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The purpose of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the debt structuring of project finance (PF) loans and the main drivers affecting the maturity of bank loans in infrastructure deals. When banks grant loans to a project, they have two decision variables: the interest margin or the spread and the maturity of the loan. Although several studies analyze the drivers of the spread, few studies in the literature look at the maturity of bank loans. As infrastructure projects are typically highly leveraged, the structuring of bank lending is an important parameter in the financial viability of the project.

The paper develops a regression analysis of the loan’s maturity on four categories: characteristics of the project, political risk of the country where the project is executed, the macro-economic setting and the regulatory framework. By using a new data set of InfraDeals containing data on bank loans of more than 1,800 infrastructure projects worldwide from 1997 to 2016, this paper reveals new insights on the debt structuring of banks for PF loans.

The results indicate that the maturity of bank loans granted to infrastructure deals is predominantly driven by political risk and regulation, rather than the structuring of the project. This implicates that the region where the deal is closed weighs more heavily than the specificities of the project itself.

The results have important policy implications. The paper allows to develop a better understanding on how political risk and new regulation, like Basel III, might affect the PF market. The paper is the first one finding empirical evidence of the impact of Basel III regulation on PF lending. By delving deeper into the political risk variable, the authors formulate several recommendations to mitigate political risk.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of the maturities of credit‐enhanced debt contracts on the value of an insurer's loan‐guarantee portfolios.

The paper proposes a contingent‐claims model and uses as measure of credit insurance risk, the market value of the private guarantee, which accounts for projects' and guarantor's specific risks, correlations as well as financial leverage.

The results indicate that in the case of insuring the debts of two parallel projects with different specific risks, one high‐risk and the other low‐risk, the tradeoff between maturities of the guarantees increases with the projects' expected losses, hence the maturity choice decision is crucial for portfolios subject to high expected losses. For a two sequential projects loan‐guarantee portfolio, the paper finds that, regardless of the order of execution of the projects, it is the maturity of the debt supporting the high‐risk project that drives the risk exposure of the portfolio.

Since the management of portfolios of guarantees is of significant importance to many organizations both domestically and internationally, this paper proposes a simple and tractable model to gauge the impact of maturity choices for loan‐guarantee portfolios.

This is a first attempt at modeling multiple maturities in the context of portfolios of vulnerable loan guarantees.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of interest rates on the size and the maturity choice of a syndicated bank loan. In addition, it attempts to determine the long‐run impact of a syndicated loan on the borrower's capital structure.

The paper uses a sample of 6,903 syndicated bank loans in the USA, covering the period 1984‐2004. First, all syndicated loans are categorized into two groups: loans in periods of increasing interest rates, and loans in periods of decreasing rates. Then, non‐parametric tests are performed to compare the characteristics of the two groups, including the proceeds from the loans, and robust regressions are used to examine the impact of the interest rates on the maturity choice. Finally, robust regressions are employed to examine the long‐run impact of the interest rates on the borrowers' leverage ratios.

On the whole, the results reject the market timing theory of capital structure for syndicated bank loans. Firms in the two groups borrow in similar amounts, and in the long run, the difference between the two groups' leverage ratios is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, firms tend to choose longer maturities when the interest rates are low compared to the rates two or three years ago.

To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study that links debt market conditions to the leverage ratios of firms that borrow in the syndicated bank loan market. In other words, this is the first study that tests the market timing theory of capital structure for syndicated bank loans.

The paper investigates whether stock liquidity of firms is valued by lending banks revealing that firms with higher liquidity in the capital market pay lower spreads for the loans they obtain. This relationship is causal as evidenced by using the decimalization of tick size as an exogenous shock-to-stock liquidity in a difference-in-differences setting. Reduction in financial constraint and improvement in corporate governance induced by higher stock liquidity are potential mechanisms through which liquidity impacts loan spreads. These higher liquidity firms also receive less stringent nonprice loan terms, for example, longer loan maturity and less required collateral.

This paper examines how the macroeconomic environment affects the determinants of prepayment of mortgage loans from October 2004 to February 2020. For more accurate analysis, the authors define the timing of prepayment not only before the loan maturity but also at the time when 50% or more of the loan principal is repaid. The results show that, during the global financial crisis as well as the recent period of low interest rates, macroeconomic variables such as interest rate spreads and housing prices have a different effect compared to the normal situation. Also, significant explanatory variables, such as debt to income (DTI) ratio, loan amount ratio and poor credit score, have different effects depending on the macroenvironment. On the other hand, in all periods, the possibility of prepayment increases as comprehensive loan to value (CLTV) increases, and the younger the age, the shorter the loan maturity. The results suggest that, in the case of ultralong (40 years) mortgage loans recently introduced to support young people purchasing houses, the prepayment risk can be, at least partially, migrated by offsetting the increase in prepayment by young people and the decrease in prepayment due to long loan maturity. In addition, this study confirms that the accelerated time failure model compared to the logit model and COX proportional risk model has the potential to be more appropriate as a prepayment model for individual borrower analysis in terms of the explanatory power.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of cross‐listing and cross‐listing location on the terms of the private debt of firms not located in the USA. Specifically, the paper examines the empirical relationship between three syndicated loan terms (pricing, maturity and amount) at loan initiation and the cross‐listed status of the borrower (cross‐listed in the USA, UK, through depository receipts or not at all), while (not) differentiating between the stage of economic development of the borrower's home country.

The three loan terms are modeled as a simultaneous system of equations and are estimated on a very extensive sample of 3,883 observations. The impact of endogeneity biases due to the sequential choices to and where to cross‐list are examined using the inverse Mill's ratios from a bivariate probit model.

All else held equal, foreign borrowers that are cross‐listed directly in the UK obtain loans with higher spreads, longer maturities and larger loan amounts if they are from economically developed countries. Borrowers from emerging economies pay lower spreads but receive shorter maturities on syndicated loans if cross‐listed in the UK. Cross‐listings in the USA are not associated with any significant differential impacts on the three loan terms.

This paper makes an important contribution to the cross‐listing and capital structure literatures by providing evidence that the net benefit from being cross‐listed for one debt component of the cost of capital (i.e. syndicated loans) depends on the listing destination and upon whether or not the borrower is from an emerging economy. The paper provides practical guidance to corporate financial officers on the benefits of international cross‐listing and the choice of cross‐listing venues on the terms of private debt issues.

The design of effective policies that increase access to agricultural credit should consider understanding credit constraint farmers’ groups and their response to changes in the credit conditions. To contribute to this understanding, this study surveyed farmers from Chile and classified them into five credit constraint categories discussed in credit literature. In addition, these farmers indicated how they would react to a series of hypothetical conditions related to changing interest rates, loan maturity and grace periods. Their responses were employed to measure credit demand scores (i.e. relative elasticities). Regression tests evaluated how different types of farmers reacted to changing credit conditions.

Farmers from Chile were surveyed using a mix of random and convenience sampling. Surveyed farmers were classified into five credit constraint categories proposed by previous research. Farmers rated their demand for credit on a five-point Likert-type scale for hypothetical changes in interest rates, loan maturities and grace periods. Their responses were employed to measure credit demand scores or relative credit elasticities. The study evaluated credit elasticity as a function of farmers’ credit constraint and some control variables using several regressions, including OLS, ordered probit and hierarchical regression.

The study identified 44% unconstrained nonborrowing farmers, 23% unconstrained borrowers, 14% quantity-constrained, 16% risk-constrained and 3% transaction cost-constrained farmers. Unconstrained borrowers and quantity-constrained farmers responded most to changing interest rates and loan maturity conditions. In addition, unconstrained nonborrowers and risk-constrained farmers were statistically less sensitive to changes in credit conditions than unconstrained borrowers. This finding is significant because, as discussed, unconstrained nonborrowers represent 44% of our sample. Furthermore, risk-constrained farmers were the least sensitive to changes in interest rates and loan maturity across all other credit categories.

This study gives insights that can guide agribusiness policies to enhance access to credit in developing countries such as Chile. Agricultural credit capital institutions can better target their clientele by identifying farmers’ possible reactions before implementing policy changes to increase access to credit. This study’s credit constraint categorization and the results discussed can guide that identification. For instance, policies directed toward unconstrained borrowing farmers may find positive responses. However, implementing policies targeting the other three groups (unconstrained nonborrowing, risk-constrained and transaction cost-constrained farmers) is more challenging because these farmers are less responsive to changing credit conditions.

This article correlates farmers’ propensity to borrow and credit constraints across five categories of farmers. Prior research using this categorization framework has not identified farmers into the five groups. Furthermore, in addition to interest rate and loan maturity credit demand relative elasticity, this study adds the grace period elasticity, which has not been included in previous studies on agricultural credit.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting.

Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity.

The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms with lower reputation, weaker shareholder rights, and lower institutional ownership. The effect of overinvestment on collateral requirement is mixed, and investment efficiency has no significant relation to loan maturity.

The results are subject to the following caveats. First, while the study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency affects bank loan contracting terms, especially the cost of bank loans, the underlying theory is not well-developed. The authors leave it up to future research to provide a theoretical framework to clearly distinguish the cash flow and credit risk effects of past investment behavior from those of existing agency conflicts. Second, due to data limitation, the sample size is small, especially when the authors control for corporate governance measured by G-index and institutional ownership.

The finding that overinvestment is costly to corporations suggests that managers should consider the potential trade-offs from such investment decisions carefully. The evidence also alerts shareholders and board members to the importance of monitoring management investment decisions. In addition, the authors find that corporate governance moderates the relationship between investment decisions and cost of bank loans, suggesting that it would be beneficial to design effective governance mechanisms to prevent management from empire building and motivate managers to pursue efficient investment strategies.

First, the findings enhance understanding of the potential economic consequences of overinvestment decisions in the context of a firm’s private debt contracting. The evidence suggests that lenders perceive higher credit risk from overinvestment than from underinvestment, likely because firms squander cash in the current period by investing in (negative net present value) projects that are likely to result in future cash flow problems. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the determinants of bank loans by identifying an observable empirical proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows that increases credit risk.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it examines if option and stock compensations raise creditor's risk, and which one is more important than the other. Second, it explores if CEO's compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence to raise creditor's risk. Third, it investigates how banks use different loan terms to alleviate their credit risk.

This study used advanced regression analysis and use of generalized methods of moment methodology.

The results show that option compensation is more important than stock compensation in raising credit risk; option compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence, giving rise to a much higher credit risk; and covenant usage is more important than other loan contract terms in mitigating credit risk given that covenant use could not be substituted away by using other loan contract terms such as increasing interest rate, reducing principal or shortening loan duration. This paper has practical implications for credit markets.

The main implication is that hand-collect data are available up to 2010.

It informs creditors the potential sources of loan risk emanating from option rather than stock incentives; it informs creditors that option incentive interacts with CEO overconfidence rendering the credit risk bigger than expected, and it informs creditors the importance of using covenants vis-à-vis other loan contract terms for mitigating compensation and overconfidence risk.

Banks are alerted to the risk due to the interaction between overconfidence and compensations, implying that overconfident managers remunerated with options compensations are more risky than overconfident managers who are not remunerated as such.

This paper is original: (1) The authors show that option compensation is more risky than stock compensation from viewpoint of creditors. This has not been assessed. (2) Interaction between managerial compensation and managerial overconfidence has not been assessed before. (3) Use of different loan contract terms to alleviate risk from overconfident managers (who are prone to over investment but who are innovative according to the literature) has not been evaluated.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of a firm’s customer base concentration on its loan contract terms and how this effect varies with the strength of its customer relationship.

This study is an archival research based on a sample of US public firms that have loan contract data between 1990 and 2008. Major customer sales data are used to construct customer concentration and customer relationship measures. A debt contract model is employed to relate loan spread and other contract terms to customer concentration and relationship.

This study finds that firms with more concentrated customer bases have higher loan spread and shorter loan maturity and are more likely to issue secured loans. These negative effects disappear when the supplier firm maintains strong relationship with its customers.

Additional forward-looking measure of customer relationship could benefit future research.

A firm’s customer base characteristics can have significant impacts on the terms of its loan contracts. Findings from this study support the notion that customer relationship is an important intangible asset that is informative to stakeholders of the firm.

This study proposes a new measure of customer relationship based on the past repeated relationships between a firm and its major customers. It shows that customer characteristics may affect firms’ contracts with creditors: customer base concentration increases credit risk whereas strong customer relationship improves credit quality.