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This paper aims to propose an empirically grounded governance framework based on complex adaptive systems (CAS) principles to facilitate formation of well-connected regional supply chains that foster economic development, adaptability and resilience of mining regions.

This study is an exploratory case study of the South Australian (SA) mining industry that includes 38 semi-structured interviews with the key stakeholders and structural analysis of the regional supply network (RSN).

Findings demonstrate the applicability of the CAS framework as a structured approach to the governance of the mining industry regional supply chains. In particular, the findings exemplify the relationship between RSN governance, its structure and interconnectivity and their combined impact on the adaptability and resilience of mining regions.

The data set analysed in the current study is static. Longitudinal data would permit a deeper insight into the evolution of the RSN structure and connectivity. The validity of the proposed framework could be further strengthened by being applied to other industrial domains and geographical contexts.

The proposed framework offers a novel insight for regional policy-makers striving to create an environment that facilitates the formation of well-integrated regional supply chains in mining regions through more focussed policy and strategies.

The proposed framework is one of the first attempts to offer a holistic structured approach to governance of the regional supply chains based on CAS principles. With the current transformative changes in the global mining industry, policy-makers and supply chain practitioners have an urgent need to embrace CAS and network paradigms to remain competitive in the twenty-first century.

There is growing contestation between states and private actors over cybersecurity responsibilities, and its governance is ever more susceptible to nationalization. The authors believe these developments are based on an incomplete picture of how cybersecurity is actually governed in practice and theory. Given this disconnect, this paper aims to attempt to provide a cohesive understanding of the cybersecurity institutional landscape.

Drawing from institutional economics and using extensive desk research, the authors develop a conceptual model and broadly sketch the activities and contributions of market, networked and hierarchical governance structures and analyze how they interact to produce and govern cybersecurity.

Analysis shows a robust market and networked governance structures and a more limited role for hierarchical structures. Ex ante efforts to produce cybersecurity using purely hierarchical governance structures, even buttressed with support from networked governance structures, struggle without market demand like in the case of secure internet identifiers. To the contrary, ex post efforts like botnet mitigation, route monitoring and other activities involving information sharing seem to work under a variety of combinations of governance structures.

The authors’ conceptual framework and observations offer a useful starting point for unpacking how cybersecurity is produced and governed; ultimately, we need to understand if and how these governance structure arrangements actually impact variation in observed levels of cybersecurity.

Challenging the static view of family business governance, we propose a model of owner–manager relationships derived from the configurational analysis of managerial behavior and change in governance structure.

Stemming from social exchange theory and building on the 4C model proposed by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), we consider the evolving owner–manager relationship in four main configurations. On the one hand, we account for family businesses shifting from a generalized to a restricted exchange system, and vice versa, according to whether a family manager misbehaves in a stewardship-oriented governance structure or a nonfamily manager succeeds in building a trusting relationship in an agency-oriented governance structure. On the other hand, we consider that family firms will strengthen a generalized exchange system, rather than a restricted one, according to whether a family manager contributes to the stewardship-oriented culture in the business or a nonfamily manager proves to be driven by extrinsic rewards. Four scenarios are analyzed in terms of the managerial behavior and governance structure that characterize the phases of the relationship between owners and managers.

Various factors trigger managerial behavior, making the firm deviate from or further build on what is assumed by stewardship and agency theories (i.e. proorganizational versus opportunistic behavior, respectively), which determine the governance structure over time. Workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism and patriarchy on the one hand, and proorganizational behavior, relationship building and long-term commitment on the other, are found to determine how the manager behaves and thus characterize the owner's reactions in terms of governance mechanisms. This enables us to present a dynamic view of governance structures, which adapt to the actual attitudes and behaviors of employed managers.

As time is a relevant dimension affecting individual behavior and triggering change in an organization, one must consider family business governance as being dynamic in nature. Moreover, it is not family membership that determines the most appropriate governance structure but the owner–manager relationship that evolves over time, thus contributing to the 4C model.

The proposed model integrates social exchange theory and the 4C model to predict changes in governance structure, as summarized in the final framework we propose.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms.

Using a large and more recent data set consisting of 2,386 Chinese-listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012, the authors use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed effects and system GMM) to analyse the effects of firm-specific and corporate governance influences on capital structure.

The authors find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term debt ratios after controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis separating the sample of this paper into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state leads to decrease in debt ratios.

The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their monitoring role.

This paper extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency theory–capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by extending the empirical work on the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure by analyzing the mediating role of cost of capital in the non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX).

The sample for this study includes non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (formerly Karachi Stock Exchange) for the period of 2004–2016. Based on 1800 firm-year observations, three approaches of panel data analysis are applied for the step-wise analysis of the underlying study. Firstly, Pooled OLS is applied. Secondly, fixed and random effect panel regression followed by the Hausman test to check the unobservable individual heterogeneity of the data. Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects model is the most appropriate model for the sample panel data.

The study's findings are that board size, board composition, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have statistically significant direct effect on the firm's financing decisions. However, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have significant indirect effect on firm's capital structure decisions. The interesting finding of the paper is on the evidence of mediating role of cost of capital in the nexus of corporate governance and capital structure. Moreover, some conventional determinants of capital structure, including the firm's size, asset structure of the firm, profitability, business risk and growth, are found as determinants of capital structure decisions of the firms.

There are a few limitations to our study which could be addressed by upcoming research. We did not include all the four mechanisms of corporate governance including board structure, audit structure, compensation structure and ownership structure. However, we used only five important attributes including board size, board composition and CEO/Chair duality form board structure, managerial ownership and institutional ownership form ownership structure of corporate governance as our explanatory variables to examine their impact on the capital structure choices of the firms. Future studies may fill this research gap by involving some other attributes of corporate governance and analyzing their effectiveness and impact on value relevant capital structure decisions. Further, due to limited time and resources, we only tested the mediating role of cost of capital, hence, future researchers can analyze the mediating and moderating roles of different variables which may influence the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure choices of the firms.

The study has many valuable guidelines and practical implications for the financial managers of the corporations. Our results will facilitate the policymakers in setting their corporate governance policies and practices and making the value relevant capital structure decisions in compliance with the implications of corporate governance mechanism. In addition, our study provides the empirical evidence in accordance with the argument that good governance practices, particularly the voluntary disclosures by the firm may reduce the information asymmetry which, ultimately, reduces the agency cost and the cost of capital for the firm. However, while deciding the financial policy of the corporations, managers can use our findings in order to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance practices employed by the firm in achieving the optimal capital structure at which the weighted average cost of capital is at its minimum level.

This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the mediating role of the cost of capital in the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure decisions of the firms. This paper provides empirical evidence that corporate governance indirectly affects capital structure decisions through the mediating role of cost of capital.

Contemporary organisational landscapes offer opportunities for hybrids to thrive. Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are one thriving hybrid form incorporating the use of resources and/or structures from both public and private sectors. The study examines the impact of such a hybrid structure on governance and accountability mechanisms in a context of institutional complexity.

This study uses an approach that draws on institutional logics and hybridity to examine governance arrangements in the PPP policy created for the delivery of UK schools. Unusually, it employs a comparative case study of how four local governments implemented the policy. It draws on a framework developed by Polzer et al. (2017) to examine the level of engagement between multiple logics and hybrid structures and applies this to the delivery of governance and accountability for public money.

The Polzer et al. framework enables a study of how the nature of hybrids can vary in terms of their governance, ownership and control relations. The findings show how the relationships between levels of engagement of multiple logics and hybrid structures can impact on governance and accountability for public money. Layering and blending combinations led to increased adoption of private sector accountability structures, whilst a hybrid with parallel co-existence of community and market logics delivered a long-term governance structure.

The paper examines the operation of hybrids in a complex education PPP environment in only four local governments and therefore cannot provide representative answers across the population as a whole. However, given the considerable variation found across the four examples, the paper shows there can be significant differentiation in how multiple logics engage at different levels and in varying combinations even in the same hybrid setting. The paper focuses on capital investment implementation and its evaluation, so it is a limitation that the operational stage of PPP projects is not studied.

The findings have political relevance because the two local government bodies with more robust combinations of multiple logics were more successful in getting funds and delivering schools in their geographical areas.

The study extends Polzer et al.'s (2017) research on hybridity by showing that there can be significant differentiation in how multiple logics engage at different levels and in varying combinations even in what was planned to be the same hybrid setting. It shows how in situations of institutional complexity certain combinations of logics lead to differentiation in governance and accountability, creating fragmented focus on the related public accountability structures. This matters because it becomes harder to hold government to account for public spending.

The governance of information technology outsourcing (ITO) has been identified as an essential determinant for ITO success. Prior studies have shed light on effective governance structures in different organizational contexts. This study aims to advance this prior knowledge by exploring how interpersonal networks, as an important aspect of such context, reflect and influence ITO governance.

A single case study was conducted from a vendor’s perspective in an ITO dyad. Social network analysis was leveraged to reveal the interpersonal networks, with whole-network analysis on 24 team members in an ITO vendor company. In addition, open-ended interviews with six selected team members were utilized to identify the perceived governance structure.

The findings of this study suggest certain features of interpersonal networks, i.e. network density and cross-network comparison, can reflect governance structure in multiple aspects. Meanwhile, the authors also argue that interpersonal networks can influence the form of governance structure.

As a single case study, the context of the research site cannot be ignored in the inference of findings. To increase the confidence for further generalization, future empirical studies are needed especially in contrasting sites, such as ITO relations based on network governance.

This study associates intra-organizational characteristics of the vendor to the inter-organizational governance structure of the ITO relationship. It also provides an innovative methodology for both researchers and practitioners to assess ITO governance structure.

The paper aims to focus on a well‐known topic in the financial literature: the relation between capital structure and firm value. The controversial empirical results on this topic can be attributable to a lack of attention to the interaction between capital structure and other corporate governance variables. In fact, capital structure represents a corporate governance device that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value.

The paper, after a synthetic review of the main literature, defines, with a descriptive model, a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value. It provides a research proposition, and some suggestions, that should be applied for future empirical research on this topic while it also promotes a more precise design for empirical analysis.

The debate on the relation between capital structure and a firm's value needs to take directly into account the role of moderation and/or mediation of the corporate governance. It is necessary to consider the presence of complementarity between capital structure and other corporate governance variables such as: ownership concentration; managerial ownership; the role of the board of directors; and so on.

This paper promotes, as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms.

The paper tried to suggest how to improve previous controversial analysis on this topic.

This paper aims to study the state of the art of corporate social responsibility (CSR) governance and operational structure within the most sustainable companies to arrive at a typology of CSR organization. Whether companies consider corporate social responsibility (CSR) a strategic management task is mirrored in the department and governance structure of CSR.

By conducting a web content analysis, the authors apply a “best practice” approach to examine the vertical and horizontal organization of CSR within the “most sustainable companies worldwide” (Robeco SAM, 2013).

The results show that most corporations have in place governance structures for CSR that organize it horizontally in stand-alone departments. Three types of CSR organization best practice emerged: the single-headed, two-headed and infused types.

The paper indicates three different ways that companies can organize CSR internally. The authors discuss the feasibility of such organization for large and small companies and their day-to-day business.

The paper addresses the under-researched area of vertical and horizontal CSR organization at the micro level. The authors analyze the state of the art of organizational and governance structures of CSR in the most sustainable companies and deduce three types of CSR governance and operational architecture.

The study aims to yield evidence on the relation between the quality of governance characteristics and the firms' financial credibility involved in financial violations.

The study uses annual data ranging from 2000 to 2018. The sample consists of 154 nonfinancial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, comprising 77 fraudulent and 77 non-fraudulent companies. To examine the relationship between improvements in the governance structure and financial credibility of the firms, hypotheses are tested using the univariate analysis and multivariate regression model through the ordinary least square method.

The results affirm that fraud firms are possessed with poor governance structure compared to control firms in the pre-fraud year. The findings further imply that an improved governance structure brings foremost performance in stock price. The results of the study divulge that board of directors characteristic i.e. change in outside directors' percentage has a significant positive impact (β = 0.015, p = 0.05) on the financial credibility of the firms. The governance variables in terms of CEO-COB joint position has a significant negative (β = −0.824, p = 0.05) association with the financial credibility, which means that whenever CEO-COB joint position enhances, the financial credibility of the firms decreases. However, governance variables in the context of blockholders percentage has a significant positive (β = 0.13, p = 0.01) impact on financial credibility. The results of the study overall indicate that the governance structure has a significant influence on the financial performance of firms in the stock market.

The study provides an understanding of how fraudulent firms rehabilitate their governance structure and accrue economic benefits by the means of financial credibility after when the fraud is made public. It also adds to the literature in the area of corporate frauds specifically the role of governance structure in the financial performance of fraudulent firms in the stock market; this field is in its initial stage, even in developed countries, while, in developing countries, little work has been done.