicians to corporate boards or the gaining of political office by former corporate employees.

The authors find that politicians becoming corporate directors is 2.5 times more common than corporate executives gaining public office. The authors determine that industries with extensive government regulation most often hire former politicians. The authors find that the office held by former politicians matters. The authors find that longevity in a cabinet position is important while formal Congressional or Senate leadership positions are not. Surprisingly, the authors determine the longer politicians are out of office, the more value they are able to provide to the firm. Finally, the authors discover that firms which hire former politicians have significantly positive long-term abnormal returns, but firms whose managers enter politics do not.

This study is highly original in its examination of political connections resulting from door swing in both directions. Further, the analysis of longevity, time out of office, and position held adds to the contributions made by this study.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in unpredictable policy environments, specific managerial choices play a vital role in designing lobbying capabilities through the choice of levels of investment in human capital, network relationships and structural modification.

Using an inductive case study approach, data were collected through 42 in‐depth, semi‐structured interviews and documented archival data. Cross‐case pattern sequencing was used to construct an interpretive model of lobbying capability design. Data were framed by the dynamic resource‐based theory of the firm.

Heterogeneous lobbying capabilities are adapted differently in private and state‐owned airlines as a result of diverse ownership structures and time compositions that interplay with organizational processes. The result is a divergence between private‐ and state‐owned airlines in how they engage with governmental actors and policies.

The paper contributes to ongoing discourse in and between the dynamic capabilities and corporate political activity literatures, particularly on how state/non‐state‐owned airlines design their political lobbying capabilities. The research is limited in so far as it only studies the European airline industry.

The paper illustrates how a specific and far‐reaching unanticipated external policy stimulus (the 9/11 terrorist attacks) impacted on management choices for lobbying design in the European airline industry.