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USDA direct and guaranteed farm loan programs exhibit significant geographical variation in lending activity. County‐level estimations made using Tobit procedures indicate that use of Farm Service Agency (FSA) farm loan programs is greater in counties with lower per capita income and regions experiencing greater farm financial stress. Use of direct FSA loan programs was lower in counties with fewer private‐sector lenders. Guarantee loan program usage was found to decline when commercial agricultural lenders are absent from the county. FSA loan programs were more highly utilized in counties with an FSA loan service center and in states receiving greater FSA farm loan funding in past years.

This study adds a new dimension in the study of racial and gender bias in farm lending. Most previous studies analyzed the separate effects of race and gender attributes on loan approval decisions. The analysis focuses on the stipulation of loan terms (loan amount, interest rate and maturity) among approved farm loan applications. The time period analyzed spans from 2004 until 2014 during which the government has undertaken reforms to improve delivery of loan services to its clientele of minority farmers. Thus, this study's findings could help validate the effectivity of such institutional reforms affecting Farm Service Agency (FSA) lending operations.

This study utilizes a national direct loan origination data from the FSA of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) collected from 2004 to 2014. The analysis begins by identifying significant differences in cross-tabulations of loan terms among different racial and gender classes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) regression techniques are then applied for a system of equations involving the three loan packaging components. The combined effects of the prescribed loan packaging terms are subsequently analyzed under a simulation-optimization framework.

Regression results validate that indeed, relative to White American borrowers, certain minority borrowers are accommodated with lower loan amounts at higher interest rates and with shorter maturities. However, these decisions seem to be prompted by credit risk management considerations. The most compelling findings include the insignificance of all double minority labeling variables, except for the interest rate equation that even produced favorable results for Hispanic American females. Simulation-optimization results further reinforce that even when one or two unfavorable loan terms are included in the packaging, double minority borrowers end up with better profitability and liquidity positions.

This study provides a different perspective in dealing with the controversial minority bias in lending by presenting evidence gathered from a government farm lending institution. The USDA-FSA has been sued in numerous occasions by minority borrowers. Since then, however, it has deliberately implemented institutional reforms to rectify previous errors. This study provides empirical evidence strengthening FSA's claim of its intention to improve its delivery of loan services, especially for its socially disadvantaged borrowers with double minority classification.

This study pioneers the analysis of the double minority labeling effect on farm lending decisions. Its contributions to literature are further enhanced by its goal to validate the effectiveness of FSA institutional reforms undertaken since the early 2000s in order to improve credit access of and delivery of credit services to minority farm borrowers, especially those that belong to more than one minority classification.

An established paradigm in small business lending is segmented by bank size with large banks more likely to lend to large informationally transparent firms while small banks are more likely to lend to small informationally opaque firms. In light of banking consolidation, this market segmentation can have implications for credit availability. Federal loan guarantees, such as those provided by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) may reduce the risks of lending to informationally opaque firms thereby mitigating the impacts of the bank size lending paradigm. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

This analysis utilized a binomial logit procedure to determine if there was any empirical evidence that smaller community banks served a unique clientele of farmers when making FSA-guaranteed loans. The analysis relied on a unique data set which incorporated detailed data on farm businesses receiving FSA-guaranteed loans, loan characteristics, as well as information about the originating bank and characteristics of the local credit markets.

Results were consistent with the bank size lending paradigm with smaller banks being less likely to engage in fixed-asset lending, and more likely to serve a riskier and less established clientele when making guaranteed loans.

Data limitations did not permit detailed analysis of banks larger than $250 million in total assets nor for consideration of non-bank lenders. An expansion by these lender groups into serving more informationally opaque borrowers could mitigate any adverse impacts arising from fewer small community banks.

The results suggested that Federal guarantees do not completely eliminate the relative informational advantages of large and small size banks. And, continued bank consolidation, such that there are fewer small community banks, could result in less credit availability among smaller, less creditworthy farm businesses.

While FSA guarantees may not enhance a large banks propensity to serve informationally opaque farm borrowers, they may enhance the ability of smaller community banks to serve groups specifically targeted through FSA lending programs; the provision of credit to family farmers who, despite being creditworthy, are unable to obtain credit at reasonable rates and terms.

The analysis examines relationship between bank size and the use of FSA guarantees using a unique data set which incorporated information on FSA-guaranteed loans, farm financial characteristics, along with characteristics of commercial banks which participated in the FSA-guarantee program.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the characteristics of borrowers likely to benefit from loan modifications (restructuring) which includes concessions provided to the borrower from the lender.

Data were drawn from the US Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency (FSA) for borrowers who had received an operating loan modification during 2005-2010. A logistic regression model is estimated to identify the characteristics associated with the likelihood of a borrower paying the modified loan as agreed or receiving a subsequent loan modification within seven years. Explanatory variables included financial condition, type and year of loan modification, farm type, organizational type, borrower demographics, and region.

Loans requiring more complex loan modifications and borrowers with previous loan restructuring, larger farms, little equity in loan collateral, little or no capital, and/or little to no liquidity are less likely to perform following loan restructuring, which could suggest a possible futility in providing concessions to these types of borrowers. Many of these borrowers ended up having a subsequent restructure within a short period of time. Most of the regional variability in loan performance appears to have been a result of land values and commodity prices and not jurisdictional laws.

FSA has followed a policy of providing loan modifications to the borrowers experiencing repayment problems for more than 25 years. Though farm financial conditions have remained relatively strong through 2016, a continuation of the low farm incomes and declining farm real estate values could increase farm loan repayment problems in upcoming years and increase interest in farm loan modifications from both lenders and policymakers. FSA’s experience provides a rich data source to examine and provide a better understanding of the costs and benefits associated with loan modifications.

The purpose of this paper is to identify determinants of feasible outcome events (expired with no loss, settled for loss, still performing) and time to event of Farm Service Agency (FSA) operating and farm ownership (FO) loan guarantees.

Data on 19,126 FSA guaranteed loans, which were made by various lenders to farmers who have limited ability to obtain loans from normal sources without the Federal guarantee, were collected. Cox proportional hazards models for operating loans (OLs) and FO loans are estimated to identify borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, lender types, and farm and macroeconomic environment factors that influence guarantee outcomes.

Loans with different characteristics (loan amount, loan term, lender type, region originated) and assistance programs (Beginning Farmer, Interest Assistance) have differing guarantee outcomes. Contemporaneous variables, in particular delinquency status, have a significant impact on guarantee outcomes.

All loans were originated in calendar years 2004 and 2005. Since FO loans may have as long as 40 year terms, results are not as robust for FO loans as for OLs.

Different loan characteristics and macroeconomic conditions significantly influence the occurrence of possible guarantee outcomes and time to the outcomes.

Guaranteed loans are the primary method of government credit assistance to US farm operators. Data on individual borrowers have been difficult to obtain for much of the life of the guaranteed program because loan applications are held privately. This study provides insight on how various factors drive guarantee performance which is useful to policy makers trying to increase guaranteed loan program efficiency.

The purpose of this paper is to examine changes in the structures of US farms and lenders and identify prospective implications for federal credit.

Data from US farm operations for 1996-2014 were adjusted to 2014 values using commodity price indices. Farm size groups were constructed by value of farm production to analyze changes in farm numbers, production, assets, debt, leverage, liquidity, profitability, land tenure, commodity type, contract production, organization type, and use of Farm Service Agency (FSA) direct and guaranteed loans by farm size. Bank, Farm Credit System (FCS), and FSA data from 1996 to 2015 were adjusted to 2014 values. Lender size groups were constructed to analyze changes in bank and association numbers, farm loans, and use of FSA guaranteed loans by lender size.

The greatest consolidation has been by farms with over $2 million in production. More farm debt is held by large, complex organizations, frequently with multiple operators, more variable income, and greater reliance on production contracts and operating and nonreal estate credit. Large farms have greater leverage, are more profitable, and have a larger share of household income from the farm. Banks and FCS institutions are fewer and larger, yet smaller institutions use FSA guarantees to a greater extent. Larger farms tend to be more reliant on both direct and guaranteed FSA loans and are likely to become more dependent on FSA credit.

Changing farm and lender structure together with softening farm income may require FSA farm loan program changes to meet any increase in loan demand. Policy alternatives are provided to meet changing demand for farm credit.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the repayment records of Farm Service Agency (FSA) borrowers in two distinct US farming regions that have been experienced serious drought conditions even as the US economy was going through a recession. The analysis will identify factors that significantly influence both the probability of FSA borrowers’ survival (capability to remain in good credit standing) and temporal endurance (or length of period of good standing with creditor).

This analysis utilizes a data set of farm borrowers of the Farm Service Agency that regular farm lenders have classified as “marginal” relative to other borrowers. The research goal is addressed by confining this study’s regional focus to the Southeast and Midwest that have both dealt with financial stress arising from abnormal natural and economic conditions prevailing during the same time period. A split population duration model is employed to separately identify determinants of the probability and duration of survival (condition of good credit standing).

This study’s results indicate that larger loan balances, declining commodity prices, and the severity of drought conditions have adversely affected both the borrowing farms’ probability of survival and temporal endurance in terms of maintaining non-delinquent borrower standing. Notably, Midwestern farms have been relatively less affected by drought conditions compared to Southeastern farms. This study’s results validate the contention that the farms’ capability to survive and the duration of their survival can be attributed to differences in regional resource endowments, farming activities, and business structures.

This study’s analytical framework departs from the basic duration model approach by considering temporal endurance, in addition to survival probability analysis. This study’s original contributions are enhanced by its specific focus on the contrasting farm business structures and operating environments in the Midwest and Southeast regions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the market microstructure related to the Farm Credit System (FCS), Commercial Banks (CB) and Farm Services Administration (FSA). The commercial banks frequently call out the FCS as having an unfair advantage in the agricultural finance market place due to tax exempt bonds, and an implied guarantee of those bonds. This paper addresses the issue by examining the interrelationships since 1939, while addressing the historically distinctive roles that the FCS, CB and FSA have played in the US agricultural credit market.

There are two components to our model. The first is the estimation of short and long run credit demand elasticities, as well as land elasticities. These are estimated from a dynamic duality model using seemingly unrelated regression. The point elasticity measures are then used as independent variables in least square regressions, combined with farm specific and related macro variables, for the Cornbelt states. The dependent variable is the year-over-year changes in paired FCS, CB and FSA loans.

The genesis of the FCS was to provide credit to farmers in good and bad years. Therefore, we expected to see a countercyclical relationship between FCS and CB. This is found for the farm crisis years in the 1980s but is not a continuous characteristic of FCS lending. In good times the FCS and CB appear to compete, albeit with differentiated market segmentation into short- and long-term credit. The FSA, which was established to provide tertiary support to both the FCS and CB, appears to be responding as designed, with greater activity in bad years. The authors find the elasticity measures to be economically significant.

The authors conclude that the market microstructure of the agricultural credit market in the US is important. Our analysis applies a broader definition of market microstructure for institutions and intermediaries and reveals that further research examining the economic frictions caused by comparative bond vs deposit funding of agricultural credit is important.

The authors believe that this is the first paper to examine agricultural finance through the market microstructure lens. In addition our long-term data measures allow us to examine the economics through various sub-periods. Finally, we believe that our introduction of credit and land demand elasticities into a comparative credit model is also a first.

Agricultural and fishery disasters are rather obscure emergency management research topics. However, the Food and Agriculture Sector is one of only 16 critical infrastructure sectors included in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, and the sector is a vital component of the United States economy. As climate change continues to increase the frequency and severity of agricultural and fishery disasters, the Food and Agricultural Sector must adapt to and cope with unprecedented levels of risk. This chapter provides an overview of federal agricultural and fishery disaster policy and explores whether such policies are consistent with Jerroleman’s (2019)principles of just recovery.

The Farm Service Agency (FSA) direct farm loan program provides credit to family‐sized farms including those operated by beginning farmers and socially disadvantaged applicants. Approximately 37% of all U.S. farms are estimated to be eligible for FSA direct loans when farm size, credit needs, farming experience, and occupation are taken into account. However, market penetration rates for various borrower cohorts range from 0.8% to 4.6% for FY 2000S2003. In general, beginning farmers have weaker financial characteristics than non‐beginning farmers. Yet, the same result is not found when comparing socially disadvantaged farmers with non‐socially disadvantaged farmers, such that there are few significant differences or the differences in financial characteristics are mixed. Overall, results indicate FSA direct farm loan borrowers have weaker financial characteristics than eligible, non‐FSA direct farm loan borrowers, implying FSA is serving farmers likely to be denied credit by commercial lenders.