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The wave of regulatory reforms in European telecoms and electricity industries has had an important impact on the structure of the state as well as of corporations. The purpose of this paper is to explore the establishment of these regulatory organizations at the state and corporate levels within a unified theoretical framework, that is grounded in the politics of regulation.

The case selection includes governance structures at the state and corporate levels in 16 European countries in both telecoms and electricity.

The data reveal that regulatory agencies exist in both telecoms and electricity sectors in all 16 countries under study, with the notable exception of Switzerland's electricity sector. At the same time, business corporate reforms were also evident, mainly via the creation of corporate regulatory offices at the headquarters of the firms. These departments, which redefine the patterns of responsibility within the corporation and have played the leading role in the negotiations with the external regulatory environment.

This paper strives to overcome the tendency in the scholarly literature to look only at one or the other aspect of the growth of regulatory development and therefore also to offer a narrow understanding of the growth of regulation. It asserts that the commonalities in the expansion of autonomous regulatory agencies and corporate regulatory departments suggest that the growth in the regulatory professionalization of the state and of business corporations reflects the changing nature of capitalist economy and society and the rise of a new global order of “regulatory capitalism”.

This paper aims to examine the effects of the 2014 European regulatory reform on auditors’ activity, the audit outcome and the audit market, with a focus on the Spanish market.

The research is based on in-depth, semistructured interviews with partners of the main audit firms operating in the Spanish market. This qualitative approach provides a precise identification of the cause-effect relationships of the new measures introduced by the European audit regulation.

The findings indicate that, based on auditors’ opinions, the costs of the main regulatory changes outweigh the benefits. The European Union (EU) Audit Regulation imposes more demanding provisions, such as an extended auditor’s report, mandatory audit firm rotation, more banned nonaudit services and stricter quality controls, resulting in substantial side effects on audit activity and the audit market. This could undermine the objective of enhancing the quality of audit services.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the effect of the 2014 EU regulatory reform on audit activity, audit market and audit outcome based on auditors’ perceptions. The findings may be of interest to academics, professionals and regulators alike, as they offer valuable insights for assessing the effectiveness of the new audit provisions. Additionally, the qualitative methodology used facilitates a causal analysis of the key elements introduced by the regulations, potentially paving the way for future research avenues.

In the context of increasing private provision of social security and welfare, alongside what is argued to be the ‘financialisation’ of daily lives, individuals in many countries face an array of potentially difficult financial choices and decisions. Limitations in levels of knowledge and expertise may lead them to consider seeking financial advice. Yet, in the wake of the great financial crisis, trust in the financial services industry is low.

At the same time, in a number of countries the financial advice sector is facing its own challenges. These include regulatory issues concerning the definition, suitability and delivery of advice; the affordability of advice; and the challenges and opportunities facing the advice sector as a result of the increasing use of technology in the financial services sector.

This chapter examines the implications of these developments for the regulation and governance of financial advice in the context of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. In particular, it considers the example of the UK and issues this raises for the implementation of recent European regulatory reforms.

This chapter aims the research whether the application of European Directive, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), had any significant effects on the European Capital Markets and the progress of the European Integration. This new regulation specifies the tasks and responsibilities of the supervisory authorities of the Member State of origin and the host Member State, in order to enhance the certainty of effectiveness of cross-border transactions supervision and to reduce the risk of imposing unnecessary legal reforms from the host Member State on investment firms which perform cross-border transactions. It has been concluded, among others, that the aligning of the national regulatory approaches to a common European regulatory system is quite necessary. It is finally concluded that MiFID will contribute to reduce problems at country level as the previous experience of the Investment Services Directive, where the European investments and economies of Member States were based mainly on the level of ‘country’ and not of the ‘sector’. An effective capital entrepreneurship market is a strategically important element in the development of new and innovative businesses, encouraging entrepreneurship, increasing the productivity and maintaining high economic growth rates in Europe. Currently, European venture capital market is much less effective than that of the US market, for example. Therefore, in this area, should be specified the priorities that will lead to new initiatives.

This paper aims to consider recent arguments that post-crisis regulatory reform has misunderstood the nature of banks’ activities. These arguments suggest that a bank’s role is not that of intermediation between savers and borrowers but the systemically riskier one of private money creation.

The paper assesses whether banks’ activities are best understood as private money creation rather than intermediation. It considers the argument that regulatory reform has not gone far enough to prevent a recurrence of future credit spirals ending in financial crises.

This paper analyses banks’ activities and finds that it is incorrect to consider that they engage in relatively unfettered money creation. While fractional reserve banking does create flows of money through the economy, these flows are tethered to banks’ funding requirements. Multiple use of that money, rather than representing an ill-understood risk, simply reflects the nature of maturity transformation. This has not been missed in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework. The revised framework contains many features that are not fully recognised by proponents of the money creation critique and goes significantly further than they allow. Once completed, it will address many of the concerns they raise. They are right to call for further consideration of whether the countercyclical features of the new framework are sufficiently developed.

The paper provides an early detailed response to recent criticism of the post-crisis regulatory reform programme coming from a money creation perspective of banks’ role in the economy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the probable structure of bilateral derivatives contracts following international regulatory reforms.

The theoretical context of the paper is private and meta‐regulation, which the author applies to a case study and current industry analysis.

While regulations are still being written, it is likely that elements of oversight for the bilateral derivatives market will involve enforced self‐regulation. When combined with more specific outcome‐oriented regulatory requirements, the industry is well‐suited to this type of coordinated regulatory regime.

In light of the uncertainty of derivatives regulation and the future size of the bilateral, over‐the‐counter (OTC) derivatives market, practitioners should consider a likely broader range of regulation structures.

The paper fills a gap in the literature about non‐traditional governance structures for the derivatives markets following the financial crisis. Rather than considering regulation on a light/heavy axis, the paper examines whether this segment of the market can sustain a process‐oriented regulatory arrangement.

A review of the literature provides a solid reason to believe that an increase in environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) activities have a positive impact on banks’ default risk (DR). However, the increasing impact of climate risk on credit, operational and market risks, as well as the reduced availability of funding for banks that underperform in terms of ESG risk, is a concern. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to verify the relevance of the implementation of ESG policies to a bank’s DR, against the background of macroeconomic and bank-specific factors.

Using a data set of 303 commercial banks from 61 countries from 2012 to 2021 and a panel regression methodology, the empirical importance of ESG activities for bank DR is documented. The two-stage generalized method of moments estimator was used to test the research questions.

Comparing different factors, the results highlight the positive impact of ESG activities on the bank’s DR. However, this relationship varies according to the specific pillars of the bank’s sustainability policies and changes into negative ones.

This paper fits the domain of DR management research, investigating whether ESG performance affects bank DR while controlling macroeconomic and market drivers. Prior literature has shown evidence on the relationship between macro and market forces and a bank’s risk profile while a limited one on the non-market drivers. The main contribution is to consider ESG (in total and as separate pillars) as independent drivers of the bank risk profile.

In order to understand this new economic environment we need first to look at the context and some of the facts. Firstly society has lost a lot of faith with two important institutions, politics and business. There is a lack of trust in both. The UK political scene has been hit by several scandals involving poor ethical behaviour such as false and fraudulent expenses claims by members of the UK parliament. This has created distrust in politicians according to many surveys and polls such as for the BBC which found 80% of voters did not trust politicians to tell the truth (BBC News 24, 18 March 2010). This distrust arguably created political ambiguity and the country and contributed to the first ‘hung parliament’ in the United Kingdom for many years with no overall majority for one party in the 2010 general election. This subsequently resulted in the first coalition government since 1945 between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives (UK General Election, 6 May 2010). In the United States, Barak Obama in an attempt to differentiate himself from the cosy business-Bush presidential era developed a presidential campaign message about ‘restoring trust’. Arguably companies need to do the same as we enter the second decade of the second millennium. According to the 11th annual Edelman Trust Barometer (2010) we have seen trust figures plummet with two-thirds of the study's public trusting companies less than a year ago. Furthermore in the context of organisations' responsibility, just 38% trust business to do what is right, which is down 20% from just the previous year. Perhaps most disturbing of all for corporations only 17% trust the information coming from a company's CEO (chief executive officer). For companies that is a terrifying statistic. In previous eras rolling out the organisational head was a sure fire way of getting media coverage as well as influencing key stakeholders such as institutional investors and also in building and developing credibility. This was achieved because organisational stakeholders when listening to corporate messages heard it ‘from the horse's mouth’, the CEO. Now these individuals are tarnished with the labels of greed, excessive pay and the abuse of managerial power.