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Although many countries are focusing on the management of construction and demolition waste (CDW) resource utilization, the effect of risk aversion of the green innovation-led enterprise on the performance of the CDW resource utilization supply chain is unclear when considering different green innovation contexts (green innovation led by the building materials remanufacturer or by the construction waste recycler). This study aims to investigate how the level of risk aversion of the green innovation-led enterprise affects CDW resource utilization under different green innovation contexts based on contingency theory.

Using Stackelberg game theory, this study establishes a decision model consisting of a building materials remanufacturer, construction waste recycler and CDW production unit and investigates how the level of risk aversion of the green innovation-led enterprise under different green innovation contexts influences the performance level of the supply chain.

The conclusions are as follows. (1) For the green innovation-led enterprise, the risk-averse behaviour is always detrimental to his own profits. (2) For the follower, the profits of the construction waste recycler are negatively correlated with the level of risk aversion of the green innovation-led enterprise in the case of a small green innovation investment coefficient. If the green innovation investment coefficient is high, the opposite result is obtained. (3) When the green innovation investment coefficient is low, the total supply chain profits decrease as the level of risk aversion of the green innovation-led enterprise increases. When the green innovation investment coefficient is high, total supply chain profit shows an inverted U-shaped trend with respect to the degree of risk aversion of the green innovation-led enterprise.

(1) This study is the first to construct a green innovation context led by different enterprises in the CDW resource utilization supply chain, which provides a new perspective on green management and operation. (2) This study is the first to explore the operation mechanism of the CDW resource utilization supply chain based on contingency theory, which provides new evidence from the CDW resource utilization supply chain to prove contingency theory. At the same time, this study examines the interactive effects of the green innovation cost coefficient and the degree of risk aversion of green innovation-led enterprises on the performance of supply chain members, expanding the contingency theory research on contingencies affecting enterprise performance. (3) This study will guide members of the CDW resource utilization supply chain to rationally face risks and achieve optimal supply chain performance.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.

An apparel supply chain primarily consists of geographically distant suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. The coordination among the members of the supply chain becomes difficult when we consider the triple bottom line of sustainability in it. Moreover, the complexity increases with the change in dominance power of the respective members. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability and dominance power simultaneously into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of three-echelon model to coordinate sustainable supply chain.

In this paper, the noncooperative game theoretic method has been applied for the exploration of models. The various structures of the centralized and decentralized supply chain are considered on the basis of a player's dominance power. The model uses simultaneous and sequential move games to analyze optimal profit of supply chain agents, total channel profit, green innovation level and corporate social innovation level.

Analytical results show that simultaneous game performs better than the sequential game. The consumer sensitivity toward green and social innovations increases total channel profit. We also proposed a linear two-part tariff contract model. The proposed model enhances the sustainability level and leads to perfect channel coordination. Using a numerical example, we present the effectiveness of multiple game structures under centralized and decentralized settings. The results reveal that channel efficiency is the highest in the two-part tariff contract followed by a simultaneous move game structure and lower in the cases of sequential move game.

In this research, model setting are deterministic and there is no any information asymmetry. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study multiechelon sustainable supply chain coordination models under stochastic and information asymmetry settings.

The paper includes implications for the development of sustainable supply chain coordination model to tackle the problems of dominance power, sustainability issues and lower channel efficiency of supply chain.

This study proposes game-theory-based three-echelon sustainable supply chain for the channel coordination.

With rising environmental concerns, recent years have witnessed a significant surge of academic and corporate interest in green supply chain coordination (GSCC). This is evident from the rise in channel coordination literature focused toward the elimination of sub-optimal in the green supply chain (GSC). This paper seeks to summarize the model-based research on coordination in GSCs with the help of a framework developed specifically for this paper. The purpose of this paper is to present an in-depth analysis of the widely used models in the area.

A review of literature is presented in this paper to examine the underlying concepts peculiar to GSCC. A classification framework is developed to present an exhaustive survey of commonly used concepts.

Around 90 percent of the papers on GSCC come from game theory (GT) application, which explicitly utilizes coordination through contracts. The review concludes prospective area of research in GSCC. The study posits that there exists a potential of creating a more rational and efficient coordination strategies to improve GSC’s operational performance, with the view of the optimum distribution of resources and better environmental management.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first state-of-the-art review of GSCC literature focused primarily on mathematical model-based literature. This review identifies various methodological and content-oriented characteristics of GSCC. The paper also opens avenues of future research.

Green innovation in supply chains is crucial for socioeconomic development and stability. Factors that influence collaborative green innovation in the supply chain are complex and diverse. Exploring the main influencing factors and their mechanisms is essential for promoting collaborative green innovation in supply chains. Therefore, this study analyzes how upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain collaborate to develop green technological innovations, thereby providing a theoretical basis for improving the overall efficiency of the supply chain and advancing green innovation technology.

Based on evolutionary game theory, this study divides operational scenarios into pure market and government-regulated operations, thereby constructing collaborative green innovation relationships in different scenarios. Through evolutionary analysis of various entities in different operational scenarios, combined with numerical simulation analysis, we compared the evolutionary stability of collaborative green innovation behavior in supply chains with and without government regulation.

Under pure market mechanisms, the higher the green innovation capability, the stronger the willingness of various entities to collaborate in green innovation. However, under government regulation, a decrease in green innovation capability increases the willingness to collaborate with various entities. Environmental tax rates and green subsidy levels promote collaborative innovation in the short term but inhibit collaborative innovation in the long term, indicating that policy orientation has a short-term impact. Additionally, the greater the penalty for collaborative innovation breaches, the stronger the intention to engage in collaborative green innovation in the supply chain.

We introduce the factors influencing green innovation capability and social benefits in the study of the innovation behavior of upstream and downstream enterprises, expanding the research field of collaborative innovation in the supply chain. By comparing the collaborative innovation behavior of various entities in the supply chain under a pure market scenario and government regulations, this study provides a new perspective for analyzing the impact of corresponding government policies on the green innovation capability of upstream and downstream enterprises, enriching theoretical research on green innovation in the supply chain to some extent.

With the global spread of environmental education, environmental awareness is becoming increasingly important in daily life and economic activities. Sustainable development, as the most effective development approach to address global climate change, has gradually become a research hotspot in countries around the world. The authors combine sustainable development with supply chain management and incorporate into the study the objective issue of corporate fairness preferences in real society to explore the pricing and product greenness decision problem of a secondary sustainable supply chain consisting of a manufacturer producing green products and a retailer selling green products. In particular, the authors explore how supply chain decisions change when both the manufacturer and the retailer focus on fairness and how this fairness behavior affects pricing and product greenness decisions in sustainable supply chains.

The authors consider that the manufacturers' greening efforts lead to expanded demand at the retail end. Upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain have preferences for the fairness of transactions. The impact of the fairness behavior of upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain on supply chain decisions is explored by building a Stackelberg game model.

The results of this study show that the fairness concern behavior of manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain has an impact on product greenness, product pricing and corporate profits.

This study on the fairness concern behavior of supply chain firms integrates behavioral economics and supply chain management. First, the authors consider the equilibrium problem of supply chain members in the centralized channel when there are no fairness preferences. Second, the decision problem of firms in the decentralized channel when fairness is considered and when fairness preferences are not considered is explored. The authors compare these three cases to derive the corresponding propositions. Finally, the authors verify the previous conclusions and draw other conclusions using arithmetic analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of demand information sharing on products’ greening levels with downstream competition. Specifically, this study examine two types of green products, “development-intensive” (DI) and “marginal-cost intensive” (MI), in a two-echelon supply chain where the manufacturer produces substitutable products, and competing retailers operate in a market with uncertain demand.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game-theoretic framework and consider a multistage game. This study consider how retailers receive private signals about uncertain demand and decide whether to share this information with the manufacturer, who then decides whether to acquire this information at a certain given cost. This paper considers backward induction and Bayesian Nash equilibrium to solve the model.

The authors find that in the absence of competition, information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under DI, whereas no-information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under MI, an increase in downstream competition drives higher investment in greening efforts by the manufacturer in both DI and MI and the manufacturer needs to offer a payment to the retailers to obtain demand information under both simultaneous and sequential contract schemes.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining how the nature of products (margin intensive green product or development intensive green product) influences green supply chain decisions under information asymmetry and downstream competition.

This study aims to examine how fairness concerns and power structure in dyadic green supply chains impact retail price, supply chain profits and greening level decisions.

This study develops game-theoretic models considering fairness concerns and asymmetric power structures under an iso-elastic demand setting. The research paper employs the Stackelberg game approach, taking into consideration the fairness concern of the channel leader.

The findings indicate that under fairness, there is an increase in both wholesale and retail prices, as well as greening expenditures. Notably, when comparing the two models (manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg), double marginalization is more pronounced in the retailer Stackelberg setup than in the manufacturer Stackelberg setup. In a traditional supply chain with iso-elastic demand, the follower typically extracts higher profit compared to the leader; however, our results show that, under fairness conditions, the leader achieves higher profit than the follower. Additionally, our study suggests that supply chain coordination is unattainable in a fairness setup. This paper provides insights for managers on the optimal supply chain structure and the level of fairness to maximize profit.

This paper investigates the impact of a leader's fairness on the optimal decisions within a green supply chain, an area that has received limited attention previously. Additionally, the study investigates how fairness concerns manifest in distinct power dynamics, specifically, in the contexts of manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the information sharing of the dynamic demand on green technology innovation and profits in supply chain from a long-term perspective.

The authors consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer has access to the information of dynamic demand of the green product, whereas the manufacturer invests in green technology innovation. Differential game theory is adopted to establish three models under three different scenarios, namely (1) decentralized decision without information sharing of dynamic demand (Model N-D), (2) decentralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-D) and (3) centralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-C).

The optimal equilibrium results show that information sharing of dynamic demand can improve the green technology innovation level and increase the green technology stocks only in centralized supply chain. In the long term, the information sharing of dynamic demand can make the retailer more profitable. If the influence of green technology innovation on green technology stocks is great enough or the cost coefficient of green technology innovation is small enough, the manufacturer and decentralized supply chain can benefit from information sharing. In centralized supply chain, the value of demand information sharing is greater than that of decentralized supply chain.

The authors used game theory to investigate demand information sharing and the green technology innovation in a supply chain. Specially, the demand information is dynamic, which is a variable that changes over time. Moreover, our research is based on a long-term perspective. Thus, differential game is adopted in this paper.