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Green technology innovation is the organic combination of green development and innovation driven. It is also a powerful guarantee for shaping sustainable competitive advantages of manufacturing enterprises. To explore what kind of executive incentive contracts can truly stimulate green technology innovation, this study aims to distinguish the equity incentive and reputation incentive, upon their contractual elements characteristics and green governance effects, and then put forward suggestions for green technology innovation accordingly.

This study establishes an evaluation model and uses empirical methods to test. Concretely, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies for the period from 2007 to 2020, this study compares and analyzes the impact of equity and reputation incentive on green technology innovation and explores the relationship between internal green business behavior and external green in depth.

This study finds that reputation incentives focus on long-term and non-utilitarian orientation, which can promote green technology innovation in enterprises. While equity incentives, linked to performance indicators, have a inhibitory effect on green technology innovation. Internal and external institutional factors such as energy conservation measures, the “three wastes” management system, and environmental recognition play the regulatory role in the relationship between incentive contracts and green technology innovation.

Those findings validate and expand the efficient contracting hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis from the perspective of green technology innovation and provide useful implications for the design of green governance systems in manufacturing enterprises.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether reputation element affects the decision relative performance of trust, bonus and incentive contracts using social laboratory experiments.

The study conducts the following lab experiments bonus–incentive treatment without reputation, bonus–incentive treatment with reputation and trust–incentive treatment with reputation.

The study finds that the reputation and fairness concerns, in contrast to self-interest, may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choices in the reciprocity-based contracts. The principal pays higher salaries in the bonus contract as compared to an incentive contract.

The study contributes to the behavioral economic literature in the following dimensions. The existing literature on lab experiments considers a bonus contract as better than the debt contract; however, it does not consider the trust contract better than the debt contract.

Non-vehicle operating carrier platform is a typical crowdsourcing logistics platform that has achieved rapid development in China in recent years, and the sustainable development of non-vehicle operating carrier platform is underpinned by a large and stable professional user group. The purpose of this paper is to understand what platform incentives are available and to explore the influence mechanism of these incentives on actual carriers’ continuous intention to participate in non-vehicle operating carrier platform.

Based on organizational institution theory and behavioral motivation theory, the paper established the influence mechanism model of platform incentives on actual carriers’ continuous participation intention of non-vehicle operating carrier platform. A total of 300 questionnaires were distributed by Road Transportation Management Bureau of Zhejiang Province and a third-party questionnaire survey platform, and 176 valid questionnaires were collected. The partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) method based on PLS estimation was used to analyze the data.

The results revealed that the platform incentives have a significant influence on actual carriers’ continuous participation intention. The influence of the reputation incentive is the most profound, ranking first. The influence of the resource incentive is second to that of reputation incentive, ranking second. The influence of the bonus incentive ranks third. The operating cost perception, social value perception and functional value perception have significantly mediating effect. Furthermore, the mediating effect of social value perception and functional value perception is significantly higher than that of operating cost perception.

This study revealed the influence mechanism of platform incentives on actual carriers’ continuous participation intention of non-vehicle operating carrier platform. The relevant research results provided references for the establishment of platform incentive mechanism.

In construction projects, engineering variations are very common and create breeding grounds for opportunistic claims. This study investigates the complementary effect between an inspection mechanism and a reputation system in deterring opportunistic claims, considering an employer with limited inspection accuracy and a contractor, which can be either reputation-concerned or opportunistic.

This paper applies a signaling game to investigate the complementary effect between the employer's inspection and a reputation system in deterring the contractor's possible opportunistic claim, considering the information-flow influence of claiming prices.

This study finds that in the exogenous-inspection-accuracy case, the employer does not always inspect the claim. A more stringent reputation system complements a less accurate inspection only when the inspection cost is lower than a threshold, but may decline the employer's surplus or social welfare. In the optimal-inspection-accuracy case, the employer always inspects the claim. However, only a sufficiently stringent reputation system can guarantee the effectiveness of an optimal inspection in curbing opportunistic claims. A more stringent reputation system has a value-stepping effect on the employer's surplus but may unexpectedly impair social welfare, whereas a higher inspection cost efficiency always reduces social welfare.

This article contributes to the project management literature by combing the signaling game theory with the reputation theory and thus embeds the problem of inspection mechanism design into a broader socio-economic framework.

To minimize customer churn, many service providers offer consumers the option of automatic contract renewal at the end of a contract period. Such agreements are known as rollover service contracts (RSCs). This research quantifies the effect of RSCs and other related factors, such as incentives, on consumers' service choice decisions.

The study adopts choice-based conjoint analysis to assess the effect of RSCs on consumers' choices and to determine whether effect size varies when selecting a cell phone network or gym/leisure club provider, which represent lower-priced utilitarian and higher-priced hedonic services.

It was found that RSCs produce negative perceptions and intended behaviors for the majority of consumers across different product types. Nevertheless, as explained by social exchange theory, many individuals may be persuaded to enter into a RSC on the basis of reciprocity if they are offered an incentive such as a price discount or free product add-on.

In the marketing domain, this is the first comprehensive study to quantify the role of contract type among a range of other factors in consumers' decision-making when selecting a service. The authors' results offer context-specific implications for service marketers. First, RSCs are perceived more negatively in high-priced hedonistic categories, especially among those with lower incomes. Second, price discounts are more effective than product add-ons for motivating hedonic purchases, while product add-ons work better with utilitarian services.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how companies’ reputation affects their selection of auditors.

This paper measures company reputation using the reputation scores from Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” list. Multivariate analysis is performed to examine the impact of company reputation on public companies’ auditor choice. Robustness checks include conducting Heckman procedures and instrumental-variable two-stage least square regressions to control for self-selection bias and using alternative measures to proxy for company reputation and auditor industry expertise.

This paper finds that companies with higher reputations are more likely to hire industry-specialist auditors than their counterparts. The results suggest that because of reputation concerns, high-reputation companies have strong incentives to maintain and signal their financial reporting quality, which in turn increase their demand for audit quality.

This paper suggests that company reputation constitutes an important determinant of auditor selection and, therefore, has both policy and practical implications for the demand of audit services. The paper provides policy-makers and practitioners with insights into critical factors influencing companies’ complex decision process of auditor selection.

The findings of this paper on the empirical link between company reputation and auditor choice contribute to the auditing literature by enhancing the understanding of the effects of different company-level characteristics in financial reporting and audit planning process. This paper also adds to the growing literature on the influence of company reputation on corporate behavior by documenting the important role that company reputation plays in the managerial decision-making process.

This paper aims to identify distinct motivation profiles among non-executive directors and explores the reasons why non-executive directors continue to serve on boards of directors.

The analysis is based on a multiple case study in the context of German supervisory boards. The authors develop their primary insights from semi-structured interviews with 53 non-executive directors.

The findings indicate that non-executive director motivation revolves around material incentives, reputation, meaningfulness, congruence with firm goals and enjoyment. Three distinct motivation profiles emerge from the analysis, with each profile exhibiting a set of unique reasons to continue serving on boards.

Future research needs to test for the statistical representativeness of the findings and their performance implications, preferably in a shareholder-oriented governance context.

The study introduces a psychological angle to the debate about non-executive director motivation. The contributions include going beyond a bi-polar distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and draw attention to how motivation profiles relate to non-executive director’s intention to continue serving on boards.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between companies’ reputation and their purchase of non-audit services (NAS).

This study measures company reputation using the reputation scores from Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” list. Multivariate analysis is performed to examine the association between public companies’ overall reputation and their decision of NAS purchase. Robustness checks are performed to control for self-selection bias and alternate measures are used to proxy for company reputation and NAS fees.

This study finds that high-reputation companies on average pay more NAS fees than their counterparts. The results suggest that due to less severe agency conflicts, high-reputation companies tend to purchase more NAS from their incumbent auditors to appreciate the potential benefits of the auditors’ knowledge spillovers.

The findings of this study on the association between company reputation and NAS fees contribute to the literature by providing additional insight on the factors influencing companies’ NAS purchases. The results of this study suggest that a unique company-level characteristic, company reputation, is significantly associated with companies’ NAS purchase, and therefore has both policy and practical implications for the demand of NAS. This study also adds to the growing literature on the influence of company reputation on corporate behavior by documenting the important role that company reputation plays in the managerial decision-making process.

This paper presents a review of the state of the art on the application of blockchain and smart contracts to the peer-review process of scientific papers. The paper seeks to analyse how the main characteristics of the existing blockchain solutions in this field to detect opportunities for the improvement of future applications.

A systematic review of the literature on the subject was carried out in three databases recognized by the research community (IEEE Xplore, Scopus and Web of Science) and the Frontiers in Blockchain journal. A total of 1,967 articles were initially found, and after the exclusion process, the 26 remaining articles were classified according to the following dimensions: System Type, Open Access, Review Type, Reviewer Incentive, Token Economy, Blockchain Access, Blockchain Identification, Blockchain Used, Paper Storage, Anonymity and Maturity of the solution.

Results show that the solutions are normally concerned on offering incentives to the reviewers' work (often monetary). Other common general preferences among the solutions are the adoption of open reviews, the use of Ethereum, the implementation of publishing ecosystems and the use of InterPlanetary File System to the storage of the papers.

There are currently no studies covering the main aspects of blockchain solutions in the field of scientific peer review. The present study provides an overall review of the topic, summarizing important information on the current research and helping new adopters to develop solutions grounded on the existing literature.

The purpose of this paper is to propose the use of priority‐based incentives for collaborative hiding of confidential information in dynamic environments, such as self‐organized networks, peer‐to‐peer systems, pervasive and grid computing applications.

The paper documents the necessity of ISSON (Incentives for Secret‐sharing in Self‐Organised Networks); it provides functional and technical details on the proposed architecture; and, it assesses its feasibility in mobile ad‐hoc networks through real experiments. The paper elaborates on the availability of the hidden information through an analytical framework.

Through the real experiments, ISSON was found to be efficient in terms of communication and processing costs. Additionally, it avoids collusions for unauthorized revealing of the hidden information, and ensures the unlinkability and availability of the secret when it is divided and stored to peers.

The proposed, incentive‐based, privacy enforcement architecture is novel and applies to distributed, dynamic, and self‐configured computing environments.