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This study aims to examine the impact of agency cost, Islamic board characteristics and corporate governance on the performance of Islamic institutions.

Based on the selected criteria, 92 Islamic banks (IBs) from 20 countries were selected for further research. The authors used generalized method moments (GMM) estimation method. The agency cost and Shariah board characteristics are the explanatory variables. The author uses the age of the bank and the size of the bank for variable control.

Empirical results indicate that first, agency costs represented by cast/total assets negatively affect IBs’ return on equity and net income. As agency costs rise, IBs’ financial performance declines. Second, Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size and board independence affect IB performance. The study found that SSB size positively affects IB performance.

This research contributes to the literature on IBs in different countries, which policymakers and practitioners can use to improve agency cost functions and Shariah board characteristics. Second, this analysis shows that IBs require specific attention for agency charges, given their operations and business structures. This study contributes to agency theory, which requires Islamic banking information and practices. Finally, the author has aided regulators and IBs by identifying the sources of agency cost practices that can be resolved. The other bank governance contribution is twofold. First, the author studied dual board governance in IBs (SSB and ordinary boards of directors). Second, the author examines how SSB and traditional board governance affect IB performance. This research focuses on banks listed on stock exchanges in the 20 countries analysed.

The research has policy and practical implications for central banks and IBs. By outlining appropriate regulatory guidelines and reporting systems, regulatory authorities can ensure Sharia compliance and protect the independence of IB Shariah department officers. Regulators and relevant stakeholders must ensure Sharia compliance, audits, inspections, reporting and accurate disclosure for IBs.

This paper offers original contributions to professionals in the field of IBs and stakeholders investigating the relationship between agency costs, governance of IBs, characteristics of Islamic supervisory boards and the performance of IBs.

This paper aims to examine the effect of dual board governance structure, i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) and board of directors (BoD), on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in Southeast Asia region versus banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.

This study uses a sample of 45 IBs over seven countries covering the period of 2007-2015 based on the GMM estimator – First Difference (2-step).

The findings reveal that SSB and BoD for IBs in both regions are segmented in terms of ROA (negative interaction) and integrated in terms of Zakat ratio (Zakat on equity [ZOE]) (positive interaction) only for Southeast Asia region. Furthermore, SSBs positively affect multi-bank performance in Southeast Asia while its effect is absent for GCC. This suggests that Shari’ah governance practices for IBs in Southeast Asia are stronger compared to GCC IBs. Finally, BoD has a significant association with low ZOE for IBs in both the regions.

The implications of this research is that the unique agency theory depicted in this study can be inferred when analyzing how dual board structure affects IBs' performance.

For regulators in both regions, SSBs must be given real power to monitor BoD. They should also balance the number of SSB scholars with experience in Shari’ah, as well as in law, accounting and finance. It is also important that such a balance of scholars with PhD in these areas be required for Southeast Asia IBs. For the GCC’s regulators, CG practices need to be improved by giving due importance to SSB characteristics and BoD structure.

Though the effects of dual board structure on IBs' performance has been previously examined in the literature, only SSB size has been used as a single proxy of SSB governance. Furthermore, no empirical evidence is recorded to date on this issue in Southeast Asia and the GCC regions. One of the innovations of this paper is the use of multi-bank performance measures in the IBs performance and corporate governance.

The chapter aims to clarify the relationship between corporate governance structure and corporate subscription to Global Compact standards. Part one of the chapter looks at the relationship between different models of board governance and active Global Compact participation by publicly listed companies. Part two of the chapter examines a number of external mechanisms aimed at bringing corporate behavior in line with Global Compact principles, and argues that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between internal governance structures and external provisions aimed at influencing corporate behavior.

Part one of the chapter uses an independent T-test to compare the average (mean) proportion of publicly listed companies from unitary board countries with an active Global Compact Communication on Progress status with the average proportion of publicly listed companies from two-tier/hybrid corporate governance systems listed as active Global Compact participants. Part two of the chapter uses primary and secondary sources to examine external mechanisms operating across national borders aimed at influencing corporate behavior.

The chapter finds that a higher proportion of public companies from countries with two-tier/hybrid corporate governance structures have become active Global Compact participants compared to public companies from legal systems with unitary board corporate governance structures. Part two of the chapter examines the potentially mutually reinforcing relationship between internal governance structures and external mechanisms for modifying corporate behavior.

While external codes and standards such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises appear to be influencing corporate behavior worldwide, quantitative data confirming and recording the extent and nature of this influence (if any) remains limited.

The chapter provides useful insights for policy makers and corporate leaders into the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and external codes, standards and guidelines aimed at influencing corporate behavior.

This chapter provides original insights into whether and how internal governance structures can complement and reinforce social standards regarding global corporate citizenship, and the legal guidelines reflecting those standards.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) and firm performance.

We focus on the political connections of SBs and BODs separately and estimate a quadratic model based on 1,099 Indonesian listed firm-year observations. Additionally, we address endogeneity problem by using sample selection model, generalized method of moments (GMM), propensity score matching\ and lagged variables regression.

We find that political connections of SBs are more significantly associated with firm performance than that of BODs. Furthermore, such an association is not monotonic, in that the relationship declines after a certain level of political connections. We also find that stand-alone firms with political connections perform better than firms belonging to family business groups. Our results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.

This study contributes to the literature by proposing non-linear model to incorporate the rent-seeking and resource dependence arguments. Although previous studies use regression analysis (linear model) and find mixed results on the association between political connections and firm performance, our non-linear model extends our understanding of the relationship between political connections and firm performance. We extend corporate governance literature by examining the role of political supervisory boards in the dual board system and the role of family business group in Indonesia. Several limitations are addressed to interpret all the findings. We use one period of the presidency (SBY-Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) in Indonesia as our sample, but other regimes are not considered. We collect political connection and family business group information based on publicly data available. For politically connected firms, we do not have information whether they obtain connections through ruling parties or not.

Practitioners (such as companies and policymakers) can use our models to consider the level of political connections that can improve corporate’s performance. Additionally, they can use our findings to design corporate governance policies.

The paper identifies the use of the non-linear model on the association between political connections and firm performance in Indonesian dual board system.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic literature review on Shariah governance and Islamic banks.

The literature was searched from Scopus and Web of Science using various queries related to Shariah governance and Islamic banks. Through a screening process, 93 articles were considered fit for the systematic literature review.

The paper provides a systematic review based on different themes, including measurement of Shariah governance in Islamic banks, disclosure of Shariah governance and its determinants, the impact of Shariah governance on performance, risk management and other outcomes of Islamic banks. Finally, issues and challenges of Shariah governance in Islamic banks are discussed, followed by conclusions and recommendations related to future research.

This study is the first of its kind, to the authors’ knowledge, to provide a comprehensive systematic literature on Shariah governance and Islamic banks by exploring different themes and highlighting multiple future avenues of research.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the mediating role of intellectual capital (IC) on the association between corporate governance mechanism (CGM) and the financial efficiency of Islamic banks (Z-score, net investment income and loan to deposit) and verify it through standard mediation in the panel based on interaction.

The data of this study draws from 125 full-fledged Islamic banks and windows from 26 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) over the period of 2009 to 2019. A two-step system generalize method of moment estimation is used to test the hypotheses.

The results underwrite that the inclusion of IC as a mediating variable has influenced positively the corporate governance and financial efficiency of IBs. Besides, only CEO power and Shariah supervisory board positively affect the financial efficiency of IBs. While structural capital and relational capital positively affect the financial efficiency of IBs. Apart from that, results show that the CGM has a significant relationship with the IC value of IBs.

These findings are valuable for policymakers and regulators to set policies to improve CG structure and effective use of IC resources to improve banking efficiency. Additionally, findings might be helpful for the bankers to proficiently use the IC as a premise to plan new strategies to get an upper hand in financial performance.

This study extends and contributes to the current literature by analysing the role of IC along with CG to boost the financial efficiency of banks in OIC countries.

Using the Indonesian setting where the government formally limits the presence of busy commissioners, the authors investigate whether a board containing busy commissioners could be beneficial or detrimental for firm performance.

The authors propose an econometric model focusing on the impact of busy commissioners on the firm's profitability. The authors are also interested in investigating whether the effect is different between small and large firms and between mature and non-mature firms. A sample of 392 Indonesian listed firms from 2014 to 2020 is used in this study.

The authors find a negative association between busyness and performance and this result is robust across different estimations and econometrics strategies. The authors also document that the negative impact of busy directors diminishes particularly in young and small firms. The authors also find that the impact is more pronounced in state-owned firms.

From a firm point of view, the result suggests that the companies should be aware that appointing busy commissioners in the board structure can detriment market-based performance. The listed firms should also understand that busy commissioners are inefficient, especially if these firms are large, mature and state-owned.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study investigating the relation between busy commissioners and performance by considering age, firm size and state-owned firms as a moderator in a sample of Indonesian listed firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Shariah governance mechanisms of takaful insurance and their impact on its financial performance.

The effect of Shariah governance mechanisms on financial performance is analyzed over 2012–2018 on a sample of 11 takaful listed insurances in the Middle East region. Using multiple regression models, four hypotheses addressing Shariah governance mechanisms are tested.

The findings generally reveal that Shariah governance has an impact on the financial performance of takaful insurance. The Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) size, the members’ reputation and their qualifications are the main determinants of financial performance for listed takaful insurance.

This paper includes two main limitations that may affect the accuracy of the finding. First, the results are restricted to the Middle East region and may not be generalized to other regions. Second, the sample is dominated by UAE, i.e. 4 takaful insurances out of 11.

Both Shariah governance and regular governance have an impact on the financial performance of takaful insurance. Yet, the effect of Shariah governance is more robust. To improve its financial performance, takaful insurance should expand the size of the SSB, hiring reputable scholars and recruit doctors in Islamic economics.

This research studies takaful insurance, unlike the majority of other works that have focused on Islamic banks.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of Shariah Advisory Board (SAB), Audit committee (AC) and board of directors (BD) characteristics on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in the MENA region.

The paper employs a quantitative approach, utilizing both ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and panel data analysis (random effects models) to examine the relationship between corporate governance variables and the performance of IBs. The sample consists of 50 IBs from 10 countries, spanning a seven-year period (2010–2016), with the exclusion of the Covid-19 pandemic period. To ensure the robustness of the results, various sensitivity tests were conducted, including pooled regression OLS and subsample analysis based on adhering to the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards.

The study's findings suggest that the size of the SAB and the membership of at least one member of the SAB on the AAOIFI have a notable adverse effect on the performance of IBs. On the other hand, the AC independence has a positive influence on bank performance. However, there was no significant impact observed for AC size, meeting frequency and BD characteristics on bank performance. The research also revealed nuanced relationships between governance variables and bank performance when analyzing the sample based on AAOIFI adoption. Among banks not adhering to AAOIFI standards, SAB size and CEO duality negatively affected return on assets, while AC independence positively impacted it. For AAOIFI-compliant banks, AC independence significantly improved bank performance, whereas AC meetings exhibited a negative effect. Furthermore, there were no significant relationships observed for return on equity among banks not adhering to AAOIFI standards, whereas AAOIFI-compliant banks experienced positive impacts from AC independence. These results offer valuable insights into the intricate connection between governance attributes and bank performance, particularly in the context of AAOIFI standards adoption.

The study's findings have important practical implications for various stakeholders in the Islamic banking industry. For bank practitioners and management, the study highlights the significance of enhancing the independence of AC to improve decision-making and risk management, leading to better bank performance. Moreover, careful selection of SAB members can mitigate potential negative effects on performance. Policymakers may consider promoting AAOIFI standards to shape the relationship between governance and bank performance. Investors can use the insights to make informed decisions, and banks with stronger governance may attract more investments.

Through quantitative analysis and AAOIFI-based sample division, this study adds to the growing literature on corporate governance and the performance of IBs by examining the impact of multiple corporate governance variables on the performance of IBs in the MENA region. To provide a theoretical basis for this relationship, three theories, namely agency, stewardship and stakeholder theories, are employed and discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the way in which CEOs are shielded or rewarded for incurring R&D expenses. Strategic expenses such as R&D yield returns over a long period of time even though GAAP requires them to be written off in the period they are incurred. Going beyond the existing shielding paradigm, the paper investigates whether compensation committees actively reward CEOs for incurring strategic expenses.

The paper uses empirical analysis by using regression analysis with CEO compensation (both cash and equity) as the dependent variable and firm size, firm performance, earnings risk, market‐to‐book ratio, R&D expenses, advertising expenses and governance variables as control, independent and test variables.

The paper shows that CEOs are not only shielded but are actively rewarded for incurring R&D expenses. The paper also shows that the shield/reward effects are stronger in manufacturing firms. Finally, the paper shows that independent compensation committees increase rewards for R&D expenses.

Given the small sample of firms with advertising expense data, a larger sample, possibly using hand‐collected data will be required to arrive at definitive conclusions regarding shielding/rewarding for advertising. Furthermore, the shielding of both R&D and advertising expenses should be looked at in conjunction with the duration of the persistence of benefits of such strategic expenses.

This paper shows how compensation committees can use compensation to induce executives to undertake strategic expenses on behalf of the firm.