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The purpose of this paper is to determine how board leadership affects the board strategic involvement in private firms in Kenya and how CEO power moderates this relationship.

The authors used a Kenyan data set to investigate what makes boards in private firms get involved in strategy. Survey data derived from a sample of 186 CEOs of private firms were used, and the hypotheses were tested using moderated regression analysis.

The results indicate that board members’ knowledge, board chairman’s leadership efficacy, board members’ personal motivation and board members’ background all have a positive and significant effect on board strategy involvement. The authors also found that CEO power moderates the relationship between board leadership and strategy involvement. The study concludes that when the CEO wields immense power, the board tends to become passive and to submit to the direction of the CEO.

The study adds value to the understanding of the effect of the board leadership on strategic involvement in private firms and how CEO power influences this relationship, particularly in a developing country like Kenya.

This paper aims to review how corporate governance is institutionalised in Nigeria and examine the relationship between board size, CEOs’ duality, board composition and the board's involvement in strategy.

A structured questionnaire was sent by post to the chairmen of 138 publicly quoted companies in Nigeria in November 2004.

Using primary and secondary data, our results suggest that the Nigerian public companies have embraced some principles of the Code of Best Practices for Public Companies. There is a high level of board involvement in strategy decision‐making process, but no correlation was found between board involvement and a number of governance variables (board size, board independence and CEO duality).

The sample of 39 responding companies is small although it represents a 28 per cent of response rate and is representative of the Nigerian stock market. However, we are unable to look at other factors such as industry sectors and we cannot generalise our findings regarding corporate governance practices in Nigeria.

The investment climate in Nigeria can become more reassuring than in the past although there is room for further improvements as the effectiveness of the corporate government practices is still in doubt.

This paper adds to the scanty literature available on corporate governance practices in developing, countries. Findings extend our understanding about the strategic functions of the board in Nigeria, which is Africa's most populous nation, and the world's sixth larger producer of oil.

A relationship between board/management “involvement” and “awareness” with organizational mission and their link to “employee commitment” and “organizational performance” was modeled by drawing on previous research. The model was tested with data from 339 large Canadian and US organizations. It was determined that “mission awareness” on the part of both the board and senior management is an important consideration in the determination of employees' commitment to the mission. However, the impact of board and management involvement with the mission is not identical. The results emphasize the strong and important role that the board performs when it is actively engaged in the development of the organization's mission.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of the size of the board of directors and board involvement in strategy on financial performance in the private club industry.

Data were collected in a web‐based survey of chief operating officers (COOs) and general managers (GMs) who are members of the Club Managers Association of America (CMAA). Hierarchical regression analysis of data from 360 respondents was used to examine the proposed model.

The results showed that board members' involvement in strategy and the size of the board of directors have a positive influence on a private club's financial performance.

Further research is indicated to include other board‐related influences such as group composition and the quality of relationships between board members and GMs/COOs to measure a club's financial performance.

The paper contributes to the limited existing literature on the association between a board of directors and financial performance in the private club industry.

On the surface, things haven't changed. In 1971, Professor Myles L. Mace, in his seminal study, Directors: Myth and Reality, reported that the typical board does not get involved in the establishment of objectives, strategies, and policies. Recently, more than a decade later, the author conducted a study of the boards of more than 225 U.S.‐based firms in which the majority of chairmen, contrary to what was subsequently found to be their practice, indicated that their boards are not involved in strategic planning.

There has been increasing interest in Australia regarding corporate boards, their role and the contribution they make to organisations' performance and success. There is however, a gap in our knowledge about what board members do. To better understand boards, we need to know more about the behaviour of those who sit on boards. Many chairmen and all non‐executive directors serve on corporate boards in a part‐time capacity, however, such part‐time service does not negate a role in strategy. The purpose of this paper is to ask how, if at all, do part‐time board members influence strategy in Australian public companies?

This paper first examines the literature on choice, change and control as key aspects of firms' strategic conduct. Second, attention turns to generating empirical data to examine how part‐time board members engage with these processes. Attention is given to the actions of part‐time board members vis‐à‐vis executive directors, both inside and outside the boardroom. Data from interviews with 20 board members are interpreted using the 1999 framework of McNulty and Pettigrew which conceptualises part‐time board members' involvement in strategy as: ”taking strategic decisions”, ”shaping strategic decisions” and ”shaping the content, context and conduct of strategy”.

Each of the three levels of part‐time board member involvement in strategy described by McNulty and Pettigrew engage part‐time board members in processes of choice, change and control in differing ways. Part‐time board members are able to shape both the ideas that form the content of corporations' strategies and the methodologies and processes by which those ideas evolve. In so doing, part‐time board members are capable of exerting control over management and influencing processes of strategic choice and change. Boards of directors have a role in strategy formulation, strategic decision‐making and strategic control.

The board's role is in the driver's seat not as a rubber stamp. A process whereby board members can engage and exert a controlling influence over strategic direction and outcomes of the corporation is of benefit not only to Australian corporations but has global corporate benefit. The paper describes and analyses the contribution to strategy made by board members in five Australian companies

This paper describes and analyzes the contribution to strategy made by board members in five Australian companies.

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the understanding of the relationship between board involvement and corporate performance within the context of developing countries.

A number of aspects related to board involvement, including board’s shareholdings, frequency of board meetings, availability of independent board committees, board size, CEO duality, and CEO is being a promoter, were examined in order to explore their influence on corporate performance measured in terms of earnings per share. The study mainly draws on agency theory, and is supplemented by resource dependence and stewardship theories. Multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the data gathered from a sample of 212 publicly listed companies in 20 industries in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka.

Among the aspects of board involvement considered, board’s shareholdings, board meetings frequency, independent committees, and CEO duality showed a positive influence on corporate performance. However, two other aspects, namely CEO being a promoter, and the size of corporate boards showed a negative effect. The findings also suggest that the use of multiple theories, rather than depending on a single theory, is more effective in understanding the relationships examined in this study. Further, the study highlights the need to be cautious in utilizing the theories that are more applicable to matured western economies when analyzing issues relating to developing countries.

This study makes an original contribution to corporate governance literature by examining the relationship between board involvement and corporate performance in a developing country, namely Sri Lanka. The study also adds to the existing literature by utilizing multiple theories to examine the issue under investigation.

This study aims to draw on the resource dependence theory to synthesize the conflicting arguments as well as commonalities of the agency and stewardship perspectives on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.

Multiple regression analysis is used to analyze the data collected from a sample of 212 large-scale publicly listed companies representing 20 sectors in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka.

The research results based on all of 212 publicly listed companies in Sri Lanka show, in support of the agency theory, that CEO duality exerts a negative effect on firm performance when the CEO is equipped with additional informal power. Conversely, CEO duality exhibits a positive effect on firm performance when board involvements are high, a finding that supports the commonalities of the agency and stewardship theoretical perspectives.

By examining the governance practices and concepts in an Asian developing economy, this study provides insight into the power dynamics between the CEO and the board of directors in managerial contexts that are largely different from those in western countries.

This study expands the theoretical underpinning of corporate governance research by identifying the performance implications of CEO duality within the broad context of the resource provision of the board of directors and the informal power of CEOs.

The purpose of this paper is to extend governance research in the small business context by examining the moderating influence of top executive involvement on the board of directors on market valuation.

Drawing on a sample of initial public offering (IPO) high-tech firms engaged in late-stage funding, the study uses stepwise regression to test board involvement moderation effects.

Primary market investors reward governance structures that limit founder power.

The current study introduces the notion that optimal market valuation depends not only on whether a CEO-founder governs the firm, but also on level of involvement on the board of directors.

The aim of the research described was to gather information about both the objective and the subjective experiences of self‐advocates who had attended learning disability partnership boards, in order to promote effective practices. Findings show that, although people with learning disabilities were present at meetings, a variety of barriers limited their ability to participate actively. Problems included lack of financial and practical help as well as the limited availability of accessible information. There were also, however, examples of good practice, and many self‐advocates were pleased at how their local authorities were beginning to implement effective partnership working practices. Ways of supporting self‐advocates and other people with learning disabilities to fulfil a truly representative, rather than a merely symbolic, function at partnership board meetings are discussed.An accessible summary of these findings is available to download from the project website: www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/NorahFry/Strategy/papers.htm