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This paper attempts to examine the activity and involvement of board of directors in internationalization activities of firms in emerging markets, by evaluating the resource provisioning roles of interlocks provided by board of directors, and the frequency of board meetings. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of board involvement is contingent upon the levels of family ownership in firms since family ownership could impact the firm’s ability to utilize the presence of different types of board members.

The authors test our hypotheses on a sample of listed Indian companies, extracted from the Prowess database published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a database of the financial performance of Indian companies. On a panel of 3,133 firm years of 605 unique Indian firms with foreign investments, over a time period of 2006–2017, the authors apply different estimation techniques.

The results demonstrate that both board meeting frequency and director interlocks are instrumental in supporting internationalization activities in emerging market firms. However, family ownership moderates the role of insider and independent interlocks on internationalization investments in different ways; the authors find that interlocks provided by independent directors support internationalization activities in family firms, whereas those provided by insider directors do not. Further, the study also finds that board meetings are less effective in internationalization of family firms.

The authors conclude that family firms aiming at international diversification require to develop more connected and networked independent directors to enable internationalization in firms. While independent director interlocks enhance the international investments, it is also useful to know that board meetings are ineffective in utilizing the resources in family firms. This points to the possibility that family firms should device mechanisms to integrate family meetings with board meetings so that they can utilize the within-family processes to aid in their internationalization decisions.

The study contributes to resource dependence theory by understanding its limiting role in family firms. Theoretically, it helps delineate the limiting resource provision role of the insider directors vis-à-vis independent directors. The authors argue that the resource provision role of insider director interlocks does not effectively help in internationalization in comparison to independent director interlocks in family-dominated firms. Consequently, the study shows the limiting role of resource provision and utilization by family-owned firms in comparison to non-family-owned firms.

Family governance mechanisms serve to govern and strengthen relations between the family and the business, as well as the relationships between the members of the business family itself. However, despite agreement on the importance of adopting family governance structures, explicit research on the determinants of family governance mechanisms is currently missing. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to uncover the determinants of family meetings. In order to do so, the social systems theory is used to unravel several determining factors of this crucial form of family governance mechanisms in private family firms.

The authors perform a qualitative study by conducting semi-structured interviews in eight Belgian private family firms in order to discover the antecedents of the implementation of family meetings. The authors use a pattern-matching technique as an analytical strategy.

The findings of the study highlight the importance of “soft,” relational, qualitative issues as antecedents of family meetings as opposed to previous research on family governance, which predominantly focused on “hard,” quantitative measures (e.g. family ownership). The findings of the study also provide novel insights into the origins of the family component (i.e. family meetings) of family business governance.

While the current literature has only focused on describing the different types of family governance and their positive consequences for the family firm, the authors take a step back to explain why family meetings, as a form of family governance, are adopted in the first place. Second, the authors demonstrate the instrumentality of the social systems theory in understanding the family's needs that necessitate the implementation of family governance mechanisms.

National mental health policies in the UK have a common theme of seeking to develop working partnerships between people who use mental health services, their families and carers and professionals. In Somerset, following a staff training programme, a Family Liaison Service has been developed whereby systemically trained staff work alongside inpatient staff to hold family meetings as part of the assessment and admission process on all wards for working age adults and older people. This article aims to focus on this initiative.

The article considers the development of the Family Liaison Service and evaluates its progress based on audit data, feedback from families using the service, and a survey of staff experience. Issues raised in developing family inclusive services are discussed.

Evaluation of the service suggests that, although there is still progress to be made, considerable success has been achieved in embedding the service on inpatient units with a substantial increase in meetings held between staff and families. Feedback from families is positive and staff report increased confidence in engaging with families and carers.

This article describes a transferable model for the implementation of national policy to develop working partnerships with families and carers in mainstream mental health services.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the status and impact of a recently formed Resident and Family Council to determine whether the group was achieving the goals of improving long-term care facility relationships, enhancing communication and promoting positive change within the facility.

The pilot evaluation was designed to develop recommendations for future sustainability, of the council, as well as providing wider lessons about the benefits and potential pitfalls of such groups. Data were gathered utilizing participatory qualitative research methods. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine council members, representing all groups within the Resident and Family Council. Documents relating to the work of the council and observational field notes maintained during meetings were also analyzed.

A number of themes and dynamics were identified relating to communication, collaboration and future sustainability.

Recommendations for initiating Resident and Family Councils should include surveying interest within long-term care facilities, involving the facility ombudsmen or volunteer coordinator, and assessing resources within the community, such as volunteer organizations or partnering with local education organizations.

This original research can serve as a template for establishing Resident and Family Councils within long-term care facilities.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the effect of royal family members on firm performance of publicly listed companies in Saudi Arabia.

Using 491 firm-year observations of non-financial publicly listed firms in Saudi Arabia’s stock market between 2009 and 2013, the study employs, besides others, the advanced econometric technique GMM-system estimator. This allows the dynamic nature and control of the endogeneity problem to be accounted for in corporate governance and firm performance.

The main result is that the attendance of royal family members at board meetings negatively influences firm performance but does not have an influence on firm value. The results also show that firms with many independent royal family members on the board of directors have better firm performance and firm value. In addition, firms with a high number of royal family members presenting on the board have better firm performance.

This study offers guidance to assist the further investigation of the SA Royal Family’s BoD membership either in SA or in other monarchy countries. It is interesting to compare these results in order to further understand the different effects that the Royal Family’s BoD membership have in such countries. This study’s results suggest that independent members of SA’s Royal Family on the BoD have some influence on firm performance in both the short and long term. Thus, policymakers should encourage the members of SA’s Royal Family to become more involved in firms’ BoDs.

This study offers guidance for further investigation of royal family members in the region or in other monarchy countries. It will be interesting to compare these results. The study suggests that royal family members on the board have a partial influence on firm performance, especially the independent ones. Thus, the policymakers should encourage more involvement of independent royal family members on the board.

Foreign and minority investors, who invest in SA’s publicly listed firms, should note that when independent members of SA’s Royal Family are on the BoD their investment will benefit from the reduced risks and uncertainty.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study undertaken to investigate empirically the influence a royal family’s presence on the board of directors has on firm performance. This study is based on both theories, namely the agency theory and resource dependence theory.

This study explores the family governance structures that family firms employ to manage family business tensions.

Building on socioemotional wealth perspective and adopting a narrative methodological approach, the study analyses nine unique narratives of representatives of three Swedish family firms.

The study illustrates how the hybrid arena created between formal and informal family meetings is used as a governance structure for mitigating tensions by reinforcing family relational ties.

Based on the findings, this study suggests how reliance on hybrid arena informs the field of family business management and governance and suggests future research directions.

The findings of this study provide opportunities for family business practitioners, including owners, family members, family firm advisers and other stakeholders, to effectively manage family business tensions and foster socioemotional wealth.

In family firms, tensions can arise due to a desire for the preservation of socioemotional wealth. The authors show that these tensions may be managed by using informal and formal family meetings that create a hybrid arena where family members separate family and business issues and emotional and rational reactions, thereby avoiding negative emotions and creating a culture of harmony within the family.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between audit committee characteristics and firm performance, and whether family ownership and involvement moderate the latter relationship.

Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), this paper estimates a two-way fixed effects model. A sub-sample analysis is used by first examining the impact of audit committee effectiveness on firm performance only in non-family firms and then only in family firms. A fully interacted model was also analyzed in the robustness tests.

This paper finds that the audit committee characteristics of size, expertise and meeting frequency are positively and significantly related to non-family firm performance, while insignificantly related to family firm performance.

The evidence reported in this paper may be of use for regulators and policy makers pondering corporate governance reforms, as well as for investors, managers and minority shareholders concerned with firm performance and valuation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to examine the moderating effect of family control and involvement on the relationship between firm performance and audit committee effectiveness in terms of size, expertise and meeting frequency.

Scholars and practitioners agree that governance practices are at the core of what differentiates family firms from other forms of business. Yet, there is a lack of consensus in the extant literature about how and the extent to which family governance affects firm performance. This study aims to address the matter by taking a more comprehensive unified systems perspective to explore the pathways through which variations in family governance mechanisms simultaneously affect both the business and the family system.

This study utilises a global dataset sourced from a survey and structural equation modelling to empirically measure several intermediate and final outcomes of family governance.

This study finds that the use of family protocols, as well as formal and informal meetings, have positive effects on the functioning of the family, whereas family involvement in the top management team diminishes the firm's competitive advantage. In turn, this study demonstrates that both family functioning and competitive advantage are positively related to firm performance.

By taking into consideration the complexity of the family and business systems, and measuring their interlinkages, this study advances knowledge by providing a more complete picture of the family governance/firm performance relationship.

The purpose of this paper is to explore board functions and their location in family firms.

Through structured induction in a four-case study of medium-sized Swedish family firms, the authors demonstrate that board functions can be located in other arenas than in the common board and suggest propositions that explain their distribution.

(1) The board is but one of several arenas where board functions are performed. (2) The functions performed by the board vary in type and emphasis. (3) The non-family directors in a family firm serve the owners, even sometimes governing them, in what the authors term “bidirectional governance”. (4) The kin strategy of the family influences their governance. (5) The utilization of a board for governance stems from the family (together with its constitution, kin strategy and governance strategy), the board composition and the business conditions of the firm.

Being a case study the findings are restricted to concepts and theoretical propositions. Using structured induction, the study is not solely inductive but still contains the subjectivity of induction.

Governance agents should have an instrumental view on the board, considering it one possible governance arena among others, thereby economizing on governance.

The institutional pressure toward active boards could paradoxically reduce the importance of the board in family firms.

The board of a family company differs in its emphasis of board functions and these functions are performed with varying emphases in different governance arenas. The authors propose the concept of kin strategy, which refers to the governance importance of the structure of the owner and observations on bi-directional governance, indicating that the board can govern the owners.

Plymouth Tube, a family business, was a manufacturer of precision tubing and extruded shapes for aerospace, desalination, medical, mining, energy, and water industries globally. Founded in 1924, as of 2012 it employed 770 people at thirteen plants in seven U.S. states and had sales of about $240 million. The family had twenty members across three generations, including spouses. The board was composed of eight members, three from the family and five who were independent. Stacy, age 30, was the only fifth-generation family member working for the company. Her father, Van, age 64 and a fourth-generation member, had been in the business for forty years and had succeeded his father as president, CEO, and chairman.

In early 2013, management presented a very large expansion project that was riskier than previous recent investments to the board, and requested the board's approval. Independent board members asked Van to obtain feedback from the family about the proposal. Van asked Stacy to direct the process for informing the family, asking for their input, and communicating it back to the board.

How should Stacy conduct the process? What should be done with the information once it has been gathered? Should family members be involved in this type of business decision? Based on the information given in the case, is this a good investment?