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Prior research shows that co-opted directors adversely impact many corporate outcomes, yet little is known about these directors' impact on CSR performance. The authors investigate whether and how co-opted boards affect the firm's CSR score and component CSR scores.

The authors use panel regression models to investigate this study's research questions and address endogeneity concerns using the system generalized method of moments (system GMM) and a quasi-natural experiment.

The authors report new evidence showing that co-opted boards negatively impact CSR performance based on the CSR score. Results identify board characteristics that accentuate or moderate the effect of co-option on the CSR score and show that board independence, the presence of women on the board, and CEO duality positively and significantly impact the CSR score. These findings are robust across alternative measures of co-option and in the results of models addressing endogeneity concerns. An extended analysis utilizing CSR component scores reveals a significant negative impact of co-option on the environment component score using various measures of co-option and on employee relations, product quality, and human rights component scores using selected measures of co-option.

Findings have implications for board structuring and composition for firms aiming at improving their CSR score.

The study provides new evidence on the impact of co-opted boards on CSR performance. The results help inform stakeholders such as policymakers, executives and directors, shareholders, and capital market participants on how board composition affects socially responsible activities and performance and identify CSR component areas that require attention.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate board co-option and employee welfare practices.

The authors employ several analysis techniques including univariate analysis, OLS regressions, Poisson regressions, and propensity score matching methodology. The sample consists of US public firms for the period of 1996–2017. The variables of interest are the employee welfare index (EWI) proposed by Ghaly et al. (2015) and the co-option ratio proposed by Coles et al. (2014).

The authors find that firms with a higher fraction of co-opted directors on their boards are less committed to the firms' employee well-being. The empirical results support the argument that the interests of co-opted directors are more closely aligned with the interests of the CEO who had an influence on selecting them to the board, which compromises their monitoring role.

This paper contributes in several ways to the literature on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) by linking board co-option to employee welfare. By focusing on board co-option to explain the degree of firms' involvement in employee welfare, which is one of the crucial components of CSR performance, the authors provide pinpointed and detailed findings on a timely issue of CSR.

This study aims to examine whether co-opted directors influence analysts’ recommendations. As information intermediaries, financial analysts should incorporate the quality of corporate governance into their valuation because well-governed firms are associated with lower agency costs and better performance. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent chief executive officer assumes office. The authors investigate whether board co-option has an effect on analyst recommendations.

The present study uses univariate analysis, multi-variate regression analysis and conduct a natural experiment using the Sarbanes-Oxley as an exogenous shock.

The results show that firms with fewer co-opted directors tend to receive more favorable recommendations, suggesting that analysts favor firms with strong corporate governance. The results hold even after controlling for various firm characteristics, including the traditional measures of board quality, i.e. board size and independent directors.

The paper is the first of its kind and offers evidence on the effect of co-opted directors on analyst recommendations. The results contribute to the literature both in corporate governance and in financial intermediaries, where analysts play a crucial role in providing information to the various participants in financial markets.

Studies on corporate boards examine how social ties between the CEO and independent board members affect the effectiveness of board monitoring. Much evidence suggests that social connections between the CEO and independent directors are associated with inadequate monitoring and lower firm value (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). In this study, the authors note that social connections of the independent directors are of different nature and thus should not be treated as a homogeneous group; that is, the nature of connections among directors can be quite different from that between the CEO and directors, which is the primary focus of previous studies.

The authors classify independent directors into four mutually exclusive groups based on their social connections to the CEO and other independent board members and examine what role each type of connection plays in corporate monitoring using panel data and cross-sectional fixed effect regressions.

The authors find that Only_CEO%, the proportion of independent directors who are connected only to the CEO, is negatively associated with monitoring intensity. Specifically, firms with higher Only_CEO% have larger CEO compensation, lower likelihood of dismissing the CEO, more co-opted board and worse firm performance. In contrast, No_CEO_Ind%, the proportion of independent directors who have no connection to either the CEO or other independent directors is associated with more effective monitoring. These findings suggest that independent directors with different degrees of social connections exhibit different monitoring qualities.

When more independent directors, who are connected exclusively to the CEO, are on the board, they consistently deliver low monitoring quality. However, when more independent directors with no connections to either the CEO or any independent directors are on the board, they enhance monitoring quality. These findings can be used to construct board structures with more effective monitoring ability.

This paper extends the literature on social networks in corporate finance. The authors show that independent directors with exclusive connections to other independent directors do not have a significant effect on board monitoring, but those truly independent directors are associated with better monitoring quality. These findings suggest that different types of social connections of independent directors play a different role in board monitoring and help extend our understanding of the function of social connections of independent directors in corporate governance.

Over the past decade, the push for recovery-oriented services has birthed a growth in the recruitment of peer providers in mental health services: Persons who live with and manage their mental health challenges and are employed to support persons currently using mental health services. The aim of this paper is to compare the responses of government and non-government organisations to the implementation of peer provision.

Employing a qualitative study design, 15 people who supervised peer providers or who were strategically involved in peer provision were recruited using snowball sampling. Participants completed an in-depth interview that explored how peer provision services operated at their organisation and factors that shaped the way peer provision operates. The interviews were transcribed and analysed using Moore's Strategic Triangle. Synthesised member checking and researcher triangulation ensued to establish trustworthiness.

The way in which peer provision operated sat along a continuum ranging from adoption (where practices are shaped by the recovery ethos) to co-option (where recovery work may be undertaken, but not shaped by the recovery ethos). Political and legal mandates that affected the operational capacities of each organisation shaped the way peer provision services operated.

The findings of the study highlight the need to reconsider where peer provision services fit in the mental health system. Research investigating the value of peer provision services may attract the support of funders, service users and policy makers alike.

In employing Moore's strategic triangle to evaluate the alignment of policy (the authorising environment) with the operational capacity and practice of peer provision services (the task environment), this study found that organisational response to peer provision is largely influenced by political and legal mandates externally. The successful implementation of peer provision is mediated by effective supervision of peer providers.

The paper proposes an approach through which incumbent enterprises can rejuvenate the value of their IC through “real time” co‐option of customer competence. In contrast to extant research evidence, the integration of customer competence is viewed not only as a means to renew the overall competence of the organization, but also as a method for ensuring that the IC of an enterprise does not become obsolete in a turbulent environment. The paper first describes the dilemma for incumbent firms regarding the continued relevancy (or “freshness”) of their IC. An evaluation of major concepts of customer capital as part of IC is then provided, and subsequently an approach for real time validation of IC through co‐option of customer competence is proposed, with application in a global telecommunications corporation. Finally, conclusions are drawn and further research efforts suggested.

This paper advances an integrative framework on the determinants of competitive advantage in global competition. It coalesces the disparate array of literature on competitive advantage in international management and strategic management. The integrative framework hinges on four general categories of factors – creation and innovation, competition, cooperation, and co‐option – and three generic types of competitive advantages – ownership‐based, access‐based, and proficiency‐based. Specific determinants of competitive advantage are juxtaposed and presented within the proposed framework. Such a framework is expected to enhance out understanding of global competitive advantage.

This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem.

The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011.

In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem.

The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

The authors seek to analyze the impact of weak corporate governance by top executives of a firm on the firm's earnings reports. This research is meant to further emphasize the impact of co-opted executives on a firm, primarily through their impact on earnings management.

Using financial data from 11,473 firm-year observations, the authors utilize ordinary least squares (OLS), 2-stage IV regressions, propensity score matching (PSM) and entropy balancing to analyze the impact of a co-opted top management team on discretionary accruals and restatements.

The authors find empirical evidence that firms with weak corporate governance from top executives are more likely to manipulate reported earnings and have lower financial reporting quality. The authors also find that the effect of co-opted executives on earnings management is weaker when a chief executive officer's (CEO’s) incentives are not aligned with those of top executives, suggesting that executives prevent earnings management due to reputational concerns. Co-opted chief financial officers (CFOs) increase the magnitude of earnings management in a firm but are not solely responsible for the authors' results.

The authors' results suggest that the top executive team provides an important first defense in the prevention of earnings management and corporate wrongdoing. Co-option of the top executive team may be an important consideration when doing research into corporate governance.

This paper reviews some recent criminal justice legislation and policy in England and Wales and considers whether the changes introduced genuinely implement new, restorative approaches or whether attempts have been made to use the rhetoric of restorative justice for other purposes.