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The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

There is a growing body of literature discussing the green logistics practices (GLPs) that companies could introduce to reduce the logistics environmental impact. Current approaches also identify several influencing factors within firms that could serve as barriers to, or enablers of, GLPs. However, less is known about the role of extra-firm stakeholders, even though these are crucial to operationalizing green logistics effectively. This study merges current theoretical understanding with empirical evidence to provide a detailed stakeholder analysis of GLPs.

Using stakeholder theory as a theoretical lens, the authors aimed at offering a mid-range contribution by conducting multiple embedded case studies examining Italian logistics service providers and shippers. GLPs and the related influencing factors were examined as sub-units of analysis within broader companies' environmental sustainability strategies.

The authors identified cascading effects among factors influencing the adoption of GLPs (e.g. key economic factors are affected by external factors which also influence organizational and collaboration factors). These effects are moderated by interdependencies between primary and secondary stakeholders, and the study highlights the prominent involvement of secondary stakeholders, such as final consumers.

This paper contributes to better understanding how and why companies adopt GLPs, emphasizing the wide set of stakeholders involved and illustrating how different stakeholders impact on GLPs adoption by affecting a set of influencing factors. By combining insights from the available literature with contemporary empirical data, the authors emphasize how Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) and shippers can no longer address the adoption of GLPs as “focal companies”, but only as part of a “focal network of interconnected stakeholders”, all of them influencing GLPs adoption.

This study reveals the green building development path and analyzes the optimal government subsidy equilibrium through evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation. This was done to explore the feasible measures and optimal incentives to achieve higher levels of green building in China.

First, the practice of green building in China was analyzed, and the specific influencing factors and incentive measures for green building development were extracted. Second, China-specific evolutionary game models were constructed between developers and homebuyers under the market regulation and government incentive mechanism scenarios, and the evolutionary paths were analyzed. Finally, real-case numerical simulations were conducted, subsidy impacts were mainly analyzed and optimal subsidy equilibriums were solved.

(1) Simultaneously subsidizing developers and homebuyers proved to be the most effective measure to promote the sustainability of green buildings. (2) The sensitivity of developers and homebuyers to subsidies varied across scenarios, and the optimal subsidy level diminished marginally as building greenness and public awareness increased. (3) The optimal subsidy level for developers was intricately tied to the building greenness benchmark. A higher benchmark intensified the developer’s responsiveness to losses, at which point increasing subsidies were justified. Conversely, a reduction in subsidy might have been appropriate when the benchmark was set at a lower level.

The expeditious advancement of green buildings holds paramount importance for the high-quality development of the construction industry. Nevertheless, the pace of green building expansion in China has experienced a recent deceleration. Drawing insights from the practices of green building in China, the exploration of viable strategies and the determination of optimal government subsidies stand as imperative initiatives. These endeavors aim to propel the acceleration of green building proliferation and materialize high-quality development at the earliest juncture possible.

The model is grounded in China’s green building practices, which makes the conclusions drawn more specific. Furthermore, research results provide practical references for governments to formulate green building incentive policies.

In times of crisis, innovation management and specifically Research and Development (R&D) investments are critical to temper company losses and stimulate higher revenues. Environmental policies, for their potential to stimulate environmental innovations and efficient management of resources, may hold a magnifying role in this relationship. By relying on the distinction between regulatory policies and institutional incentives, this paper argues about the moderating role of environmental policies between a firm's R&D expenses and its performance.

Hypotheses are tested on data collected from a sample of small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises after the 2008 financial crisis.

Findings reveal positive moderating effects of both regulatory pressures and institutional incentives, with a more significant effect of government support. The highest impact is reached when both these types of policies are present.

The theoretical and methodological relevance of this distinction, the importance of an appropriate mix of environmental policies in policymaking and their resilience building role in stimulating environmental innovations in the aftermath of crises are discussed.

Green technology innovation is the organic combination of green development and innovation driven. It is also a powerful guarantee for shaping sustainable competitive advantages of manufacturing enterprises. To explore what kind of executive incentive contracts can truly stimulate green technology innovation, this study aims to distinguish the equity incentive and reputation incentive, upon their contractual elements characteristics and green governance effects, and then put forward suggestions for green technology innovation accordingly.

This study establishes an evaluation model and uses empirical methods to test. Concretely, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies for the period from 2007 to 2020, this study compares and analyzes the impact of equity and reputation incentive on green technology innovation and explores the relationship between internal green business behavior and external green in depth.

This study finds that reputation incentives focus on long-term and non-utilitarian orientation, which can promote green technology innovation in enterprises. While equity incentives, linked to performance indicators, have a inhibitory effect on green technology innovation. Internal and external institutional factors such as energy conservation measures, the “three wastes” management system, and environmental recognition play the regulatory role in the relationship between incentive contracts and green technology innovation.

Those findings validate and expand the efficient contracting hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis from the perspective of green technology innovation and provide useful implications for the design of green governance systems in manufacturing enterprises.

This paper aims to investigate the cooperative governance mechanisms for personal information security, which can help enrich digital governance research and provide a reference for the formulation of protection policies for personal information security.

This paper constructs an evolutionary game model consisting of regulators, digital enterprises and consumers, which is combined with the simulation method to examine the influence of different factors on personal information protection and governance.

The results reveal seven stable equilibrium strategies for personal information security within the cooperative governance game system. The non-compliant processing of personal information by digital enterprises can damage the rights and interests of consumers. However, the combination of regulatory measures implemented by supervisory authorities and the rights protection measures enacted by consumers can effectively promote the self-regulation of digital enterprises. The reputation mechanism exerts a restricting effect on the opportunistic behaviour of the participants.

The authors focus on the regulation of digital enterprises and do not consider the involvement of malicious actors such as hackers, and the authors will continue to focus on the game when assessing the governance of malicious actors in subsequent research.

This study's results enhance digital governance research and offer a reference for developing policies that protect personal information security.

This paper builds an analytical framework for cooperative governance for personal information security, which helps to understand the decision-making behaviour and motivation of different subjects and to better address issues in the governance for personal information security.

Green innovation in supply chains is crucial for socioeconomic development and stability. Factors that influence collaborative green innovation in the supply chain are complex and diverse. Exploring the main influencing factors and their mechanisms is essential for promoting collaborative green innovation in supply chains. Therefore, this study analyzes how upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain collaborate to develop green technological innovations, thereby providing a theoretical basis for improving the overall efficiency of the supply chain and advancing green innovation technology.

Based on evolutionary game theory, this study divides operational scenarios into pure market and government-regulated operations, thereby constructing collaborative green innovation relationships in different scenarios. Through evolutionary analysis of various entities in different operational scenarios, combined with numerical simulation analysis, we compared the evolutionary stability of collaborative green innovation behavior in supply chains with and without government regulation.

Under pure market mechanisms, the higher the green innovation capability, the stronger the willingness of various entities to collaborate in green innovation. However, under government regulation, a decrease in green innovation capability increases the willingness to collaborate with various entities. Environmental tax rates and green subsidy levels promote collaborative innovation in the short term but inhibit collaborative innovation in the long term, indicating that policy orientation has a short-term impact. Additionally, the greater the penalty for collaborative innovation breaches, the stronger the intention to engage in collaborative green innovation in the supply chain.

We introduce the factors influencing green innovation capability and social benefits in the study of the innovation behavior of upstream and downstream enterprises, expanding the research field of collaborative innovation in the supply chain. By comparing the collaborative innovation behavior of various entities in the supply chain under a pure market scenario and government regulations, this study provides a new perspective for analyzing the impact of corresponding government policies on the green innovation capability of upstream and downstream enterprises, enriching theoretical research on green innovation in the supply chain to some extent.

The credit of agricultural product quality and safety reflects the ability of the main actors involved in the supply chain to provide reliable agricultural products to consumers. To fundamentally solve the problem of agricultural product quality and safety, it is worth studying how to make the credit awareness and integrity self-discipline of the supply chain agriculture-related subjects strengthened and the role and value of credit supervision given full play. Starting from the application of blockchain in the agricultural product supply chain, this paper aims to investigate the main factors affecting the credit regulation of agricultural product quality.

Using the DEMATEL-ISM (decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory–interpretative structural modeling) method, we analyze the credit influencing factors of agricultural quality and safety empowered by blockchain technology, find the causal relationship between the crucial influencing factors and deeply explore the hierarchical transmission relationship between the influencing factors. Then, the path analysis in structural equation modeling is utilized to verify and measure the significance and effect value of the transmission relationship among the crucial influencing factors of credit regulation.

The results show that the quality and safety credit regulation of agricultural products is influenced by a combination of direct and deep influencing factors. Long-term stable cooperative relationship, Quality and safety credit evaluation, Supply chain risk control ability, Quality and safety testing, Constraints of the smart contract are the main influence path of blockchain embedded in agricultural product supply chain quality and safety credit supervision.

Credit supervision is an important means to improve the ability and level of social governance and standardize the market order. From the perspective of blockchain embedded in the agricultural supply chain, the regulatory body is transformed from the product body to the supply chain body. Take the credit supervision of supply chain subjects as the basis of agricultural product quality supervision. With the help of blockchain technology to improve the effectiveness of agricultural product quality and safety credit supervision, credit supervision is used to constrain and incentivize the behavior of agricultural subjects.

The primary objective of this study aims to intensively explore the environment of Indonesian regulations and laws related to the Islamic banking system and micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) and unveil the restrictive laws and regulatory flaws that potentially hinder the Islamic banking institution and MSME industry in achieving financial inclusion and promoting sustainable growth.

This paper implements a qualitative method by implementing a multi-case study research strategy, both from the Islamic banking institutions and the MSME industries. The data were gathered primarily through an interview approach by adopting purposive uncontrolled quota sampling.

The findings of this paper reveal two essential issues: First, the regulatory imbalances and restrictions could demotivate and hinder the efforts of Islamic banks in providing access to finance for the MSME segment, hence, encumbering the achievement of the financial inclusion agenda from the Islamic banking industry. Second, the flaws in MSME registration and taxation might discourage the formal MSMEs from extending their business license and prevent the informal MSME units from registering their business. This issue would potentially lower their chance of accessing external financing from the formal financial institutions and participating in supportive government programmes due to the absence of proper legality.

Since this paper only observed six Islamic banks and 22 MSME units in urban and rural locations in Indonesia using a case study approach, the empirical findings and case discussions were limited to those respective Islamic banks and MSME participants.

By referring to the recommendations as presented in this paper, two critical policy implications could be expected from adopting the proposed recommendations, among others: By addressing the issues of the regulatory imbalance associated with the Islamic banking industry and introduce the deregulatory policies on profit and loss sharing (PLS) scheme implementation, this approach will motivate the Islamic banking industry in serving the MSME sector better and provide greater access to financial services, particularly in using the PLS financing schemes. By resolving the problems on MSME registration and taxation, this strategy will enhance the sustainability of the formal MSMEs’ operation and encourage the informal ones to register, hence, improving their inclusion into the formal financing services and government assistance programmes.

The present study attempts to address the literature shortcomings and helps to fill the gaps – both theoretical and empirical – by incorporating the multi-case study among Indonesian Islamic banks and MSMEs to extensively explore the Indonesia regulatory environment pertaining to the Islamic banking system (supply-side) and MSMEs (demand-side), and thoroughly investigates and reveals the restrictive laws and regulatory flaws that could potentially hinder the Islamic banking institutions and MSME industries in attaining financial inclusion and contributing to sustainable development.

The purpose of this study is to examine how formal and informal institutions play a role in the Iranian context in shaping corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies and practices.

Using a multiple case-study approach combining comparative and cross-sectional methods with semi-structured interviews, primary data was collected from eight corporations that actively participated in CSR activities in Iran. A microanalysis approach was used to examine the meanings and dynamics in the data. Through thematic analysis and pattern-matching techniques, the authors separately examined the roles of formal and informal institutions. Cross-case analysis was used to highlight the cases’ similarities and differences.

This study demonstrates that both formal and informal institutional structures exist in Iran and that both types influence CSR. This study also shows that informal institutions (such as personal values, culture, religion, traditions, charity and philanthropy) play a more explicit role than formal institutions (such as legal regulations and laws) in shaping CSR adoption policies and practices. The results indicate that, among institutions linked to CSR, formal and informal institutions are complementary and potentiate each other in Iran. Nevertheless, compared to formal ones, informal institutions play a more prominent role in shaping CSR policies and practices.

The authors recognize that, although the eight corporations are large, and although they interviewed their key personnel, they do not claim that these findings are generalizable, owing to the qualitative nature of the study and the small number of selected corporations.

This study makes relevant theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it contributes to the growing body of CSR literature that highlights the necessity of linking informal and formal institutions. Although the CSR literature lacks research on informal institutions in developing economies, researchers have yet to push forward and explore how the CSR adoption process works in developing economies that have influential informal institutions.