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This study aims to investigate how gender diversity and remuneration of boards of directors’ influence earnings quality for Spanish-listed firms.

The sample includes 105 nonfinancial Spanish firms from 2013 to 2018, corresponding to an unbalanced panel of 491 firm-year observations. The primary empirical method uses a Tobit semiparametric estimator with firm- and industry-level fixed effects and an innovative set of measures for earnings quality developed by StarMine.

Results exhibit a positive correlation between increased gender diversity and a firm’s earnings quality, suggesting that a gender-balanced board of directors is associated with more transparent financial reporting and informative earnings. We also find a nonmonotonic, concave relationship between board remuneration and earnings quality. This indicates that beyond a certain point, excessive board compensation leads to more opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting with subsequent degradation of earnings quality.

This study only covers nonfinancial Spanish listed firms and is silent about how alternative board features’ influence earnings quality and their informativeness.

This study introduces measures of earnings quality developed by StarMine that have not been used in the empirical literature before as well as measures of board gender diversity applied to a suitable Tobit semiparametric estimator for fixed effects that improves the precision of results. In addition, while most of the literature focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries, this study discusses board gender diversity and board remuneration in the underexplored context of Spain. Moreover, the hand-collected data set comprising financial reports provides previously untested board features as well as a nonlinear relationship between remuneration and earnings quality that has not been thoroughly discussed before.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between earnings quality and corporate cash holdings in an emerging economy. Existing literature posits that earnings quality is a result of information asymmetry and firms with lower earnings quality increases cash holdings, to shield the firm from future uncertainties. In this paper, the authors propose a ‘private benefits hypothesis’, which suggests that lower earnings quality is an indicator of opportunism and expropriation of resources in the firm, through tunneling or excessive executive compensations. As a result, firms with lower earnings quality increase cash holdings in their control, to increase their private benefits and to avoid the scrutiny of the external stakeholders. The authors further examine the monitoring role played by institutional investors on cash holdings, with varying degrees of earnings quality.

This study uses an unbalanced panel data sourced from Prowessdx, from 2000 to 2019. The analysis employs 20,231 firm-year observations from 2,421 firms. Earnings quality is calculated following Dechow and Dichev (2002).

Empirical analysis confirms that the firms with higher earnings quality reduce cash. Further, institutional investors reduce the cash holdings in firms with higher earnings quality. Institutional investors effectively reduce the cash only in firms with at least 10% of equity shareholding. The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings quality and endogeneity concerns.

This study diverges from the information asymmetry hypothesis in the existing literature on earnings quality and cash holdings and highlights the underlying private benefits hypothesis, that will impact cash holdings. Next, the 10% institutional shareholding is important in the Indian context as it represents the minimum threshold at which block holders can request extraordinary general meetings (Section 100 of the Companies Act 2013) or the involvement of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) (Section 213 of the Companies Act 2013). This study highlights that unlike in Anglo-Saxon economies, institutional investors or other minority shareholders are empowered by the Companies Act 2013 to play a vital role in corporate governance with a mere 10% equity.

The study examines the impact of a recent mandate (Section 149 of the Indian Companies Act, 2013, where firms of a certain size are mandated to appoint at least one woman director on the board) on the earnings quality of firms. The study also examines the role of financial expertise and the presence of a woman director in the audit committee on the association between mandate and earnings quality.

Taking leverage of a quasi-natural experiment in India, the authors employ the ‘Difference-in-Difference’ (DiD) technique. DiD enables the author to filter out the impact of concurrent exogenous shocks while examining the issue. The propensity score matching and entropy balancing techniques have been employed to overcome the problem of endogeneity and self-selection bias.

Based on the sample of 538 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listed firms, the author finds that magnitude of discretionary accruals has decreased among test firms (firms mandated to comply with Section 149) relative to benchmark marks (firms not mandated to comply with Section 149) during the post-legislation period, indicating the improved earning quality after the mandate. This finding is consistent with the notion of social role theory that women are less likely to be engaged in risky activities such as earnings management. Further, the author find that the financial expertise of the woman and presence of the woman on the audit committee strengthen the positive impact of the mandate on earnings quality. These results are robust to alternative measurements of discretionary accruals.

The study is among the pioneering attempts to make use of a quasi-natural experiment and investigate the impact of a woman director on earnings quality. The study is also one of the few studies to focus on a developing country like India having a culture dominated by men.

The purpose of this study is to examine how lenders alter their behavior when faced with real earnings management.

This study uses the incremental R-square approach as in Kim and Kross (2005) to examine how much lenders rely on income statement and balance sheet ratios as the degree of real earnings management increases.

As real earnings management affects mostly the income statement, the authors find that lenders rely less on income statement ratios in making credit decisions in the presence of real earnings management. The authors also find that lenders do not alter their reliance on balance sheet ratios when faced with real earnings management.

This paper is the first to study how lenders alter their reliance on financial statements in making credit decisions in the presence of real earnings management. The findings of this paper could help the regulators set standards to improve the usefulness of financial statements. The findings of this paper could also help practitioners (borrowers and lenders) understand how real earnings management affects credit decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect on earnings quality in private firms caused by a negative shock to fundamental performance, while simultaneously addressing methodological challenges measuring fundamental performance present in prior accrual-based earnings management literature.

Fundamental performance is unobservable and, therefore, difficult to measure. Existing research has used proxies that are subject to estimation errors and endogeneity concerns (e.g. DeFond and Park, 1997, Balsam et al., 1995). This study attempts to overcome these issues by taking advantage of the exogenous shock in oil price which occurred in 2014 and by using a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effect on earnings management caused by a negative shift in fundamental performance.

The results suggest that a negative shock in fundamental performance, indicated by the oil price shock in 2014, reduces earnings quality. This result holds for various robustness tests such as the use of propensity score matching, and the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Additional analysis suggests that the reduction in earnings quality is driven by an increase in positive discretionary accruals, suggesting that managers of private firms experiencing poor performance manage earnings upwards to conceal true performance.

This study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of a negative shock to performance in a setting of private firms and by addressing methodological challenges in prior literature. Private firms are fundamentally different from public firms, with the consequence that results from public firms may not be generalizable to private firms (e.g. Hope et al., 2012, Burghstahler et al., 2006, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).

This study examines the association between internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committee) and the information value of bank earnings. The authors comparatively assess this association across different bank types, Islamic versus conventional banks. The authors also investigate the mediating effect of Shariah governance.

The authors utilize a unique and an international sample of 723 bank-year observations representing 100 listed banks from 16 countries during the period 2007–2015. The authors investigate the characteristics of the board of directors and audit committee (i.e. size and independence) and employ three core analyses for earnings informativeness (i.e. earnings persistence, cash flow predictability and reliability of loan loss provisions). Additional analyses address Shariah supervisory boards’ (SSBs’) size, financial expertise and multiple outside directorships. The authors use the random-effect Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation technique and provide several robustness checks and sensitivities.

The authors find that, on average, having large and independent boards (and audit committees) increases the informativeness of reported earnings for banks. Conditional on bank type, our results report strong evidence for differential effects across the two alternative banking systems. In Islamic banks, large and independent board of directors (and audit committees) is positively associated with all measures of information value. There is insignificant evidence for conventional banks. However, SSBs show no significant effect on the reported earnings’ informativeness.

This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, that empirically and comparatively assesses the information value of reported earnings in association with effective internal governance while recognizing the institutional characteristics of different bank types. The authors offer new insights to policymakers, investors and other stakeholders located within countries operating on a dual banking system. The results could help regulators to improve their rules/guidance related to double-layer governance and financial reporting quality.

This paper empirically investigates whether trade openness (TO) in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries affects how banks might employ loan loss provisions (LLPs) to smooth out their earnings and how adopting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) can mitigate it.

The analysis includes 78 commercial banks from five BRICS nations and spans 2014 through 2020. To test these hypotheses, the authors utilized a fixed-effect and two-step system panel generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator.

TO positively affects income smoothing (earnings management) across BRICS commercial banks. The effect is clearer in banks that make financial reports under the IFRS. Path analysis reveals that the effect of TO is driven by nonperforming loans (NPLs). Additionally, the IFRS restricts earnings management in the BRICS banking sector when a better institutional environment is present. The authors found that accounting rules (IFRS) and enforcement (better institutional settings) interact to enhance earnings’ quality.

The relationship between TO and bank earnings management practices is important for understanding the complex interplay between trade and finance and ensuring financial stability, investor confidence and regulatory compliance. This study recommends better regulations and governance mechanisms for financial reports in emerging nations like BRICS. Additionally, macro-prudential regulators and banking supervisors should work closely to ensure transparent TO decisions with improved discipline, institutional quality and regulatory support to enhance bank stability.

The study finds evidence of bank income smoothing in the BRICS and introduces TO as a determinant. It also identifies the evolving role of IFRS in the presence of higher institutional quality and TO, thereby expanding the financial reporting literature.

This paper aims to provide insights into the complicated relationship between earnings management (EM) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) during the financial downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Parametric t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests accompanied by ordinary least squares regression analysis, augmented with Newey–West procedure approaches, are used for a sample that consists of 1,984 firms from 47 countries for the period of 2014–2020. EM was proxied once with discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (1995) and once with real earnings management (REM) using the Roychowdhury model (2006). This study uses environmental, social, and governance scores from the Thomson Reuters database as a proxy for CSR.

The results reveal that firms tend to engage more in EM practices during the pandemic and that more socially responsible firms tend to be honest and transparent during the financial reporting process. Interestingly, it was found that more socially responsible firms engaged less in REM practices during the pandemic.

The findings of this research help lenders, investors, policymakers and managers gain a better understanding of EM practices during a negative shock and shed light on the importance of CSR in being ethical.

The findings extend both the literature on the role of CSR in promoting financial reporting quality and the literature on the impact of COVID-19 on accrual and REM practices.

The authors seek to analyze the impact of weak corporate governance by top executives of a firm on the firm's earnings reports. This research is meant to further emphasize the impact of co-opted executives on a firm, primarily through their impact on earnings management.

Using financial data from 11,473 firm-year observations, the authors utilize ordinary least squares (OLS), 2-stage IV regressions, propensity score matching (PSM) and entropy balancing to analyze the impact of a co-opted top management team on discretionary accruals and restatements.

The authors find empirical evidence that firms with weak corporate governance from top executives are more likely to manipulate reported earnings and have lower financial reporting quality. The authors also find that the effect of co-opted executives on earnings management is weaker when a chief executive officer's (CEO’s) incentives are not aligned with those of top executives, suggesting that executives prevent earnings management due to reputational concerns. Co-opted chief financial officers (CFOs) increase the magnitude of earnings management in a firm but are not solely responsible for the authors' results.

The authors' results suggest that the top executive team provides an important first defense in the prevention of earnings management and corporate wrongdoing. Co-option of the top executive team may be an important consideration when doing research into corporate governance.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the revised Code of Corporate Governance 2017 (CCG-2017) clauses pertaining to board independence, mandatory inclusion of female directors, audit committee (AC) chair independence and directors’ expertise on earnings manipulation.

Using an unbalanced panel of 323 listed companies from 2015 to 2019, this study uses panel data regression models with a robust methodology called difference-in-differences to tackle the potential endogeneity.

This study’s findings show that, as compared to the pre-CCG-2017 period, board- and AC-related variables increased significantly in the post-CCG-2017 period. Furthermore, financial experts on the board and board independence have a negative effect on discretionary accruals (DAs), whereas female directors and DAs are positively related, as is real activity manipulation. The AC-related variables, such as AC independence, expertise in AC, and AC chair independence, are significantly different from the preperiod to the postperiod, whereas their relationship is not according to the hypotheses of the study. Moreover, these results are robust to additional analysis of the alternative proxies for female directorship and the endogeneity problem.

The findings of this study have implications for regulators and practitioners who are concerned with the functions of the board of directors (BOD). The findings of this research study show that earnings management (EM) may be reduced by independent and expert directors. However, board gender diversity is not reducing the EM. Therefore, the decision to appoint female directors to the board should be based on their business and professional attributes rather than simply filling quotas or blindly adhering to regulations. Moreover, the findings of this research may assist the regulator in encouraging listed firms to enhance board governance via independence, diversity and competency, which are useful for effective monitoring.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing the first evidence of country-specific regulation (CCG-2017), concerning the BOD and AC-related clauses on EM in Pakistan, which is missing in the relevant literature general and in Pakistan in particular.