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Many manufacturers implement a dual channel strategy, which can be defined as the simultaneous use of integrated and independent channels of distribution for the same product line. This study employs the resource-based theory and examines how manufacturers' and distributors' capabilities affect manufacturers' choices of dual channel strategy. The study also examines how fit between organisational capability and channel structure affects channel system performance.

Empirical testing was conducted using survey data collected from 262 Japanese business-to-business manufacturers. This study performed a multinomial logistic regression analysis to examine the antecedents of dual channel strategy and a t-test to examine its performance implications.

The results show that manufacturers' information capabilities and the availability of distributors' selling capabilities affect whether manufacturers choose a dual channel strategy, and that market turbulence moderates the effects of these two capability factors. The results also indicate that manufacturers can improve their channel system performance by choosing channel strategies that fit organisational capabilities.

Most previous studies employ transaction cost theory to identify the factors driving the choice of dual channel strategy. However, these studies neglect the heterogeneity of resources/capabilities. Little is known about whether capability factors affect the dual channel strategy, and how this choice can be linked to channel system performance. By addressing this knowledge gap, this study contributes to enhance our understanding of dual channels.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fairness concerns of the retailer on the pricing policies of the supply chain partners, their individual profits, and the overall performance of a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. First, the authors model the dual-channel supply chain under retailer’s fairness concern. Second, the authors derive the optimal pricing policies of the channel members. Third, the authors analyze the effects of retailer’s fairness and bargaining power on the pricing strategies and profit functions of the dual-channel supply chain system.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game theoretic framework, where the dominant manufacturer’s pricing decisions are based on the retailer’s pricing decision. The paper considers Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point to formulate the utility function of the fair-retailer. The paper uses this approach because it endogenously accounts for the competitive power and cooperative contribution of the channel members when they interact.

The authors find that the retailer’s fairness concerns are not always beneficial for its better performance. If the retailer is moderately sensitive towards its fairness, it will positively influence its performance. However, if the fairness concern becomes too high then it will negatively impact the retailer’s performance because it results in customers’ migration towards direct online channel for buying the products. In addition, if the retailer’s fairness concerns are mild, the manufacturer’s prices will decrease in retailer’s bargaining power, which is opposite otherwise.

The authors use Nash bargaining solution model as the fairness reference in the context of dual-channel supply chain, which is comparatively a recent approach and has been used independently from dual-channel supply chain system.

This paper aims to explore product pricing and green promotion effort policies and further analyzes the influences of financing interest rate, green promotion effort and free-riding behavior on the optimal strategies.

Research will be conducted with the aid of Stackelberg game research method, considering that the manufacturer has financial constraints and financing from e-commerce platform, and consumers have dual preferences, based on the two models of no green promotion effort for physical store and green promotion effort for physical store to explore dual-channel green supply chain strategies.

This research puts forward the following findings, in the two models: the rise in financing interest rate leads to an increase in wholesale and selling prices of dual channels and a decrease in demand of dual channels. The green promotion effort has a positive impact on wholesale prices, selling prices and demand of dual channels. The rise of free-riding rate makes offline wholesale and selling prices fall, whereas online wholesale and selling prices rise.

This research results can provide reference for the decision-making in the context of supply chain financing and free-riding.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal sale effort deployment under dual-channel distribution which combines a traditional brick and mortar retail channel from the partner retailer and an online direct channel from the manufacturer.

A sales effort competition game is set up in the dual-channel distribution between the manufacturer and the retailer. Demand under sales efforts is determined based on the consumer valuation, consumer’s channel preference and sales efforts. Then, the optimal sales effort deployment is studied with a game theory approach which allow the retailer and the manufacturer to maximize their own profit.

Consumer’s channel preference is a key parameter of the demand assignment in the dual-channel distribution. Interestingly, the optimal sales effort and the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer can be limited by the other’s efficiency of sales effort. The finding suggests that the manufacturer and the retailer should collaborate to enhance the efficiency of the sales effort. It also shows that the manufacturer can utilize the direct channel as an important marketing channel even though no profit is obtained through the direct channel.

This research provides a new method to model the sales effort in the dual-channel distribution. The optimal sales efforts based on the consumer behavior are determined. However, since this study assumes a consistent product price across channels, the results is not applicable for a retailer who can set their own price.

It is a win-win situation for adoption of the dual-channel distribution although the manufacturer can benefit more. Additionally, direct channel can be used as an effective marketing channel.

This research contributes to a better understanding of demands in dual-channel distribution under sales efforts. Additionally, the research results provide a useful framework of sales effort deployment under different consumers’ channel preferences in the dual-channel distribution.

The paper attempts to discuss the impact of reference price effect on pricing decisions.

With the growth of the Internet and e-commerce, more and more customers purchase products in through online channels and choose products by comparing different prices and services, and the reference price effect has an impact on pricing decisions. To investigate the impact of consumers' reference price effect on the dual-channel supply chain, the authors establish a basic model consisting of a single dominant manufacturer and a single downstream retailer, and analyze the optional decisions under different situations and discuss the influence of reference price effect. Finally, a number case verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.

The results show that (1) the reference price effect has varying effects on the price, channel demand and income of manufacturers and retailers in the channel depending on the role of customers' channel preferences. (2) The manufacturer's online channel demand and profits always increase with the reference pricing effect, whereas the retailer's offline demand and profits always decline. (3) When the proportion of consumers preferring offline is higher, the manufacturer's network price and wholesale price increase with the reference price effect, while the retailer's retail price decreases with the reference price effect; when the proportion of consumers preferring offline is lower, the opposite is true, and the centralized decision results are consistent with the decentralized decision results.

This paper can clarify the impact of consumer reference price effects on the operation of dual-channel supply chains, and help inform pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chains.

The proposed approach can well analyze the impact of consumer reference price effect and give channel their optional decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of single- and dual-channel minimum quantity lubrication (MQL) for reaming spool bores in an automotive transmission valve body.

Machining experiments are conducted under various parameters for both single- and dual-channel MQL. Comparison metrics include part surface temperature, spindle power consumption and hole quality. Experimental data from traditional through-tool flood coolant are provided as a baseline for spindle power consumption and part quality.

The results show that with proper tooling and machining parameters, dual-channel MQL can perform equivalently or better than flood coolant. Single-channel MQL was not deemed suitable for this machining application.

The results of the study show that MQL can be successfully applied for precision reaming of aluminum and can provide guidance in developing an MQL system.

Few studies have been performed for reaming holes in general, and very few studies have been performed for reaming with MQL. Reaming is a critical operation used to create holes with precise quality. No study was found in the literature review that directly compared the performance of single- and dual-channel MQL delivery systems.

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer offers coupons in the online channel and the retailer in the offline channel. The optimal pricing and coupon promotion policies are explored, and the brand image under different promotion scenarios is studied.

Three differential game models, namely no coupon is offered, coupons offered by the manufacturer and coupons offered by the retailer, are constructed.

The results show that the manufacturer and retailer intend to conduct coupon promotions under a large coupon redemption rate. Coupon promotion derives a higher price and profit for the issuers, and the manufacturer can free-ride on the retailer's coupon promotion. The retailer's profit in the retailer-promotion scenario may be lower than that in the manufacturer-promotion scenario in some special conditions. Besides, price, coupon face value, brand image and profit increase over time. After multiple cycles game, the operational strategy evolves to an optimal equilibrium status.

This paper provides guidance and advice for dual-channel supply enterprises to implement joint pricing and coupon promotion strategies under multiple sales seasons.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retailer innovation investment and its spillover’s effect on competitive dual-channel supply chain pricing and optimization strategy, and explore the coordination mechanism considering decision maker’s bargaining ability.

The Cournot and Stackelberg game methodology are made use of for the duopoly decentralized and joint decision-making model. The bargaining theory with different negotiation ability was used to analysis the coordination mechanism. Then this paper validates the model by simulation techniques.

The results enlightened some interesting facts, the increase in innovation demand coefficient spur rise in channel pricing, innovation investment level, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. The rise in innovation spillover coefficient leads to increase in online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. Due to the innovation spillover effect, retailer has to maintain channel competitiveness either through low price or high innovation investment strategies. In addition, online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare in joint decision-making scenario is greater than that of decentralized decision-making scenario, while the difference in retailer channel pricing depends on parameters value. The increase in retailer’s joint negotiation factor leads to decrease in channel pricing and innovation investment level. Furthermore, there existence of an optimal innovative investment cost sharing proportion threshold indicates the achievement of dual-channel supply chain coordination. A refinement equilibrium can be achieved through Robinstein bargaining game. A larger interest discount factor leads to decrease in profit.

The research provides a theoretical reference for dual-channel supply chain pricing and coordination strategy under channel competition environment. The research can develop innovative investment strategies for retailers and implement response strategies for manufacturers.

Distribution systems usually utilize both traditional retailing channels in conjunction with e-channels. The purpose of this paper is to investigate a dual-channel supply chain, comprising a traditional retailing channel and an e-channel under disruption. By benchmarking against the centralized decision structure, the authors intend to propose a collaboration model to achieve channel coordination as well as more reliable decisions.

Four different channel disruption scenarios, with customers’ reaction toward disruptions, are examined, and then, optimal pricing decisions for both centralized and decentralized decision-making structures are extracted. Next, a collaboration mechanism based on the dominancy power of channel members is developed to entice all channel members to participate in channel coordination. By benchmarking the proposed collaboration model against both the decentralized/centralized structures a win–win solution is guaranteed for all channel members. In addition, the proposed model ensures more reliable decisions than the centralized structure, as it guarantees less fluctuated income levels.

This study shows, as the disruption probability grows, the channel profit decreases while the channel-retailing price increases. Furthermore, the exact alignment of the centralized decision-making approach and the proposed collaboration model is not achievable due to the problem infeasibility. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses benchmark the performance of the proposed collaboration mechanism against the centralized structure for the full alignment with centralized decision-making approach.

This study contributes to the channel conflict literature as jointly considers pricing decisions, disruptions and coordination. Further, consumers’ reaction toward disruption is analyzed through a transshipment agreement.