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This study aims to investigate the impact of Shari’ah and corporate governance on Islamic banks performance in Asia.

The study uses hand collected data set on Shari’ah and corporate governance variables of 79 Islamic banks of 19 countries of Asia, for the period of 2011-2016. Augmented Mollah et al. (2017) composite corporate governance index into Islamic corporate governance (ICG) index by incorporate Shari’ah board’s (SBs) attributes. Two types of statistical analysis were performed; descriptive statistics, sample t-test and panel random effects regression. The analysis was further sub-sampled by considering the supervisory vs advisory, GCC vs non-GCC and large vs small effects of Shari’ah and corporate boards on Islamic banks performance.

The results of the baseline model reveal that Shari’ah governance-related variables are more influential in determining the financial performance of the Islamic banks. The sub-sampled data findings illustrated some interesting facts. Shari’ah supervisory vs advisory boards regression results show that the ICG index was found significant in both the models. However, when SBs are weak the general board dominates in determining the performance. GCC vs non-GCC results show a relatively good governance in non-GCC countries. While, in case of large vs small Islamic banks, banks having high total assets demonstrates sound governance characteristics.

Independent, large and educated SB can play a significant role in removing the hurdles facing the Islamic banking industry and can also enhance stakeholders’ value.

This study enriches the understanding on Shari’ah governance, corporate governance and financial performance of Islamic banks in Asia.

This chapter summarizes the current practice of shari'ah governance framework of Islamic banking entities (IBEs) in Oman and the challenges faced by such institutions. The Central Bank of Oman (CBO) issued proper shari'ah governance framework enshrined in the Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework of CBO. The shari'ah governance framework shall contain shari'ah supervisory board, internal shari'ah reviewer, shari'ah compliance unit, shari'ah risk unit, and shari'ah audit unit. To strengthen the role of shari'ah, the CBO also issued a regulation for the establishment of High Shari'ah Supervisory Authority in CBO to harmonize opinions related to shari'ah matters among the IBEs. These elements are expected to perform an oversight role on shari'ah matters relating to Islamic banking business activities. This chapter also discusses the issues and challenges faced by IBEs in Oman, and proposed some improvement to the CBO to strengthen shari'ah governance framework in the Sultanate.

This paper aims to examine the impact of Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSBs) on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs). It also tests whether SSBs’ attributes affect the performance of IBs. Based on a sample of 1,803 Islamic bank-year observations from 82 banks in 15 countries over the period 1993-2014 and controlling for factors known to affect bank performance, this study reveals a robust and significant positive relationship between SSBs and Islamic bank performance. This study also shows that the characteristics of SSBs affect the performance of IBs. This research reveals how SSBs influence the performance of IBs, as well as the processes and roles SSBs use to ensure Shari’ah compliance in business transactions.

The purpose of this study design is to relate SSB presence, size and diversity to financial performance using three techniques. The first technique is a multivariate data analysis that analyzes data arising from more than one variable. The second technique is a clustered regression (clustering by bank), which corrects for serial correlation and produces unbiased t-statistics. Because this sample is drawn from panel data, it is expected serial autocorrelation of the independent variables and error term within banks. In cases where within-company correlation exists, t-statistics based on average regression coefficients from year-by-year regression are upwardly biased and potentially severe (Peterson, 2009). Therefore, this study uses a technique that agrees with Stock and Watson (2002), who show that the standard method of calculating heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the fixed-effects estimator generates inconsistent variance estimates. Thus, using the clustered regression is consistent with the fixed-effects estimator. The third technique is a two-stage least-squares regression that helps build an instrumental variable for robustness tests purposes.

The findings suggest that large corporate boards and large SSBs are more efficient in dealing with different monitoring and advisory roles than small SSBs. Consequently, this suggests that increasing the size of corporate boards and SSBs should improve monitoring and advisory functions, management behavior and organizational performance.

It is possible that there is an upper limit to this benefit, however; we do not explore this limit, which therefore provides opportunities for additional research. Because Shari’ah compliance relates only to a rational legal framework of negative screening relegated to interest prohibition and limiting uncertainty. The interest prohibition and limiting uncertainty have not been investigated between the two samples due to data unavailability. In addition, limited accounting-based measures of financial performance may not accurately portray IB performance; hence, an additional market measure is implemented, which is Tobin’s Q.

Ultimately, these findings could help IBs improve their financial results by enhancing their internal and external governance mechanisms (Walsh and Seward, 1990). They provide a basis for developing larger, more diverse SSBs that are more focused on complying with Shari’ah and corporate governance. The results also have significant policy implications for improving firm-level corporate governance versus improving country-level institutional factors. Both views have their advocates. However, it is very difficult to reform the legal system in a short time. Still, this study shows that struggling IBs have a way to improve their corporate governance and simultaneously improve their financing environment.

This research contributes to the literature on the effects of SSBs on IBs’ organizational financial performance, processes and roles. It is the first to examine empirically the underpinnings of how SSBs affect organizational financial performance via agency theory and contingency theory.

This chapter aims to explore and examine the extent of Islamic corporate governance practices in 35 Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) in Malaysia, Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the United Kingdom, particularly in its six major areas, namely approaches to Islamic governance, regulatory framework and internal policies, roles and functions of shari’ah board, attributes of shari’ah board members on independence, competency and transparency, and confidentiality, operational procedures and perception of IFIs of the shari’ah board’s performance. A questionnaire was developed by benefiting from the Islamic corporate governance standards identified by International Financial Services Board and Accounting and Auditing Organization for IFIs, which included mainly about 50 standards with sub-sections as questions. The study demonstrates the state of Islamic corporate governance practices in these countries. The survey findings affirm that there are significant differences and diverse Islamic governance practices amongst IFIs in the case countries. The study hence provides evidence that there are shortcomings and weaknesses to the existing governance framework, which needs further enhancement and improvement.

The prime difference between conventional and Islamic financial institutions (IFIs)is the compliance with shari'ah. Hence, shari'ah is a very crucial pillar, rather a main pillar of Islamic finance. In order to ensure shari'ah compliance by the IFIs at all levels, central banks of different countries crafted and implemented shari'ah governance framework. This chapter focusses on the cross-country comparison of shari'ah governance framework. The countries included in this chapter are Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Bahrain. The result shows that Malaysia and Pakistan are leading in terms of comprehensive shari'ah governance framework whereas Bahrain comes next and the United Kingdom is the last in terms of comparison.

The purpose of this paper is to understand current Shari'ah governance practices with the purpose of promoting greater understanding of some of the crucial issues and to provide relevant information in guiding the future development of Shari'ah governance system. The paper illustrates the state of Shari'ah governance practices in Malaysia, GCC countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and the UK by highlighting five main elements of good corporate governance that consist of independence, competency, transparency, disclosure and consistency.

Since the availability of secondary data on Shari'ah governance practices is very limited, a detailed survey questionnaire is generated for sourcing primary data from Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). The study utilizes descriptive analysis approach in extracting and analyzing the data and factual input derived from the questionnaire feedback.

The survey findings affirm that there are significant differences and diverse Shari'ah governance practices in the case countries. This position acknowledges that there are shortcomings and weaknesses to the existing governance framework which needs further enhancement and improvement.

The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in guiding the future development of Shari'ah governance practices in IFIs.

This paper provides fresh data and recent information on the actual Shari'ah governance practices of IFIs in three jurisdictions.

The paper aims to contribute to the discussion on Shari'ah governance systems by examining the extent of disclosure on the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) as well as the content of the Board's report in the annual reports of 23 Islamic banks in Malaysia and Indonesia. The paper also investigates the disclosures about zakat (Islamic levy).

The study is a cross-sectional analysis of annual report disclosures in the year 2009. The paper uses both disclosure indices and content analysis to measure the extent of disclosures about SSB and zakat. The paper also tests hypotheses examining the relationship between SSB characteristics and the extent of the SSB-related and zakat disclosures.

The results indicate that SSB-related and zakat disclosures are still limited, with only four banks disclosing more than half of the SSB Index. What is noticeable is the low level of disclosure on sensitive matters. Among the factors associated with SSB-related disclosures are cross-membership with other SSBs and the expertise of SSB members in accounting, banking, economics or finance

Originality/value

The study is the first to provide an in-depth analysis of Shari'ah disclosures in Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic banks. As such, this study makes an important contribution to the debate on Shari'ah governance systems and has implications for regulators and standard setters. The Malaysian and Indonesian standard setters could play an important role in ascertaining appropriate disclosure requirements relating to the SSB as the study suggests that the level of disclosure is less than expected. The evidence also suggests the need for mandatory enforcement of standards on these types of disclosures.

The most crucial challenge facing Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) is the full compliance of their activities with shari'ah principles. The complexity of IFIs requires Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK, Indonesian Financial Services Authority) to adopt a good shari'ah governance framework to address shari'ah risks of Islamic banking and financial institutions (IBFIs). However, the current shari'ah governance structure in Indonesia is far from ideal compared to the international best practice. This chapter proposes a new shari'ah governance framework by involving shari'ah supervisory board authority (Otoritas Dewan Pengawas Syariah) under the commissioners of OJK to oversight, regulate, and supervise the shari'ah matters for IBFIs in Indonesia. The chapter discusses the challenges in adopting this new framework. The chapter concludes that the current shortcomings of the proper shari'ah governance framework for shari'ah supervision and regulation requires a new shari'ah board authority under the commissioners of OJK who has full authority over shari'ah matters.

This chapter highlights the variations of agency theory in the unique and complex context of Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. The results provide an insight into agency structures in the context of Islamic banking that may lead to trade-offs between shari'ah compliance and mechanisms for protecting the rights of investors. This empirical study finds that most of the surveyed Islamic banks appear to recognize the value of governance and have implemented some basic mechanisms. Certain flaws in governance pertaining to audit, control, and transparency were also noted. The situation gets worse in cases where the investment account holders do not have any representation on the board or any voice for control or monetary rights. Other peculiar models balancing the two key requirements may be effective regarding agency dynamics. This study should motivate the policy makers to tailor the regulations to safeguard the interests of all investors without violating the principles of shari'ah.