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This paper aims to examine the effect of dual board governance structure, i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) and board of directors (BoD), on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in Southeast Asia region versus banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.

This study uses a sample of 45 IBs over seven countries covering the period of 2007-2015 based on the GMM estimator – First Difference (2-step).

The findings reveal that SSB and BoD for IBs in both regions are segmented in terms of ROA (negative interaction) and integrated in terms of Zakat ratio (Zakat on equity [ZOE]) (positive interaction) only for Southeast Asia region. Furthermore, SSBs positively affect multi-bank performance in Southeast Asia while its effect is absent for GCC. This suggests that Shari’ah governance practices for IBs in Southeast Asia are stronger compared to GCC IBs. Finally, BoD has a significant association with low ZOE for IBs in both the regions.

The implications of this research is that the unique agency theory depicted in this study can be inferred when analyzing how dual board structure affects IBs' performance.

For regulators in both regions, SSBs must be given real power to monitor BoD. They should also balance the number of SSB scholars with experience in Shari’ah, as well as in law, accounting and finance. It is also important that such a balance of scholars with PhD in these areas be required for Southeast Asia IBs. For the GCC’s regulators, CG practices need to be improved by giving due importance to SSB characteristics and BoD structure.

Though the effects of dual board structure on IBs' performance has been previously examined in the literature, only SSB size has been used as a single proxy of SSB governance. Furthermore, no empirical evidence is recorded to date on this issue in Southeast Asia and the GCC regions. One of the innovations of this paper is the use of multi-bank performance measures in the IBs performance and corporate governance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) and firm performance.

We focus on the political connections of SBs and BODs separately and estimate a quadratic model based on 1,099 Indonesian listed firm-year observations. Additionally, we address endogeneity problem by using sample selection model, generalized method of moments (GMM), propensity score matching\ and lagged variables regression.

We find that political connections of SBs are more significantly associated with firm performance than that of BODs. Furthermore, such an association is not monotonic, in that the relationship declines after a certain level of political connections. We also find that stand-alone firms with political connections perform better than firms belonging to family business groups. Our results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.

This study contributes to the literature by proposing non-linear model to incorporate the rent-seeking and resource dependence arguments. Although previous studies use regression analysis (linear model) and find mixed results on the association between political connections and firm performance, our non-linear model extends our understanding of the relationship between political connections and firm performance. We extend corporate governance literature by examining the role of political supervisory boards in the dual board system and the role of family business group in Indonesia. Several limitations are addressed to interpret all the findings. We use one period of the presidency (SBY-Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) in Indonesia as our sample, but other regimes are not considered. We collect political connection and family business group information based on publicly data available. For politically connected firms, we do not have information whether they obtain connections through ruling parties or not.

Practitioners (such as companies and policymakers) can use our models to consider the level of political connections that can improve corporate’s performance. Additionally, they can use our findings to design corporate governance policies.

The paper identifies the use of the non-linear model on the association between political connections and firm performance in Indonesian dual board system.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the mediating role of intellectual capital (IC) on the association between corporate governance mechanism (CGM) and the financial efficiency of Islamic banks (Z-score, net investment income and loan to deposit) and verify it through standard mediation in the panel based on interaction.

The data of this study draws from 125 full-fledged Islamic banks and windows from 26 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) over the period of 2009 to 2019. A two-step system generalize method of moment estimation is used to test the hypotheses.

The results underwrite that the inclusion of IC as a mediating variable has influenced positively the corporate governance and financial efficiency of IBs. Besides, only CEO power and Shariah supervisory board positively affect the financial efficiency of IBs. While structural capital and relational capital positively affect the financial efficiency of IBs. Apart from that, results show that the CGM has a significant relationship with the IC value of IBs.

These findings are valuable for policymakers and regulators to set policies to improve CG structure and effective use of IC resources to improve banking efficiency. Additionally, findings might be helpful for the bankers to proficiently use the IC as a premise to plan new strategies to get an upper hand in financial performance.

This study extends and contributes to the current literature by analysing the role of IC along with CG to boost the financial efficiency of banks in OIC countries.

Using the Indonesian setting where the government formally limits the presence of busy commissioners, the authors investigate whether a board containing busy commissioners could be beneficial or detrimental for firm performance.

The authors propose an econometric model focusing on the impact of busy commissioners on the firm's profitability. The authors are also interested in investigating whether the effect is different between small and large firms and between mature and non-mature firms. A sample of 392 Indonesian listed firms from 2014 to 2020 is used in this study.

The authors find a negative association between busyness and performance and this result is robust across different estimations and econometrics strategies. The authors also document that the negative impact of busy directors diminishes particularly in young and small firms. The authors also find that the impact is more pronounced in state-owned firms.

From a firm point of view, the result suggests that the companies should be aware that appointing busy commissioners in the board structure can detriment market-based performance. The listed firms should also understand that busy commissioners are inefficient, especially if these firms are large, mature and state-owned.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study investigating the relation between busy commissioners and performance by considering age, firm size and state-owned firms as a moderator in a sample of Indonesian listed firms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the way in which CEOs are shielded or rewarded for incurring R&D expenses. Strategic expenses such as R&D yield returns over a long period of time even though GAAP requires them to be written off in the period they are incurred. Going beyond the existing shielding paradigm, the paper investigates whether compensation committees actively reward CEOs for incurring strategic expenses.

The paper uses empirical analysis by using regression analysis with CEO compensation (both cash and equity) as the dependent variable and firm size, firm performance, earnings risk, market‐to‐book ratio, R&D expenses, advertising expenses and governance variables as control, independent and test variables.

The paper shows that CEOs are not only shielded but are actively rewarded for incurring R&D expenses. The paper also shows that the shield/reward effects are stronger in manufacturing firms. Finally, the paper shows that independent compensation committees increase rewards for R&D expenses.

Given the small sample of firms with advertising expense data, a larger sample, possibly using hand‐collected data will be required to arrive at definitive conclusions regarding shielding/rewarding for advertising. Furthermore, the shielding of both R&D and advertising expenses should be looked at in conjunction with the duration of the persistence of benefits of such strategic expenses.

This paper shows how compensation committees can use compensation to induce executives to undertake strategic expenses on behalf of the firm.

The existing literature asserted that the Islamic banking industry progress significantly, but it has increasingly found asset deficient which assaulted the performance of Islamic banks (IBs). The aim of this study to examine the mediating role of intellectual capital (IC) on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and IBs performance is examined (ATO, NPM).

A panel sample of 129 IBs is drawn from the 29 organisation of Islamic cooperation (OIC) countries from 2008 to 2017. Two-step system generalized method of moments (2SYS-GMM) was used to account for the unobserved endogeneity and heteroscedasticity problem.

The empirical findings demonstrate that there is a significant impact of the CG mechanism on IC. Moreover, the empirical findings indicate that CG has a direct influence on banking performance but it affects indirectly through IC. IC also appears to have a mediation role in the relationship between the CG mechanism and the performance of IBs.

As the empirical research on IC from CG point of view in Islamic banking is generally new in the banking literature, the output of this research will contribute to the building up of empirical framework and practices regarding IC in the Islamic banking industry by using the resource-based theory as a leading theory and agency theory as a sub theory. It is anticipated that this study provided a superior comprehensive discussion of the IC in IBs across OIC countries which discovers the CG mechanism to influence the IC to improve banking performance.

This study offers useful insights to the regulators and practitioners to draw the rules and regulations in improving the CG mechanism and the effectiveness of internal controls by acknowledging the importance of IC in Islamic banking institutions. Particularly, the findings of this study may be of benefit to bankers to efficiently use the IC as a premise to design new and creative strategies to achieve a competitive advantage in the banking industry.

The study is unique in its nature because it presents a successful model for IBs to concentrate more on the role of IC in enhancing banking performance, which might be used by the banks to rearrange the roles within CG, to place their priorities regarding the internal governance system and financial plans for competency enhancement.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the directors’ socioeconomic backgrounds on the risk-taking behavior of the listed commercial banks in China.

The generalized least square method and Arellano and Bover’s (1995) generalized method of moment were used to study the relationship between the directors’ socioeconomic backgrounds and bank risk-taking behavior. The sample studied consists of 16 listed commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2011.

It was found that smaller board sizes and higher percentage of independent directors contribute to lower risk-taking. The results also indicate that banks are better off with boards that have gender diversity, government affiliation and higher average age because they enhance problem-solving and market insights facilitate adherence to government or regulatory policies and help reduce the banks’ risks.

Future studies may consider including non-public-listed banks, pre-2003 data and analyses of the agencies to which the government-affiliated directors are or were attached.

The paper suggests that corporate governance reform initiatives with closely monitored implementation and phased liberalization contributed toward the banking industry’s resilience. Implications for management include that boards of directors with better quality, sufficient independence, gender diversity, government affiliation and maturity will help reduce risks.

This study may facilitate the decision-making for the bank management and policymakers on the selection of best directors in the Chinese banking sector. The Chinese banking system serves as a plausible role model for consideration, given that four of its banks have now leapfrogged to be among the top ten largest banking institutions after the global financial crisis.

The study covers a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds of the board of directors which are crucial in influencing the behavior of the board in banking operations.

This paper aims to systematically review the existing studies on the relationship of Sharī'ah governance (SG), as represented by the Sharī'ah supervisory board (SSB), with firm performance of Islamic banks (IBs), to suggest opportunities for future research in this field.

By adopting a systematic literature review, 21 empirical and theoretical papers published in Scopus concerning the relationship between SSB and performance of IBs were selected for review and analysis.

In light of the existing research studies' limitations, this paper suggests that the effect of SSB on IBs' performance still requires more empirical analyses using alternative analytical methods, alternative measures, and different periods (during crisis and non-crisis). Besides that, these studies should take into account the differences across jurisdictions in their SG models, the degree of agencies' intervention in SG practices, the control over cross-memberships of scholars, and the differences across IBs in the position of SSB in the organization structure.

The analysis undertaken in this paper would address the literature gaps on the effect of SSB on IBs' performance as this study serves as a guide for the researchers, academicians, and interested researchers from Islamic international autonomous non-for-profit organizations, e.g. AAOIFI and IFSB in research related to this important area. Importantly, the findings of this study would support regulators and related authorities across jurisdictions with suggestions on improving the current SG practices.

This paper presents a critical review of the existing research on SSB and IB performance and suggests new variables, measurements, analytical methods, and new issues for researchers in this area. Thus, it identifies the literature gap that still needs further empirical investigation and a suitable way to close it.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance and other related factors on the risk-taking of Islamic banks. Risk-taking is defined according to credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risk.

The study uses the two step system generalized method of moment (2SYS-GMM) estimation technique by using a panel data set of 129 Islamic banks (IBs) from 29 countries in the Middle East, South Asia and the Southeast Asia regions covering from 2008 to 2017. Governance variables incorporated include board size, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) power, Shariah board and audit committee, as well as other control variables.

This study provides evidence that board size and Shariah board are positively and significantly related to credit and liquidity risk. Board independence and CEO power are negative and significantly associated with credit and liquidity risk, but the audit committee has a mixed relationship with bank risk. Male CEOs take more risk compared to the female and more board meeting has an inverse relationship with Islamic banks risk. Bank size, however, does not influence the level of risk in Islamic banks, but leverage has an inverse relationship with bank risk.

The present study sheds light on the risk-taking behaviour of the board of IBs, particularly the board independence and CEO power reducing the level of risk in IBs thereby contributing to the agency theory. Therefore, regulators and policymakers can use the findings of this study to strengthen the internal corporate governance mechanism to protect IBs at a time of financial distress. Moreover, it increases the trust of the shareholders and stakeholders in the effectiveness of governance reforms that have been pursued to reap long-term benefits.

To the best of the knowledge, this research is preliminary in examining the board behaviour on risk-taking of IBs from four different regions. The results are robust and suggest that the board of directors mitigate the level of risk in IBs.

This paper examines the role of corporate governance on the financial performance of life insurers in South Africa. Specifically, the paper tests two competing hypotheses on the role of boards as effective monitors of opportunistic behaviour of executives, as prescribed by the agency theory or as an effective resource, as advocated by the resource dependency view.

The paper estimates both static and dynamic panel data of 68 insurers from 2007 to 2014 using random effects, panel corrected standard error ordinary least squares and generalized method of moment’s estimation techniques. Board size, audit committee size, board independence and audit committee independence are used as the governance indicators while profitability is measured as returns on assets and equity.

The findings support both the resource dependency and agency theoretic views of boards. Specifically, the results indicate that large board and audit committees improve financial performance which supports the view of boards as effective resources for insurers. In addition, the role of non-executive directors in addressing agency conflict is reflected in the positive effect of board independence on financial performance. However, the long-run causal positive effect is only reported for audit committee size on return on assets. In addition, the paper also finds evidence of profitability persistence in the life insurance market. Finally, reinsurance usage, insurer size and market concentration were found to have a negative effect on financial performance.

The findings re-enforce the important role of boards in their oversight responsibilities and as effective resources in the operations of highly specialized insurance businesses.

As far as the authors are concerned, this empirical analysis documents the first evidence of the linkages between governance mechanisms and financial performance of an insurance market in Africa.