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The existing literature documents mixed evidence toward the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate tax planning (e.g., Davis, Guenther, Krull, & Williams, 2016; Hoi, Wu, & Zhang, 2013). In this study, I aim to identify a causal relationship between CSR and tax planning, leveraging the staggered adoptions of constituency statutes in US states, which is a plausibly exogenous shock to firms' emphasis on their social responsibility. In general, the statutes permit firm directors to consider the interests of all constituents when making business decisions, including those who benefit from firms paying their fair share of income taxes. Thus, the adoption of the statutes raises the importance of firms' social responsibility in paying income taxes. Employing a staggered difference-in-differences (DiD) method, I find that firms incorporated in states that have adopted constituency statutes exhibit significantly higher effective tax rates (ETRs) based on current tax expense. This causal relationship suggests that managers, with the legitimacy to consider the social impact of tax avoidance, become less aggressive in tax planning. I further find that the effect of adoption is stronger for financially unconstrained firms and firms in retail businesses, where the demand (cost) for tax avoidance is lower (higher). Finally, I show that my main results are driven by firms located in states with a high sense of social responsibility and firms with high levels of tax avoidance prior to the adoption. Overall, the findings in this chapter contribute to the literature by delineating a negative causal relationship between CSR and tax avoidance and identifying a positive social impact brought by the passage of constituency legislation.

This chapter analyzes how the industry environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, common participants in the product market are competitors, suppliers, and customers. These micro-stakeholders create competitive pressures on firms and thus affect their current and future performance. Competitors influence dividend decisions through three mechanisms, namely predation threat, corporate governance, and imitation. Predation threat reduces firms' incentives to pay dividends when facing high rivalry. Competition helps firms improve corporate governance. However, strong corporate governance may increase or decrease dividend payments since dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for weak corporate governance, respectively. Besides, firms tend to imitate their industry peers in dividend policy. Second, as a financial policy, dividend policy is also affected by participants in the financial market like investors, creditors, and auditors. These financial stakeholders' behaviors are important to stock prices. Due to the agency problem, creditors have high incentives to restrict firm's dividend payments in order to protect their benefits. On the other hand, creditors are effective external monitors who help firms improve their corporate governance. Outside investors affect corporate dividend policy through their valuation. Firms pay more dividends if investors prefer dividends to capital gains. Auditors play the role of a third-party monitor, and thus, they help firms reduce managers' expropriation of shareholders and improve the quality of accounting information. Furthermore, we also investigate dividend policy of regulated industries in both financial sector (banking, insurance, and real estate) and utilities sector (energy, telecommunications, and transportation).

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

Purpose: The main aim of the study is to provide a tool for non-financial information in decision-making. We analysed the non-financial data in the annual reports in order to show the usage of this information in financial decision processes.

Need for the Study: Main financial reports such as balance sheets and income statements can be analysed by statistical methods. However, an expanded financial reporting framework needs new analysing methods due to unstructured and big data. The study offers a solution to the analysis problem that comes with non-financial reporting, which is an essential communication tool in corporate reporting.

Methodology: Text mining analysis of annual reports is conducted using software named R. To simplify the problem, we try to predict the companies’ corporate governance qualifications using text mining. K Nearest Neighbor, Naive Bayes and Decision Tree machine learning algorithms were used.

Findings: Our analysis illustrates that K Nearest Neighbor has classified the highest number of correct classifications by 85%, compared to 50% for the random walk. The empirical evidence suggests that text mining can be used by all stakeholders as a financial analysis method.

Practical Implications: Combining financial statement analyses with financial reporting analyses will decrease the information asymmetry between the company and stakeholders. So stakeholders can make more accurate decisions. Analysis of non-financial data with text mining will provide a decisive competitive advantage, especially for investors to make the right decisions. This method will lead to allocating scarce resources more effectively. Another contribution of the study is that stakeholders can predict the corporate governance qualification of the company from the annual reports even if it does not include in the Corporate Governance Index (CGI).

We examine the stock market reaction to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 during its enactment process, focusing on its international provisions. Consistent with extant evidence, we find lower returns for high-foreign-activity firms, indicating a negative market reaction to the international provisions overall. Considering specific international provisions, we find that the market reaction was more positive (negative) for firms likely most affected by the shift to a quasi-territorial system for taxing foreign earnings (the transition tax on existing unrepatriated earnings, the tax on global intangible low-taxed income, and/or the base erosion and antiabuse tax) than for other firms. Our findings imply that investors are able to disentangle the economic implications of complex and interactive tax law changes.

The environmental performance of organizations has come under public policy limelight since the phenomenal increase of natural resource degradation and industrial waste. Thus, green concepts have been put forward, but the implementation of green practices faces many barriers and challenges. These barriers require attention as organizational practices are negatively affecting the environment leading to global warming and climate change. Therefore, this chapter systematically identifies four internal barriers including inadequate management commitment and support, insufficient technology competence and infrastructure, financial constraints, the uncertainty of economic benefits, and eight sub barriers within an organization concerning green concepts implementation. Moreover, this chapter also identifies four external barriers including lack of stakeholder's interest, inadequate environmental administrative support, scarce academic research, and lack of green collaborative practices, and eight sub barriers outside an organizational context concerning green concept implementation. The barriers in this research were identified by reviewing the existing literature on the topic. This chapter advances the green literature by identifying multiple barriers and challenges to the successful implementation of green concepts in organizations. This is of significance as if these barriers are tackled strategically, it would reduce environmental degradation problems and help make financial gains. Moreover, this research can help managers understand the key barriers to green concept implementation and provide guidance to them when attempting to implement green practices in their organizations. This research would also motivate researchers to extend further investigation on how to overcome such barriers and find out strategies to mitigate the barriers to green concept implementation to effectively address environmental issues.

This chapter analyzes how the macro-environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, political factors including political uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, political corruption, and democracy may have two opposite effects on dividend decisions. For example, firms learn democratic practices to improve their corporate governance, but dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for poor corporate governance. Second, firms in countries of high national income, low inflation, and highly developed stock markets tend to pay more dividends. A monetary restriction (expansion) reduces (increases) dividend payments, as economic shocks like financial crises and the COVID-19 may negatively affect corporate dividend policy through higher external financial constraint, economic uncertainty, and agency costs. On the other hand, they may positively influence corporate dividend policy through agency costs of debt, shareholders' bird-in-hand motive, substitution of weak corporate governance, and signaling motive. Third, social factors including national culture, religion, and language affect dividend decisions since they govern both managers' and shareholders' views and behaviors. Fourth, firms tend to reduce their dividends when they face stronger pressure to reduce pollution, produce environment-friendly products, or follow a green policy. Finally, firms have high levels of dividends when shareholders are strongly protected by laws. However, firms tend to pay more dividends in countries of weak creditor rights since dividend payments are a substitute for poor legal protection of creditors. Furthermore, corporate dividend policy changes when tax laws change the comparative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.