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This paper considers a supply chain with a manufacturer (she) selling through an online retail platform (he) and studies the channel structure choices of two firms when investing in advertising.

The authors assume that the platform provides the manufacturer with an agency and/or reselling channel; thus, there are three possible channel structures: agency channel, reselling channel and dual channel. By developing a game-theoretic model, the authors investigate the channel structure choices of two firms when advertising separately, simultaneously and cooperatively and analyze the optimal combination strategy of channel structure and advertising scheme for both firms.

When the advertising efforts of the two firms are independent of each other, the equilibrium results show that different advertising schemes lead to different channel choices. For the manufacturer, it is optimal to choose the dual channel structure and adopt the advertising scheme that both subsidizes platform advertising and advertises on her own. For the platform, this combination is also optimal at a high commission rate; otherwise, the advertising scheme in which both firms advertise simultaneously is optimal and he is better off switching from the dual channel structure to the reselling channel structure as interchannel substitution intensity increases. The above results still hold for complementary advertising efforts and asymmetric marginal advertising costs, while in the case of substitutable advertising efforts, one firm may ride on another firm's advertising efforts, leading to different strategic combinations.

This paper not only provides useful guidance for manufacturers and platforms in channel selection and advertising strategy, but also theoretically enriches the literature on manufacturer encroachment.

Distribution systems usually utilize both traditional retailing channels in conjunction with e-channels. The purpose of this paper is to investigate a dual-channel supply chain, comprising a traditional retailing channel and an e-channel under disruption. By benchmarking against the centralized decision structure, the authors intend to propose a collaboration model to achieve channel coordination as well as more reliable decisions.

Four different channel disruption scenarios, with customers’ reaction toward disruptions, are examined, and then, optimal pricing decisions for both centralized and decentralized decision-making structures are extracted. Next, a collaboration mechanism based on the dominancy power of channel members is developed to entice all channel members to participate in channel coordination. By benchmarking the proposed collaboration model against both the decentralized/centralized structures a win–win solution is guaranteed for all channel members. In addition, the proposed model ensures more reliable decisions than the centralized structure, as it guarantees less fluctuated income levels.

This study shows, as the disruption probability grows, the channel profit decreases while the channel-retailing price increases. Furthermore, the exact alignment of the centralized decision-making approach and the proposed collaboration model is not achievable due to the problem infeasibility. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses benchmark the performance of the proposed collaboration mechanism against the centralized structure for the full alignment with centralized decision-making approach.

This study contributes to the channel conflict literature as jointly considers pricing decisions, disruptions and coordination. Further, consumers’ reaction toward disruption is analyzed through a transshipment agreement.

The aim of this paper is to study the optimal pricing decision in a supply chain with a dual distribution channel in a centralized and decentralized decision-making systems and investigate the economic impact of retail services on pricing behaviors with respect to the power structures.

To reach the equilibrium behavior of decision-makers, two-stage optimization, the Stackelberg game and the Bertrand–Nash game have been used. Also, to explore the effect of environmental uncertainty on the behavior of decision-maker, demand functions are characterized as an uncertain price dependent, service dependent and channel dependent. Decision parameters are based on experts’ belief degree, in the sense of uncertainty theory initiated by Liu (2007).

Obtained results reveal that the retail services have a strategic role in the centralized supply chain and the decentralized supply chain with dominant manufacturer, while both the supply chain and the consumer suffer from higher environmental indeterminacy.

This study is based on possible scenarios of dual distribution system only. Further research is recommended to investigate the applicability of the authors framework in different distribution systems.

The study findings are believed to be valuable for supply chains and organizations about to make a strategic decision on price of their good/service.

The paper contributes to the scarce literature on Uncertainty Theory initiated by Liu (2007), and combination of it with Game Theory for pricing in distribution system of supply chains. The study also contributes by investigating impact of non-price competitive factor (level of service) on pricing strategy.

The literature on export channels suggests that intermediary resources, namely intermediary competence and availability, are critical for export success. However, little is known about how the beneficial effects of intermediary resources differ amongst integrated, independent and dual channel structures. One difference between these channel structures is the degree of reliance on independent intermediaries. This study aims to investigate (1) the impact of intermediary resources on export venture success, that is, export sales performance and channel maintenance costs and (2) the moderating role of the degree of reliance on independent intermediaries.

Empirical testing was conducted using survey data collected from 204 Japanese industrial exporting ventures. To test the proposed hypotheses, this study estimated a structural equation model with the maximum likelihood estimation procedure.

Evidence shows that two aspects of intermediary resources have different beneficial effects on export venture success. Specifically, intermediary availability leads to export venture success by decreasing channel maintenance costs, whereas intermediary competence is not always beneficial for it. Furthermore, this study finds that reliance on independent intermediaries positively moderates the impacts of intermediary competence and availability.

Previous studies emphasise the importance of intermediary resources and export channel structures. However, the question of whether export channel structures determine the performance benefits of intermediary resources is unanswered. By addressing this question, this study provides helpful insight into how exporting managers can implement channel strategy and access intermediary resources to achieve export success.

This paper aims to explore product pricing and green promotion effort policies and further analyzes the influences of financing interest rate, green promotion effort and free-riding behavior on the optimal strategies.

Research will be conducted with the aid of Stackelberg game research method, considering that the manufacturer has financial constraints and financing from e-commerce platform, and consumers have dual preferences, based on the two models of no green promotion effort for physical store and green promotion effort for physical store to explore dual-channel green supply chain strategies.

This research puts forward the following findings, in the two models: the rise in financing interest rate leads to an increase in wholesale and selling prices of dual channels and a decrease in demand of dual channels. The green promotion effort has a positive impact on wholesale prices, selling prices and demand of dual channels. The rise of free-riding rate makes offline wholesale and selling prices fall, whereas online wholesale and selling prices rise.

This research results can provide reference for the decision-making in the context of supply chain financing and free-riding.

The consumers want to purchase the target products in the right place, whereas the manufacturers want to allocate their possible products to optimal distribution channels. The manufacturer must know how to handle itself in this business. The study aims to examine the B2B channel decision-making with different product qualities in a non-cooperative supply chain.

The authors develop a B2B Manufacturer-Stackelberg game as an analytical framework, combining asymmetric preference of purchase channels choice by the consumers, a continuous quality setting of the manufacturer and differential channel structure to study the manufacturer’s product strategy and channel optimisation. By horizontal comparisons across four channel structures, product variety can be classified into the differential quality-level zone through exogenous quality intervention, and the preference of manufacturers in each quality-level zone within the structures can be ranked.

Theoretically and practically, the hybrid-channel structure should be completely neglected when the direct channel dominates the retail channel. In contrast, dual-channel structures dominate single channels irrespective of the channel power, and channel preferences between high-quality and low-quality zones are stable, whereas the preference in medium-quality zone is unstable. In addition, the supply chain system cannot achieve global Pareto improvement without any additional coordination mechanism between the manufacturer and the retailer.

The extended results by numerical examples suggest that the bigger the area of the medium-quality zone, the more significant the product variety of the manufacturer.

With the development of e-commerce and mobile payment, platform sales become unstoppable, and many manufacturers also encroach on online market by establishing direct selling channels. Channel conflict intensifies in online market and quality differentiation and is widely used in business practice as an effective way to alleviate such a competition. The authors study a retail platform's sales strategy and interactions with an upstream manufacturer's encroachment strategy in this paper. Unlike most online marketplace and encroachment research, product quality selection is also engaged in the present research to capture the motivation above.

The authors analyze a game-theoretical model that the platform as the first/second mover participates in strategic decision-making, and then jointly decides the product quality level with manufacturer.

The authors find that encroachment always profits the manufacturer and almost hurts the platform. Interestingly, the first-mover advantage can help the platform guide the manufacturer encroachment and promote a “win–win” situation when product quality level is relatively slight or obvious. Nevertheless, the second-mover advantage can help the platform alleviate the profit loss caused by encroachment when product quality level is moderate. Furthermore, suffered from encroachment loss, the platform can make a credible threat by sales termination to restrain manufacturer encroachment.

This paper innovatively explores the strategic interaction between manufacturer encroachment and quality differentiation in a platform supply chain, and further analyzes the first-mover advantage in this interaction, which fills the gaps of previous platform research and has great significances to enterprise production and operational decision in business practice.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retailer innovation investment and its spillover’s effect on competitive dual-channel supply chain pricing and optimization strategy, and explore the coordination mechanism considering decision maker’s bargaining ability.

The Cournot and Stackelberg game methodology are made use of for the duopoly decentralized and joint decision-making model. The bargaining theory with different negotiation ability was used to analysis the coordination mechanism. Then this paper validates the model by simulation techniques.

The results enlightened some interesting facts, the increase in innovation demand coefficient spur rise in channel pricing, innovation investment level, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. The rise in innovation spillover coefficient leads to increase in online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. Due to the innovation spillover effect, retailer has to maintain channel competitiveness either through low price or high innovation investment strategies. In addition, online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare in joint decision-making scenario is greater than that of decentralized decision-making scenario, while the difference in retailer channel pricing depends on parameters value. The increase in retailer’s joint negotiation factor leads to decrease in channel pricing and innovation investment level. Furthermore, there existence of an optimal innovative investment cost sharing proportion threshold indicates the achievement of dual-channel supply chain coordination. A refinement equilibrium can be achieved through Robinstein bargaining game. A larger interest discount factor leads to decrease in profit.

The research provides a theoretical reference for dual-channel supply chain pricing and coordination strategy under channel competition environment. The research can develop innovative investment strategies for retailers and implement response strategies for manufacturers.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

The purpose of this paper is to better understand the selection of a distribution channel strategy for a non‐profit organization selling products or services to its end customers.

Two channel strategies are generally considered: an integrated channel where the non‐profit organization sells its products or services using its own selling departments or branches; and a decentralized channel where the non‐profit organization sells through a for‐profit retailer. The fundamental question is: how should a non‐profit organization select its distribution channel strategy under certain market conditions?

It was found that selecting a decentralized channel strategy results in an optimal retail price that is higher than that under an integrated channel strategy, which results in lower customer welfare under the decentralized channel. It was also found that a decentralized channel behaves as an integrated fully for‐profit channel. Thus, whether a non‐profit organization should choose an integrated or a decentralized channel when facing competition from an integrated or a decentralized fully for‐profit channel depends on its cost structure and the level of substitutability of the products or services offered by the two channels.

When competing with an integrated fully for‐profit channel, the non‐profit organization is better off using an integrated channel under strong competition or a decentralized channel under weak competition. When competing with a decentralized fully for‐profit channel, the selection is more complicated. It was found that a decentralized channel is the best choice if the price competition factor, where threshold value depends on the cost structure, is large.

Non‐profit organizations have a clear (perhaps increasing) need for distribution centers or retailers in order to reach people who need their products or services. Moreover, it has been reported that the interactions between for‐profit and non‐profit sectors continue to grow, thus increasing the forms of community involvement available to reach people. It is thus clear that additional research is needed to better understand the selection of a distribution channel strategy for a non‐profit organization selling products or services to its end customers, and also the related managerial implications.