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This manuscript studies municipal transparency in Iberian countries, Spain and Portugal, to analyse similarities and differences in both countries. Despite some political-administrative similarities, the way Spain and Portugal, deal with the issue of transparency may vary.

Based on the levels of municipal transparency, this work aims to analyse how legal and institutional context and political factors framed the way municipalities are managing the “naming and shaming” approach resulting from the creation of the Municipal Transparency Index. A descriptive analysis of the levels of municipal transparency will be carried out and a multivariate analysis to study the characteristics that may be determining differences and similarities between the two countries.

The study shows similarities in municipal transparency in Iberian countries, the positive effect of the “naming and shaming” approach on transparency and the influence of legal and institutional factors in transparency.

While there is extensive attention to municipal transparency at the country level, less research focuses on comparing municipal transparency in countries that have similar political-administrative characteristics. This study addresses this research gap by investigating two neighbouring countries.

This paper seeks to identify some of the most important drivers of Portuguese local government transparency in their activities over time. The recent literature on good governance has repeatedly identified transparency as central to promoting accountability, preventing corruption and mismanagement and stimulating greater civic engagement. As local government is the main provider of many primary services to the population, evaluating its transparency is especially relevant given that misconduct or maladministration will have a strong impact on the population's well-being. Given increased diffusion of European good governance norms and practices, the authors believe the Portuguese case to be relevant across the EU.

The authors develop a dynamic panel data model to evaluate the simultaneous influence of both political and contextual variables on the municipal transparency index (MTI) in 308 Portuguese municipalities during the period from 2013 to 2017.

The results suggest support for previous studies that found increased Internet enabled transparency in municipalities with low levels of indebtedness (per capita), are more highly populated, are governed by left-wing parties, demonstrating higher levels of financial efficiency. The urban/rural status, measured by population density, is not a significant predictor.

The paper seeks to confirm earlier analyses of these same data over a longer period of years to substantiate the validity of those findings. This is important especially in the context of the political variable, to demonstrate it was not necessarily a particular collection of left-wing mayors, but that the relationship holds over time, across administrations, because the dataset covers two election periods.

The lexicon of corporate governance has ‘transparency’ as a key imperative. Yet transparency as a management principle begs explanation. It also raises several questions: transparent to whom, how and why? Who decides? Is full transparency desirable? What are its merits and benefits? What are the risks of increased transparency? The answers may lie somewhere between the shareholder and stakeholder views of the modern corporation, with the former defending shareholder-owner primacy and firm profit-maximisation, and the latter offering a values-based approach towards balancing the needs and expectations of all stakeholders. While corporate governance broadly addresses the needs of shareholders and investors, driven by the position that companies need to be better governed for stockholder value, the ‘stakeholder’ view of the corporation has gained ground over the past 20 or so years whereby the modern corporation is accountable not only to its owners, but also society.The transparency debate has emerged in parallel, and with it, issues of privacy and/or secrecy on one hand and the notion of ‘sunlight’ on the other. Transparency’s role has been variously described as the promotion of corporate disclosure and protection of the rights of minority shareholders in the information environment (Bushman & Smith, 2003); the promotion of corporate accountability and advancement of the rights of stakeholders (Clarke, 2004; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Hess, 2007; Mallin, 2002); a tool to limit information asymmetries (Boatright, 2008; Florini, 2007a, 2007b; Hood, 2006; Lev, 1992); a means to create a level playing field through ethics and fairness (Boatright, 2008; Oliver, 2004); the promotion of market efficiency (Bessire, 2005; Heflin, Subramanyam, & Zhang, 2003); and the prevention of abuse through stakeholder activism (Bandsuch, Pate, & Thies, 2008; Roche, 2005). Aspirations aside, there is lack of consensus as to transparency's dimensions, drivers and dilemmas in corporate behaviour. Indeed, its perceived value to stakeholders and corporations alike remains questionable. In this chapter, the author discusses the governance of corporate transparency and argues that clarity and Board policy are needed to manage transparency activism and its resultant risks.

This paper aims to raise awareness of the potential misuse of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) within the financial services industry and outline the potential negative impact this may have on society in certain developing countries.

This piece of research adopted a mix-method approach across three strands; an online line anonymous survey, consisting of 24 questions, face to face interviews with 10 anti-bribery and corruption compliance officers and three focus group, one in Hong Kong, India and Mexico.

The results of the research have evidenced that there is a lack of understanding of the methodology used to compile the CPI within the financial services industry and there is a potential adverse impact if misused.

A potential limitation was the fact that the survey was written in English yet was distributed to some countries where English was not the respondents’ first language. As such, it was accepted that there may have been context challenges or a misunderstanding of what the question asked.

By raising awareness of the methodology of the CPI and the advantages and disadvantages of its use, it will enable the financial service industry to better understand the implications of using such an index and the impacts of its misuse.

This research highlights that through the potential misuse and lack of understanding of the CPI by the financial services industry this may have an adverse financial, growth and development impact on societies in low ranked countries.

This paper draws on a sub-set of results from a wider piece of research that was undertaken for a Professional Doctorate. This research combined academic knowledge with practitioner research skills, providing an original contribution to knowledge surrounding corruption from a more targeted focal point, particularly with input from anti-bribery and corruption compliance officers in the financial service industry.

This article will attempt to answer the following question: what has been done to prevent corruption and promote a “good government” in Latin America, what are the results and what explains the current situation? After analyzing very different experiences, the following could be stated: (1) there is at least a formal concern for promoting integrity in several countries, but there are problems of diagnosis and formulation; (2) the examples of implementation failures are far too many in Latin America. In any case, the most important factor explaining failures of design and implementation is the presence of a social trap and a political trap. The social trap is expressed by the incoherence of society itself, which demands honesty from Government, but in practice incentivizes corruption by paying bribes, breaching rules, and demanding privileges within the framework of clientelist networks. The political trap emerges from the strong path dependency effect resulting from the consolidation of patronage or clientelist networks.

Can transparency mitigate the trade-distortive effects of nontariff measures (NTMs)? This chapter explores the trade impact associated with promoting greater transparency in NTMs, using a new database of transparency provisions in over 100 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). The investigation surveys the incidence and scope of transparency provisions in RTAs, and econometrically assesses the trade effects of these instruments on bilateral agricultural and food trade. The findings demonstrate that transparency provisions in RTAs are associated with greater agricultural trade flows, suggesting that transparency should remain an important element of ongoing policy efforts to make NTMs less onerous for trade in agriculture.

This chapter discusses the special case of extractive industries in relation to susceptibility to corruption, especially in states with weak institutional and governance structures. The systemic nature of this corruption is shown in a vicious cycle of extractive resource dependency and corruption which reinforce each other. The chapter then concentrates on the supply side of corruption, and the role of the private sector with domestic and foreign natural resources companies feeding into systemic corruption. Corruption is underpinned by a high demand, high prices for extractive resources scenario, and mitigated by a low demand, low prices scenario. Transparency oriented, anticorruption measures may not be effective in their own right, but a low demand, low prices scenario could provide an opening for such measures to take root, with accompanying benefits to the citizens of resource rich states and their environment. This suggests taking a contingency approach to dealing with corruption.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, transparency became a rhetorical token used to provide a solution to financial problems. This study examines how transparency materialized in the context of the European securitization industry, which was largely blamed for the credit crunch. The authors show that although transparency was broadly associated with a political call for financial system reform, in the European securitization industry it provided the basis on which to repurpose its market infrastructure. The authors introduce the concept of transparency work to show that transparency is a market achievement organized as a standardization network of heterogeneous actors aiming at establishing a new calculative infrastructure for managing credit risk. Combining insights from information infrastructure research and Economic Sociology, the authors contribute to a distributed and networked understanding of information infrastructure development.

Multinational resource companies (MRCs) are under pressure to become responsible corporate citizens. In particular, stakeholders are demanding more information about the deals these companies negotiate with the host governments of resource-rich nations, and there is general agreement about the need for industry commitment to transparency and the benefits that a mandatory disclosure regime would bring. This paper examines the production of one attempt to regulate disclosures related to payments between MRCs and the governments of nations with resource wealth: Section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank Act.

Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) Sociology of Worth, the authors examine the comment letters of participants in this process with a view to revealing how stakeholder groups produce justifications to promote their positions vis-à-vis transparency to regulators.

The authors show how justifications were mobilised by various constituents in an effort to shape the definition of transparency and the regulatory architecture that governs disclosure practices. In this case, the collective recognition of desirability of transparency enabled the SEC to suture together the views of constituents to create a shared understanding of the role of the common good as it relates to transparency.

This paper explores an alternative approach to the consideration of comment letters advanced during the process of disclosure-related rule-making. The authors show how a sophisticated regulator may be able to draw together elements stemming from different constituents in a way that appeals to a shared sense of the “common good” in order to produce Final Rules.