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Online ride-hailing platforms match drivers with passengers by receiving ride requests from passengers and forwarding them to the nearest driver. In this context, the low acceptance rate of offers by drivers leads to friction in the process of driver and passenger matching. What policies by the platform may increase the acceptance rate and by how much? What factors influence drivers' decisions to accept or reject offers and how much? Are drivers more likely to turn down a ride offer because they know that by rejecting it, they can quickly receive another offer, or do they reject offers due to the availability of outside options? This paper aims to answer such questions using a novel dataset from Tapsi, a ride-hailing platform located in Iran.

The authors specify a structural discrete dynamic programming model to evaluate how drivers decide whether to accept or reject a ride offer. Using this model, the authors quantitatively measure the effect of different policies that increase the acceptance rate. In this model, drivers compare the value of each ride offer with the value of outside options and the value of waiting for better offers before making a decision. The authors use the simulated method of moments (SMM) method to match the dynamic model with the data from Tapsi and estimate the model's parameters.

The authors find that the low driver acceptance rate is mainly due to the availability of a variety of outside options. Therefore, even hiding information from or imposing fines on drivers who reject ride offers cannot motivate drivers to accept more offers and does not affect drivers' welfare by a large amount. The results show that by hiding the information, the average acceptance rate increases by about 1.81 percentage point; while, it is 4.5 percentage points if there were no outside options. Moreover, results show that the imposition of a 10-min delay penalty increases acceptance rate by only 0.07 percentage points.

To answer the questions of the paper, the authors use a novel and new dataset from a ride-hailing company, Tapsi, located in a Middle East country, Iran and specify a structural discrete dynamic programming model to evaluate how drivers decide whether to accept or reject a ride offer. Using this model, the authors quantitatively measure the effect of different policies that could potentially increase the acceptance rate.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

Untimely delivery of goods and services, especially in a post-COVID landscape, is a critical harbinger of end-to-end fulfillment. Existing literature in supplier delivery modeling is focused on penalizing suppliers for late deliveries built into a contractual transaction, which eventually erodes trust. As such, a holistic modeling technique focused on long-term relationship building is missing. This study aims to design a supplier evaluation model that analytically equates supplier delivery performance to cost realization while replicating a core attribute of successful supply chains – alignment, leading to long-term supplier relationships.

The supplier evaluation model designed in this paper uses delivery deviation as a unit of measure as opposed to delivery duration to enhance consistency with enterprise resource planning protocols. A one-sided modified Taguchi-type quality loss function (QLF) models delivery lateness to construct a multinomial probability penalty cost function for untimely delivery. Prescriptive analytics using simulation and optimization of the proposed mathematical model supports buyer–supplier alignment.

The supplier evaluation model designed herein not only optimizes likelihood parameters for early and late deliveries for competing suppliers to enhance total landed cost comparisons for on-shore, near-shore and off-shore suppliers but also allows for the creation of an efficient frontier toward supply base optimization.

At a time of systemic disruptions such as the COVID pandemic, global supply chains are at risk of business continuity. Supplier evaluation models need to focus on long-term relationship modeling as opposed to short-term contractual penalty-based modeling to enhance business continuity. The model offered in this paper is grounded in alignment – a cornerstone of successful supply chain integration, and offers an interesting departure from traditional modeling techniques in this genre.

The results from this analytical approach offer flexibility to a supply manager toward building redundancies in the supply chain using an efficient frontier within the supply landscape, which also helps to manage disruption and maintain end-to-end fulfillment.

The model offered in this paper is grounded in alignment – a cornerstone of successful supply chain integration, and offers an interesting departure from traditional modeling techniques in this genre. The authors offer a rational solution by creating an evaluation model that uses penalty cost modeling as an internal quality measure to rate suppliers and uses the outcome as a yardstick for negotiations instead of imposing penalties within contracts.

Positive-framed and negative-framed messages were delivered to examine the effect of framing on intertemporal decisions through lab experiments while holding the level of financial literacy constant. The three big questions adopted by Lusardi and Mitchell were utilized to assess the financial literacy of our subjects before they were asked to complete 20 incentivized intertemporal decisions. A small, delayed reward and a slightly bigger one were incorporated into the intertemporal decisions with a delay of 30 days. The ordinary least square (OLS) shows that the negative relationship between financial literacy and discount rates was held when the delayed reward was small. Interestingly, when the delayed reward became slightly bigger, their discount rates were reduced significantly with the negatively framed message. These findings suggest that the negatively framed message can motivate individuals to save for a greater return in the real world. Lastly, subjects with the highest level of financial literacy were not responsive to the magnitude effect, proving that a financial literacy program is essential to strengthen the individual's financial plan and reduce their discount rates in the developing country context.

This paper introduces a novel quality measure, the percent-within-distribution, or PWD, for acceptance and payment in a quality control/quality assurance (QC/QA) performance specification (PS).

The new quality measure takes any sample size or distribution and uses a Bayesian updating process to re-estimate parameters of a design distribution as sample observations are fed through the algorithm. This methodology can be employed in a wide range of applications, but the authors demonstrate the use of the measure for a QC/QA PS with upper and lower bounds on 28-day compressive strength of in-place concrete for bridge decks.

The authors demonstrate the use of this new quality measure to illustrate how it addresses the shortcomings of the percent-within-limits (PWL), which is the current industry standard quality measure. The authors then use the PWD to develop initial pay factors through simulation regimes. The PWD is shown to function better than the PWL with realistic sample lots simulated to represent a variety of industry responses to a new QC/QA PS.

The analytical contribution of this work is the introduction of the new quality measure. However, the practical and managerial contributions of this work are of equal significance.

The study focuses on drug safety regulation capture, reveals the inner mechanism and evolutionary characteristics of drug safety regulation capture and provides suggestions for effective regulation by pharmacovigilance.

The article introduces prospect theory into the game strategy analysis of drug safety events, constructs a benefit perception matrix based on psychological perception and analyzes the risk selection strategies and constraints on stable outcomes for both drug companies and drug regulatory authorities. Moreover, simulation was used to analyze the choice of results of different parameters on the game strategy.

The results found that the system does not have a stable equilibrium strategy under the role of cognitive psychology. The risk transfer coefficient, penalty cost, risk loss, regulatory benefit, regulatory success probability and risk discount coefficient directly acted in the direction of system evolution toward the system stable strategy. There is a critical effect on the behavioral strategies of drug manufacturers and drug supervisors, which exceeds a certain intensity before the behavioral strategies in repeated games tend to stabilize.

In this article, the authors constructed the perceived benefit matrix through the prospect value function to analyze the behavioral evolution game strategies of drug companies and FDA in the regulatory process, and to evaluate the evolution law of each factor.

This study aims to conduct a bibliometric analysis on “intertemporal choice” behavior of individuals from journals in the Scopus database between 1957 and 2023. The research covered the data on the said topic since it first originated in the Scopus database and carried out performance analysis and content analysis of papers in the business management and finance disciplines.

Bibliometric analysis, including science mapping and performance analysis, followed by content analysis of the papers of identified clusters, was conducted. Three clusters based on cocitation analysis and six themes (three major and three minor) were identified using the bibliometrix package in R studio. The content analysis of the papers in these clusters and themes have been discussed in this study, along with the thematic evolution of intertemporal choice research over the period of time, paving a way for future research studies.

The review unpacks publication and citation trends of intertemporal choice behavior, the most significant authors, journals and papers along with the major clusters and themes of research based on cocitation and degree of centrality and relevance, respectively, i.e. discounting experiments and intertemporal choice, impulsivity, risk preference, time-inconsistent preference, etc.

Over the past years, the research on “intertemporal choice” has flourished because of the increasing interest of researchers and scholars from different fields and the dynamic and pervasive nature of this topic. The well-developed and scattered body of knowledge on intertemporal choice has led to the need of applying a bibliometric analysis in the intertemporal choice literature.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

This paper aims to survey literature on behavioral economics and finance, with particular emphasis on a selection of models, methods and tools that this strand of thought uses to approach and explain observable phenomena.

After a brief discussion on the meaning and context of behavioral economics, the manuscript identifies five topics of special interest: time preference, heuristics, emotions, finance and macro behavior. For each of these topics, relevant models, methods and tools are identified and scrutinized.

Behavioral economics and finance establish an effective bridge between orthodox economic thinking and new and revolutionary methods of analysis. Exploring the intricacies of human behavior can frequently be done by adapting the trivial and conventional intertemporal utility maximization models that economists insistently resort to, but to fully grasp such intricacies, a step forward is required. Agent-based models and other tools from complexity sciences constitute the analytical arsenal that is needed to improve our understanding of how behavioral issues attach to heterogeneity, local interaction, path-dependence, out-of-equilibrium dynamics and emergence.

Although surveys on behavioral economics and finance abound in the specialized literature, this study has the peculiarity of emphasizing five relevant topics that are particularly illustrative of the pivotal role of behavioral science in promoting the transition from the strict neoclassical perspective to a less mechanic and more organic view of economics and finance.

User feedback inferred from the user's search-time behavior could improve the learning to rank (L2R) algorithms. Click models (CMs) present probabilistic frameworks for describing and predicting the user's clicks during search sessions. Most of these CMs are based on common assumptions such as Attractiveness, Examination and User Satisfaction. CMs usually consider the Attractiveness and Examination as pre- and post-estimators of the actual relevance. They also assume that User Satisfaction is a function of the actual relevance. This paper extends the authors' previous work by building a reinforcement learning (RL) model to predict the relevance. The Attractiveness, Examination and User Satisfaction are estimated using a limited number of the features of the utilized benchmark data set and then they are incorporated in the construction of an RL agent. The proposed RL model learns to predict the relevance label of documents with respect to a given query more effectively than the baseline RL models for those data sets.

In this paper, User Satisfaction is used as an indication of the relevance level of a query to a document. User Satisfaction itself is estimated through Attractiveness and Examination, and in turn, Attractiveness and Examination are calculated by the random forest algorithm. In this process, only a small subset of top information retrieval (IR) features are used, which are selected based on their mean average precision and normalized discounted cumulative gain values. Based on the authors' observations, the multiplication of the Attractiveness and Examination values of a given query–document pair closely approximates the User Satisfaction and hence the relevance level. Besides, an RL model is designed in such a way that the current state of the RL agent is determined by discretization of the estimated Attractiveness and Examination values. In this way, each query–document pair would be mapped into a specific state based on its Attractiveness and Examination values. Then, based on the reward function, the RL agent would try to choose an action (relevance label) which maximizes the received reward in its current state. Using temporal difference (TD) learning algorithms, such as Q-learning and SARSA, the learning agent gradually learns to identify an appropriate relevance label in each state. The reward that is used in the RL agent is proportional to the difference between the User Satisfaction and the selected action.

Experimental results on MSLR-WEB10K and WCL2R benchmark data sets demonstrate that the proposed algorithm, named as SeaRank, outperforms baseline algorithms. Improvement is more noticeable in top-ranked results, which usually receive more attention from users.

This research provides a mapping from IR features to the CM features and thereafter utilizes these newly generated features to build an RL model. This RL model is proposed with the definition of the states, actions and reward function. By applying TD learning algorithms, such as the Q-learning and SARSA, within several learning episodes, the RL agent would be able to learn how to choose the most appropriate relevance label for a given pair of query–document.