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The purpose of this study is to use crime mapping techniques to examine geographic patterns of signed deferred and non-prosecution agreements across federal districts. The purpose is also to examine the variation in the number of agreements by the district since 1992.

This study uses data from the Corporate Prosecution Registry to examine geographic patterns in federal corporate agreements since 1992 (n = 534). Choropleth mapping techniques were used to create national crime maps displaying the geographic locations of signed corporate agreements.

The results showed that, overall, prosecutors in the District of Columbia have signed the most federal corporate agreements although there is some variation over time.

This study is unable to determine the causes of changes in the geographic placement or number of agreements signed. It is also unable to determine the precise geographic locations of crimes, but only the location of the District Court that elected to pursue a federal agreement with the organization.

The wide discretion prosecutors have in the agreement process has led to an overall lack of transparency concerning prosecutors’ decision-making when signing agreements with organizations. This study helps to make the number and geographic location of agreements more transparent.

This study uses crime mapping techniques to visually depict the locations of signed agreements allowing for visual comparisons and analyzes for an extended period of time.

Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are the tool of choice for federal prosecutors when adjudicating corporate misconduct. A DPA is a negotiation that permits the allegedly guilty party from undergoing a criminal trial if they avoid committing further wrongdoing for a specified period. This paper aims to examine whether DPAs are a beneficial mechanism for the criminal justice system to use while adjudicating corporate misconduct. By conducting in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews with 24 practitioners in the legal field and white-collar crime experts, this study identifies the shortcomings and advantages of DPAs and highlights what policy enactments might enhance their application. The study contributes to the existing literature by expanding the narratives used by judicial officials, legal practitioners and white-collar crime scholars on the role of DPAs.

The current study is an in-depth qualitative analysis that explores judicial actors’ and white-collar crime scholars’ opinions on the adoption of DPAs to adjudicate corporate misconduct. The literature on DPAs is currently derived primarily from law and literature reviews published by legal scholars. Clandestine negotiations are not accessible to the public and are frequently kept in sealed files unless a breach of contract occurs, resulting in the case proceeding to trial. Hence, a qualitative analysis is the best approach to evaluate the effectiveness of DPAs. Further, little evidence is available that focuses on the opinions of professionals who have participated in these agreements. The interviews were conducted over Zoom and lasted an average of 43 min, with the longest interview spanning 1 h and 45 min and the shortest interview being 14 minutes. A non-probability sampling method – specifically, snowball sampling – was used to generate a total sample of 24 legal professionals and white-collar crime scholars. Initial participants were found by contacting law offices specializing in white-collar crime litigation and using current networks to attain access to a broader range of participants. Then, 19 participants provided referrals throughout the study. The final sample consisted of nine government officials, eight legal practitioners and seven white-collar crime academics experts. One of the government official interviews was excluded from the final research project due to a lack of expertise in the field of white-collar crime. The interview questions were designed to promote in-depth conversation and insight into personal opinions on the adoption of DPAs. Several inquiries highlighted whether DPAs are an appropriate response to corporate misconduct and whether they reduced recidivism through their intended deterrent effect. Furthermore, several descriptive questions sought to understand which criminal justice actors support the adoption of DPAs in white-collar crime cases and why. Coding of the data was first conducted individually by each author. The researchers then compared thematic findings that reflected consensus.

An immediate theme identifiable in the research is the intrinsic value that DPAs offer in adjudicating corporate wrongdoing. As indicated by a participant, corporate misconduct is not “black or white,” stressing the importance of prosecutors having a middle ground between criminal prosecution and the dismissal of charges. A judicial official indicated that “DPAs are another essential arrow in a prosecutor’s quiver – and something a defense attorney can bargain for” (Respondent 5). Seven government officials and legal practitioners noted that you are unable to send a corporation to jail, and you do not simply want to put them out of business; thus, a DPA is the only tool in which the government can mandate structural change in a company without dismantling the entire entity. Only three academics concurred with the government officials and legal practitioners that DPAs are beneficial and offer prosecutors a vital middle ground. One academic, for example, stated that “DPAs have given U.S Attorney offices that ability to be involved for a considerable amount of time in a company's business, while simultaneously promoting change within the entity” (Respondent 14). Additionally, DPAs ensure that corporations are held criminally liable without triggering an endless cycle of collateral consequences for innocent third parties. One legal practitioner, for example, stated: “Just look at the Enron case; they charged Arthur Andersen with obstruction of justice and dismantled the entire entity they made it where the business was never going to come back. A small subset of individuals, in this case, should have been held responsible but instead, hundreds and if not thousands of people were harmed. With this in mind, DPAs are extremely important, in that it limits collateral consequences because DPAs take a more holistic view that criminal prosecution does not consider” (Respondent 21). Another respondent highlighted that “DPAs are the only tool available that can be employed to change an entire organization structurally” (Respondent 20). Ultimately, the findings suggest that there is a consensus among respondents that DPAs are an appropriate response to corporate misconduct, particularly when the agreement stipulates that a company must hire an external compliance monitor and update their current compliance system. Overall, participants emphasized that these stipulations promote a sense of corporate accountability, provide for the dismissal of guilty employees and mandate structural change. The majority of the respondents (n = 20) insisted that DPAs are advantageous, yet a subset of participants were skeptical of their use in white-collar crime prosecutions. One legal practitioner, for example, noted that “DPAs are political creatures that are awarded as political favors to the largest of corporations that our economy relies upon” (Respondent 17). Another government official confirmed this statement, indicating that “DPAs are a mere slap on the wrist for large corporations – they simply see it as doing business” (Respondent 6). Four academic participants emphasized that DPAs are typically negotiated with multi-level corporations and are not extended to the small businesses that suffer the dire consequences of criminal prosecution. One academic, for instance, stressed that “the question becomes is it fairly applied and being implemented properly. Larger companies are more likely to receive and benefit from a DPA, thus, raising the question of fairness” (Respondent 12). Another academic who was previously a government official stated: “DPAs risk abuse – there have been several instances where prosecutors have forced companies to donate money to favored charities and overstepped their powers. Sometimes DPAs also come with monitors. For example, banks typically have to pay for the auditor, and it becomes extremely intrusive, and it it not clear that they are efficient.”

Several limitations exist in this research. First, it is not a comprehensive study that is representative of the larger population, which limits generalizability. Given the contention of research on DPAs, this qualitative research contributes to the literature, and its findings are likely transferable to multiple settings in which DPAs are used. Second, DPAs are processed and drafted differently across jurisdictions; thus, comparing DPAs across state levels and among departments in the federal government would be equivalent to comparing apples to oranges. This comparison is yet another limitation to the study because criminal justice practitioners operate in both the state and federal jurisdictions. Another challenge in the current study and something that likely will be a problem for future researchers is the difficulty of gaining access to experts in an exclusive field of criminal justice, such as federal prosecutors, Department of Justice officials, federal judges and elite corporate defense attorneys. Ultimately, several obstacles arose during the study, particularly when recruiting participants to gain a large enough sample size to conduct meaningful analysis. This resulted in smaller sample size but rich, in-depth data that achieved saturation among participants.

Several policy implications are identifiable. First, it appears that DPAs are a mainstay of white-collar crime prosecution. No participants advocate for their complete removal from the prosecution process. Participants highlight that DPAs occupy an essential middle-ground between dismissal and criminal charges. Without this mechanism, prosecution would be impeded, and holding corporate criminal actors liable would increasingly become formidable. Although it appears that the system cannot function without DPAs, several respondents emphasize that we must begin to hold individuals accountable alongside corporations. Another policy implication that a minority of participants mentioned within the study involves ensuring that our compliance monitoring system operates appropriately. A majority of participants note that the overarching stipulation that promotes structural change within an organization is adopting a functioning compliance monitoring system, thus, emphasizing the importance of this process operating smoothly and ethically. The selection of an independent compliance monitor may be problematic. For example, a former government compliance monitor notes that not all monitors are experts in the field they are overseeing. A pharmaceutical expert, for example, may be attempting to regulate an automotive organization, which may present unique challenges. An agency of federal professionals dedicated to supervising specific industries such as automotive, pharmaceutical and financial would ensure that organizations are actually implementing the terms of the DPA.

Ultimately, the current research highlights the necessity of empirically studying the benefits and drawbacks of such agreements. Future research on the topic remains onerous due to the scarcity of a centralized database that contains extensive details of DPAs. The present study suggests that the verdict on DPAs is undecided, with more than half of the study's criminal justice professionals advocating for their continued and even increased use. However, about half of the participants, particularly academics, called attention to the agreements’ potential bias. The disagreement among participants is most contentious in the consideration of a DPA centralized database which would immensely aid future research and policy advancements.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This study aims to analyze corporate mail and wire fraud penalties, using bounded rationality in decision-making and assessing internal and external influences on prosecutorial choices.

The study analyzed 467 cases from 1992 to 2019, using data from the Corporate Prosecution Registry of the University of Virginia School of Law and Duke University School of Law. It examined corporations facing mail and wire fraud charges and other fraud crimes. Multiple regression linked predictor variables to the dependent variable, total payment.

The study found that corporate penalties tend to be lower for financial institutions or corporations in countries with US free trade agreements. Conversely, penalties are higher when the company is a U.S. public company or filed in districts with more pending criminal cases.

This study’s originality lies in applying the bounded rationality model to assess corporate prosecutorial decisions, unveiling external factors’ influence on corporate penalties.

The objective of the paper is to describe how criminal prosecutors in the USA have expanded the reach of federal statutes punishing fraud and extortion to combat the influence of organized criminal groups in certain American labor unions and employee benefit plans from 1980 to 2006.

The paper reviews newspaper accounts and published judicial decisions to explain how prosecutors have used fraud and extortion offenses in novel ways on a case‐by‐case basis to prosecute labor‐management corruption in the USA.

Although the American federal prosecutor's arsenal is limited to statutory crimes, prosecutors are continually evolving new means of addressing corruption on a case‐specific basis in the best tradition of Anglo‐American common law. By diligently persuading trial judges, appellate courts, and the US Congress of the merit of looking at fraud and extortion in new ways, federal prosecutors have carried out the intent of the statutory laws which Congress enacted to deal with corruption in government, business, and labor unions.

The federal criminal offense of “honest service fraud,” which was codified by Congress only following successful criminal prosecutions of public and private corruption, will continue to be used to address corruption on the part of persons holding fiduciary duties toward union members and employee pension and health benefit plan participants as the American retired population increases and the national government assumes greater oversight of employee health care.

The paper encourages the reader, especially those in law enforcement, to think creatively about the scope of existing criminal statutes while reviewing or enforcing their application to all forms of organizational corruption.

In a country where judicial institutions are known to be inefficient and where activists have traditionally not engaged in legal mobilization, what explains the emergence of NGO strategic litigation? The author argues that a change in the legal opportunity structure impacts how activists interact with the legal system. Comparing two states in Mexico, the author demonstrates that the introduction of private prosecution rights opened the door for activists to litigate femicide cases. The emergence of strategic litigation has helped improve compliance with international human rights law and has had a demonstration effect on how to use the law to press for accountability.

In this chapter, we provide a brief historical framework of the events and policy changes that impacted the prosecution of terrorism over the past 50 years with emphasis placed on the changes that resulted from the 9/11 attacks.

We provide a review of relevant literature and complete the chapter by providing new data (2015) on case outcomes derived from the American Terrorism Study, a database housed in the Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, at the University of Arkansas.

Investigative and prosecutorial authority in U.S. terrorism cases has experienced ebbs and flows that correspond with terrorism attacks as well as missteps by the FBI, and each has impacted the success of prosecution efforts. Despite dramatic changes, the number of cases prosecuted after 9/11 is unprecedented, and conviction rates continue to climb.

This chapter provides the reader with a synopsis of the policy changes that have occurred in federal terrorism investigations and trials from the late 1960s upto the present. Based on that context, we provide an explanation of how those policy changes have impacted terrorism prosecutions.

The large, all‐purpose local authorities established by the Local Government Re‐organization Act, 1972, for England and Wales—Scottish local government re‐organization is yet to be completed—are operative; members have long since been elected and organization and staffing, if not complete, at least ready to commence. It is certainly the greatest upheaval since urban and rural sanitary authorities were set up about the middle of the last century. The last change of any magnitude was in 1934; small, however, compared with 1974. At that time, there were 62 county councils, 83 county boroughs and nearly 300 municipal boroughs, 29 metropolitan boroughs, more than 600 urban and about 500 rural districts; roughly 1,600 local authorities. The tremendous reduction in authorities by the present re‐organization illustrates the extent of the upheaval.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

Immigration enforcement along the Southwest border between United States and Mexico has long channeled migrants into perilous desert corridors, where many thousands have died, out of general public view. In response to this humanitarian crisis, activists from organizations such as No More Deaths (NMD) trek deep into the treacherous desert, hoping to save lives, honor the remains of those who did not survive, and influence public opinion about border enforcement policies. NMD’s activism is not merely utilitarian but also deeply expressive; ultimately, they hope to convey the message that all lives – including those of unauthorized migrants – are worth saving. The Trump Administration has escalated repressive tactics intended to silence these forms of border-policy dissent. Some federal land managers now blacklist NMD, preemptively denying requests for access permits. Meanwhile, the US Attorney’s office has aggressively prosecuted members for humanitarian activities. This chapter explains the expressive components of humanitarian activism in this context and of the government’s attempt to suppress it, suggesting the need for constitutional scrutiny and legal change.